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Preface  
The Recovery Partnership is the City of Chicago’s collaboration with the Chicago philanthropic 
community to secure funding and provide strategic guidance in allocating funds from the 
American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA) of 2009.  The Partnership sought assistance 
in conducting an evaluation of the impacts of ARRA funding in Chicago, and this report presents 
the work of the Harris School students who conducted this evaluation.  Through the Harris 
School’s policy practicum program, graduate students in public policy worked on this project 
under the guidance of James H. Lewis, Senior Program Manager at the Chicago Community 
Trust; Alexander Gail Sherman of the Civic Consulting Alliance; and Paula R. Worthington, 
Senior Lecturer at the Harris School of Public Policy Studies. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 5 
 
Executive Summary 
 
From 2009 – 2011, the City of Chicago and Cook County received a total of $2.35 billion 
in funding provided by the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act [ARRA].  The stimulus 
money was allocated to seven areas: education, basic needs, transportation & infrastructure, 
housing & energy, public safety, broadband and workforce development. The Chicago Recovery 
Partnership Evaluation of ARRA analyzes the impact of the stimulus spending using a cost-
benefit analysis framework.  This report evaluated $1.09 billion of total spending in Chicago and 
Cook County, resulting in net benefits ranging from -$173.9 to $2,740.2 million.  The wide range 
in net benefits is attributed largely to education, which received over half of ARRA funding.   
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Introduction 
 
In February 2009, the United States Congress enacted the American Recovery and 
Reinvestment Act (ARRA) as a response to the recession that began in December 2007. The 
stimulus package was intended to create jobs and promote investment and consumer spending. 
All the interventions (tax incentives, expansion in unemployment benefits and welfare programs, 
and spending in education, health care, infrastructure, etc.) amounted to $787 billion in stimulus 
investments.  The City of Chicago created strategy teams in seven specific areas: education, 
basic needs, transportation & infrastructure, housing & energy, public safety, broadband and 
workforce development to obtain and effectively disburse the available funds. In total, the City 
of Chicago and Cook County received $2.35 billion in funding, from which $468 million were 
awarded competitively. Chicago received the second highest level of ARRA funding of all U.S. 
cities.  
In April 2009, Mayor Richard Daley invited Chicago-based foundations to join the city in 
establishing the Recovery Partnership. The City of Chicago has partnered with the Chicago 
Community Trust and Civic Consulting Alliance to organize, staff, and manage the recovery 
efforts. As a part of ongoing efforts to increase transparency in policy making, the Recovery 
Partnership wished to examine the effects of ARRA in Chicago through a large-scale cost-
benefit analysis. This report contains cost-benefit analyses on programs totaling $1.09 billion of 
funding in six categories (excluding broadband). Each of these six sections tracks ARRA 
spending for its specific area, provides a thorough literature review, outlines the cost-benefit 
methodology, and summarizes the net value derived from the programs’ implementation.  
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Chapter 1. Basic Needs 
 
1. Introduction 
  
1.1. Education 
 
The American Recovery and Reinvestment Act allocated funds via grants to Education 
programs that totaled more than $869 million. The funds were allocated to the following eight 
programs: Head Start, Title I funds, McKinney-Vento Homeless Education, National School 
Lunch Assistance, State Fiscal Stabilization Fund (SFSF) in 2009 and 2010, IDEA fund and 
Teacher Incentive fund. 
According to the City of Chicago’s Recovery website, stimulus money related to 
education would be used with the goal of: “Promoting innovation and excellence, recruiting, 
preparing, and rewarding outstanding teachers, encouraging better standards and assessments and 
investing in early childhood initiatives and college and career preparedness”. This also included 
funding teachers’ salaries and expanding coverage of existing programs like Head Start. 
The largest percentages of funds were SFSF funds. SFSF is a one-time allocation of 
$53.6 billion from the federal government to states under ARRA.  The funds are appropriated 
through two types of block grants to that are: 1) earmarked for education; 2) other governmental 
services.  States have significant autonomy in how they distribute funds to their state and local 
education budgets, with a general goal in mind: keep budgets for K-12 and higher education 
from dropping below FY2006 levels. The Chicago Public School system was allocated $261.05 
million in FY2009, and $166.72 in FY2010.  While no jobs were “created” using this funding, a 
high percentage of these funds were dedicated to paying teacher salaries in order to prevent 
layoffs.   
Title I, Part A funds constituted the second largest amount. The ARRA provided the 
Illinois State Board of Education with an allocation for Title I Part A of $420.15 million in 
addition to the regular Title I appropriations for FY2010. The Chicago Public School system was 
awarded $261.61 million out of the total allocation for Illinois.  Specific programs and projects 
to be funded in Chicago include: teacher support and professional development, parental 
involvement programs, administrative costs, additional after school programming and one-on-
one tutoring, pre-K and early education programs, technology to drive student achievement, 
college and career preparedness.  
IDEA, Part B funding for Preschool and Special Education Flow Through was $119.2 
million, making it the third largest program funded by the ARRA in Education. Preschool 
funding provides grants to States, to provide special education and related services for children 
with disabilities aged 3 through 5. States may include children experiencing developmental 
delays and 2-year olds who will turn 3 during the school year. Funding under the Preschool 
Grants program supports early childhood programs that provide services needed to prepare 
young children with disabilities to enter school ready to learn. According to the US Department 
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of Education (2010b) Special Education Flow Through funding provide grants to ensure a free, 
appropriate public education for children with disabilities that meets challenging standards and 
prepares them for higher education, employment, and independent living.   
The Teacher Inventive Fund received $42.2 million in ARRA funds. The program’s goals 
include: “improving student achievement by increasing teacher and principal effectiveness, 
reforming teacher and principal compensation systems so that teachers and principals are 
rewarded for increases in student achievement, increasing the number of effective teachers 
teaching poor, minority, and disadvantaged students in hard-to-staff subjects and creating 
sustainable performance-based compensation systems” (US Department of Education, 2010). 
The other two programs funded were the National School Lunch Program Assistance 
($1.5 million) and the McKinney-Vento for Homeless Children and Youth ($1.1 million). The 
goal of the School Lunch Program is for children to have access to nutritional food, helping them 
thrive in the classroom and in life. McKinney-Vento program provides services to homeless 
children to ensure they continue attending school.   
Given the variety of programs we chose to focus our analysis on evaluating the impact of 
SFSF and Title one funds dedicated to pay for teachers’ salaries, and thus prevent teachers’ 
layoffs, due to the large percentage these funds represent from the total ARRA funds dedicated 
to Education. 
 
1.2. Basic Needs 
 
The goal of providing funding for Basic Needs, Health and Human Services, was to 
improve the quality of life for those residents of Chicago who need it most. With a focus on the 
homeless, children and low-income individuals and families the funding was dedicated to 
programs that focused on these communities. 
The stated goals of the Basic Needs group as found on the City of Chicago website are1:  
• Expansion of services for children through additional slots in Head Start, Early Head Start 
and Child Care Assistance Program  
• Expansion of services for youth through summer employment opportunities, scholarships, 
engagement of homeless youth; and case management, substance abuse and mental health 
services for youth involved in the criminal justice system  
• Expansion of services for low income residents, including the homeless, through housing 
placement and stabilization, public benefits outreach and enrollment, counseling and case 
management, substance abuse and mental health services, and targeted outreach to the 
chronically homeless  
• Expansion of workforce development services including targeted services for veterans, 
homeless persons, and expanded service delivery at Community Service Centers                                                          
1 "City of Chicago :: Basic Needs (Health & Human Services)." City of Chicago. Web. 28 March 2011. 
<http://www.cityofchicago.org/city/en/progs/recovery_reinvest/education3.html> 
 9 
• Expansion of Services for seniors through nutrition and job training programs  
• Stimulating the local economy through the creation of jobs in the human services sector  
The Chicago Recovery Partnership report of October 2010 reports that almost $70 million 
dollars was awarded to the Basic Needs group, with $90 million being requested.2 The programs 
receiving the largest amounts of funds were Homeless Prevention and Rapid Re-Housing, Head 
Start/Early Head Start, Community Services Block Grants, and Immunizations.  
The programs the basic needs team focused on for analysis were Homelessness Prevention 
and the Head Start/Early Head Start program. These programs were chosen because they 
received significant amounts of money and/or were of specific interest to the team based on their 
potential for producing high-impact results. The funding for these programs would not have 
existed were it not for the ARRA grants, receiving these funds allowed the City of Chicago to 
explore and test the viability of these programs without risking a loss of existing city funds. 
 
1.2.1. Homeless prevention 
 
The Homeless Prevention and Rapid ReHousing Program is administered through the 
U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD).  Approximately $34 million was 
awarded to the City of Chicago to provide financial assistance and services to families that are 
homeless or are at risk of becoming homeless. Of the total funds awarded, $23 million are 
dedicated to providing direct financial assistance to Chicago residents and will be used to 
provide short and medium term rental assistance, security deposits, utility payments, moving 
assistance, and motel vouchers. The remaining $9 million have been set aside for housing 
relocation and stabilization services that include case management, outreach, housing search and 
placement, legal services, mediation and credit repair. 
To measure the impact of the $34 million spent on Homeless Prevention and Rapid Re-
Housing, our team collaborated with the Emergency Fund, a non-profit whose mission is to 
provide immediate financial assistance to help low-income individuals and families through a 
crisis or transition. The Emergency Fund was the largest recipient of ARRA funding for 
Homeless Prevention and Rapid ReHousing receiving $24 million dollars, of which $23 was 
dedicated to direct financial assistance.  
The Emergency Fund will be distributing the ARRA funds over a period of three-years to 
individuals and families at risk of becoming homeless. This is a short-term program, and all 
people who enter it must be willing and eventually able to pay for their unit when the assistance 
ends, as this is not a subsidized housing program. 
 
1.2.2.Head Start Early Head Start                                                         
2 "Recovery Partnership Final Report." City of Chicago :: Recovery and Reinvestment (Stimulus). Web. 
22 May 2011. 
<http://recovery.cityofchicago.org/etc/medialib/stimulus_site/pdf_s/stimulus_scorecard.Par.36329.File.da
t/RecoveryPartnershipFinalReportNov2010.pdf>. 
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We evaluated Head Start funds dedicated to expansion of coverage due to critical role 
early childhood education plays in the future success of disadvantaged children. Three types of 
ARRA funding, totaling $16.4 million, were allocated for Head Start and Early Head Start: 
Expansion, Quality Improvement (QI) and Cost-of-Living Adjustment (COLA). The goal of the 
Expansion funding ($7.8 million) was to provide 590 low-income families and their children up 
to age 5 with early childhood education and other support services. QI funding would mainly 
provide greater professional development resources for teachers while COLA funding would 
provide cost of living increases for Head Start/Early Head Start staff. QI and COLA funding 
amounted to $8.6 million. A much smaller amount of funding, $225 thousand, was awarded to 
provide technical assistance for these programs. 
 
Title I & SFSF Funds 
2. Literature Review 
 
Title I and the State Fiscal Stabilization Funds (SFSF) make up a substantial amount of 
the total the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA) funds allocated to education, 
together totaling $688.38 million.  Both grants are vast in scope and the states have substantial 
flexibility about where to spend the money.  A Report to Congress by the Government 
Accountability Office (GAO) in December 2009 reports that about 60 percent of the State Fiscal 
Stabilization Funds allocated to Illinois was intended to pay teacher salaries in order to prevent 
teacher layoffs.  The GAO report estimated that approximately 15 percent of Title I ARRA 
funding would be spent on teacher salaries.  With those assumptions in mind, we chose to focus 
first on determining the costs and benefits associated with the 60 percent of SFSF and 15 percent 
of Title I funds that went to pay teacher salaries.   
The ARRA funding that infused the Chicago Public Schools (CPS) budget prevented 
major layoffs throughout the district.  Without these funds, CPS would have had far fewer 
teachers for the same number of students, pushing up classroom size significantly.  The Chicago 
Defender predicted on June 9, 2010, that putting teachers out of work to close the budget gap 
could result in a 20 percent increase in class size (Hutson 2010). A review of the State’s 
legislation and Chicago Public School’s Policies regarding teachers’ layoff shows that layoffs are 
decided based on seniority of teacher, making the possible effects of a reduction in funds on 
class sizes stronger. 
A wide range of estimates have been made about the effect of class size on student 
outcomes such as test scores, other achievement measures, and earnings. In November of 2000, 
economist Caroline Hoxby published the study, “The Effects of Class Size on Student 
Achievement: New Evidence from Population Variation.”  She performed an econometric 
analysis of classes in 649 elementary schools in Connecticut.  She used longitudinal data to 
smooth population variation, and looked at jumps in class size as a result of maximum or 
minimum class size rule changes.  She measured student outcomes by using the log of 
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standardized tests.  Her estimates lead her to conclude that class size does not have any 
statistically significant effect on student achievement (Hoxby 2000).   
Many less conclusive studies have shown mixed results for class size on student 
outcomes.  Joshua Angrist and Victor Lavy used the twelfth century rabbinical scholar 
Maimonides’ “rule of 40” to create an IV to consider the effect of class size.  Maimonides’ 
assumption that the class sizes should not exceed 40 students per teacher is important because 
Israeli education policy has been shaped by the belief (Angrist and Lavy 533).  The 40 person 
maximum induces a non linear and non-monotonic relationship between Israeli public school 
class size (Angrist and Lavy 533).  The statistical model developed on the 40-student maximum 
inference estimates that reductions in class size are correlated with significant and substantial 
gains in math and reading achievement for fifth graders, modest improvements for fourth 
graders, and little improvement for third graders (Angrist and Lavy 569).   
A paper published in January 2011 evaluates the long-term impacts of Project STAR, a 
random control trial experiment performed in Tennessee to determine effects of class size and 
teacher quality on student outcomes.  The paper specifically links the long term effects on 
earnings for STAR participants and an analysis of variance shows that increased test scores in 
kindergarten have a significant effect on earnings at age 27 (Chetty et al).  The study uses 
administrative data from tax returns to link class size to kindergarten test scores to earned wages 
in adulthood (Chetty et al).  Thus, the paper associates interventions that increase test scores 
(namely, reduced class size and improved teacher quality) with the increase in adult wages 
(Chetty et al 2).  Another study of Project Star (Krueger 2002) examines the effects of Class Size 
on Student Achievement performing an analysis of the existing literature and a Cost – Benefit 
Analysis of class size reduction. Using this data we were able to estimate how wages were 
affected by class size so that we could monetize the potential benefits that Title I and SFSF funds 
will produce by preventing teacher layoffs. 
 
3. Cost-Benefit Analysis Methodology 
 
A key impact measure of class size is students’ educational achievement, which is 
directly correlated with students’ lifetime earnings. Therefore, we endeavored to assess how the 
ARRA funds dedicated to these two programs may have affected these measures.  
Evidence strongly suggests that CPS would have been forced to lay off teachers and 
increase the number of pupils per classroom had it not received these funds. (Hutson 2010)  A 
report by the Government Accountability Office indicates that about 15% of Title I ARRA funds 
and about 60% of SFSF ARRA funds were used towards teachers’ salaries in Illinois (see Annex 
1). Based on these figures we estimated that $175.67 million in ARRA funds were used for 
teachers’ salaries (See Table 1).  
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Table 1. Overview of ARRA Funding Used Toward Teacher Salaries 
 
We investigated the current number of teachers and students in CPS in 2009 to estimate 
the impact that not receiving ARRA funds would have had on class size. In 2009, CPS had 
409,279 students and 21,320 teachers, for an average ratio of 19.2 teachers for every student 
(Chicago Public Schools 2010). Based on salary and benefits data, we then estimate that the 
average annual salary of a CPS teacher is $75,000 and the annual benefits package is $25,000, 
for a total cost of $100,000 per teacher (Chicago Public Schools). However since teachers are 
laid off based on seniority (Illinois General Assembly), and as a result teachers with lower than 
average salaries must be dismissed first, we decided to evaluate three different cost scenarios. 
We then calculated how many teachers CPS would have laid off had they not received ARRA 
funds by dividing the cost of a teacher in each scenario into the $175.67 million in ARRA funds 
used for teachers’ salaries. 
Without ARRA funds the total number of CPS teachers would have increased the 
student-teacher ratio as shown in the following table:  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Program Total 2009-
2011 ARRA 
Funding 
Received 
(Millions)1 
FY 2009 
ARRA 
funding 
% Allocated to 
Teacher 
Salaries to 
Prevent 
Layoffs 
Annual Funding 
to Teacher’s 
Salaries* 
(Millions) 
Title I $261.61 $130.8 
(Assume 
50% spent 
each year) 
15% $19.62 
SFSF $426.77 $260.05 60% $156.04 
TOTAL $688.38 $390.87 44.9% $175.67 
*For the purposes of this cost benefit analysis, we assume the same total dollars are spent on teachers’ 
salaries in both FY 2009 and FY 2010, despite an overall decline in SFSF ARRA funds in FY 2010 relative 
to FY 2009. 
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Table 2. Effect of ARRA Funds on Student-Teacher Ratio 
 
The evidence of impact of class size on achievement is not conclusive, with some 
researchers purporting that class size differences have no influence on students’ educational 
achievement or other long-term outcomes3 and some purporting it does.4 5Given this, we decided 
to look at a range of potential outcomes, with Hoxby’s (2000) research as the “floor” estimate, 
Chetty et al’s (2010) Project STAR research as a medium estimate and Krueger (2007) as the 
“ceiling” estimate. 
  
Table 3. How does class size affect student outcomes? 
 
One important point to consider is that prior research in the field has investigated the 
impact of decreasing class size, whereas our intention is to understand the impact of preventing 
an increase in class size. Despite this difference, for our purposes, we assumed that the impact 
would be the same.  
We then estimated income gains per student for all our cost scenarios and impact levels. 
To do so we first estimated earnings for all students given the impact found in the studies used. 
Since Project STAR research was based on three years of reduced class size and our analysis of 
ARRA only on two and assuming that each year of reduced class size has an equal impact on 
students’ lifetime earnings we then adjusted those earnings to reflect the actual timeframe (2/3). 
Finally since class size could have varied without ARRA funds at different levels than those in                                                         
3 (Hoxby, 2000) 
4 (Chetty,  R, et al, 2010) 
5 (Krueger, 2002) 
  Scenario 1 Scenario 2 Scenario 3 
Annual salary of a CPS teacher  $75,0001 $60,000 $45,000 
Benefits $25,0002 $20,000 $15,000 
Total $100,000 $80,000 $60,000 
ARRA funds $175,670,000 $175,670,000 $175,670,000 
# teachers funded 1,757 2,196 2,928 
# of teachers in 2009 w/ARRA 21,320 21,320 21,320 
# of teachers in 2009 w/o ARRA 19,563 19,124 18,392 
# of CPS students 409,279 409,279 409,279 
# students per teacher w/ARRA 19.20 19.20 19.20 
# students per teacher w/o ARRA 20.92 21.40 22.25 
Increase in class size 8.98% 11.48% 15.92%  
                                                              
No Effect Medium Effect High Effect 
$0 
 
(Caroline Hoxby) 
A 33% decrease in class 
size is associated with a 
$9,460  income gain (PV) 
 
(2011 Chetty et al, Project 
STAR) 
A 31.8% decrease in class 
size is associated with a 
$20,937  income gain (PV) 
 
(2002 Alan Krueger, Project 
STAR)  
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the studies chosen, we adjusted earnings to reflect the real class size change. The estimate found 
reflected the total benefits of Title I and SFSF funds dedicated to teacher’s salaries; when 
divided by the total number of CPS student we got the income gain per student due to ARRA. 
Finally, we performed a Cost Benefit Analysis of the program, using as cost the total 
amount of funds allocated by ARRA to Tile I and SFSF and the estimated benefits from our 
analysis. 
 
4. Cost-Benefit Analysis Results 
 
Table 4. Income Gain per Student 
 
As stated in Table 2, Scenarios 1, 2 and 3 represent class size increase prevented given 
our three salary levels. Scenario 1 explores income gains per student using a prevented a class 
size increase of 8.98%, Scenario 2 of 11.48% and Scenario 3 of 15.92%. No, Medium and High 
effect are based on the findings of Hoxby (2000), Chetty et al. (2010) and Krueger (2002) as 
stated in Table 3. We estimated that income gains per student range from $0 to $6,666 depending 
on amount of class increase prevented.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Income gain per 
student Scenario 1 Scenario 2 Scenario 3 
No effect $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 
Medium effect $1,716.18 $2,193.96 $3,042.49 
High effect $3,759.87 $4,806.60 $6,665.60  
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Table 5. Net Benefits and Benefit-Cost Ratio 
 
 
Net Benefits range from a loss of $688.4 million, if we believe that Class size has no 
impact on student achievement and future wages, as Hoxby (2000) proposes, to a gain of $2.03 
billion for a scenario that assumes a higher impact of class size on achievement.  It is important 
to note that even medium impacts have significant Net Benefits.  
 
Early Head Start & Head Start 
2. Literature Review - Early Childhood Education 
 
Over the past several decades, the fields of developmental psychology, demography, 
sociology, economics, and neurobiology have produced a significant amount of research on the 
importance of positive, stimulating early experiences and environments for the long-term 
cognitive and social development and mental health of children.  
Recently, neuroscience researchers have discovered “sensitive periods” early in human’s 
lives when the brain’s circuitry demonstrates the most malleability in response to experiences 
(Knudsen et al 2006). As a result, we now have evidence that early experiences play a more 
significant role in shaping children’s temperament, social development, perceptual and cognitive 
abilities – the general foundation for future productivity – than comparable experiences later in 
life (Knudsen et al 2006). Social and emotional difficulties that onset in the first five years of life 
CBA Scenario 1 (8.98%) 
Estimate Cost Benefit Net Benefits Benefit-Cost Ratio (Millions) (Millions) (Millions) 
No effect $688.38  $0.00  ($688.38) 0 
Medium $688.38  $702.40  $14.02  1.020 
High $688.38  $1,538.83  $850.45  2.235 
     
CBA Scenario 2 (11.48%) 
Estimate Cost Benefit Net Benefits Benefit-Cost Ratio (Millions) (Millions) (Millions) 
No effect $688.38  $0.00  ($688.38) 0 
Medium $688.38  $897.94  $209.56  1.304 
High $688.38  $1,967.24  $1,278.86  2.858 
     
CBA Scenario 3 (15.92%) 
Estimate Cost Benefit Net Benefits Benefit-Cost Ratio (Millions) (Millions) (Millions) 
No effect $688.38  $0.00  ($688.38) 0 
Medium $688.38  $1,245.23  $556.85  1.809 
High $688.38  $2,728.09  $2,039.71  3.963  
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have been linked to negative effects on school achievement and peer relationships in later 
childhood (Breitenstein et al 2007). Other studies show that children who attend preschool are 
more likely than their counterparts to perform favorably in the early elementary grades and, 
ultimately, to achieve more desirable outcomes at age 19 (Berrueta-Clement et al 1984). A study 
of the Chicago Child-Parent Centers found evidence that the program: 1) decreased expenditures 
on school and remedial services, criminal justice system services for youth and adult crime; 2) 
reduced costs of child care, child welfare services, and college tuition; and 3) increased  lifetime 
earnings. (Reynolds et al 2002) 
However, many low-income families lack the necessary resources to invest money or 
quality time in their children. And many of these families are plagued by other stressors (e.g., 
poor neighborhood safety, unstable employment, substance or domestic abuse,), or are 
vulnerable in other ways (e.g., single, teen, mentally ill and/or developmentally-delayed parents), 
that may reduce the priority that these parents place on their child’s early learning (DeLuca and 
Rosenblatt, forthcoming). For these at-risk families, early childcare programs are essential in 
enhancing their children’s intelligence, language skills, and school readiness (Ramey & Ramey 
2004).  
Two-generation programs have been found to have the potential to maximize the benefits 
of early intervention programs by providing supports to low-income parents while concurrently 
addressing the developmental needs of their children. Two of the largest and most prominent 
two-generation programs are administered by the U.S. Department of Health and Human 
Services: Head Start and Early Head Start. While program providers have a great deal of 
discretion in the development of their program models, all are required to provide “high-quality, 
comprehensive child development services, delivered through home visits, child care, case 
management, parenting education, health care and referrals and family support.” (Love et al 
2005). In 2009, these programs served over 900,000 economically disadvantaged children and 
families, at an average cost of $7,600 per child (US Department of Health and Human Services 
2010b). 
The Head Start program was created in 1965, and focuses on school readiness by 
“enhancing the social and cognitive development of children through the provision of 
educational, health, nutritional, social and other services to enrolled children and families” (US 
Department of Health and Human Services 2010a). The program strives to promote parents’ 
engagement in their children's learning and aid them in making progress toward their own goals.  
Studies have found continued benefits from Head Start participation on children 
participating, including improved test scores, less grade repetition, and lower special education 
placement rates (Ramey & Ramey 2004). Others have found evidence that Head Start reduces 
childhood obesity. However, the average demonstrated effects of participation on children’s 
achievement and school progress are smaller than those yielded by participation in the “model” 
preschool programs (like Abecedarian and the Perry Preschool Project) that informed Head 
Start’s creation (Barnett 2002). This result is not surprising given Head Start’s much lower per 
child funding relative to the model programs, its wide variety of models and approaches, and the 
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much larger population it serves. A 2010 study by the Department of Health and Human Services 
(Westat 2010) reports that the quality of Head Start centers is variable, with no centers rated as 
“poor,” only a few centers rated as “excellent”, and the remainder being of a middling quality 
level (“Understanding the Head Start Impact Study” 2010).  Additionally, some studies on the 
Head Start preschool program suggest that gains made in low-income children’s cognitive ability 
and school achievement begin to disappear after a few years if additional supports are not 
continued after kindergarten entry (Lee and Loeb 1995). 
It is difficult to quantify how cognitive and noncognitive skills of young children 
translate into long-term life outcomes. Ludwig and Phillips (2008) assess the body of research on 
this topic, and come to the conclusion that the best available evidence suggests that Head Start 
does produce long-term benefits that outweigh its costs. They look at work by Garces, Thomas, 
and Currie who attempted to remove self-selection bias and control for any other unmeasured 
family attributes that could confound a comparison of Head Start participants to non-participants, 
by comparing outcomes for program participants relative to siblings that did not participate. 
Garces et al found that Head Start attendance was associated with significant improvements in 
educational outcomes for whites, and reduced reported criminal activity among African-
Americans (Ludwig and Phillips 2008) 
Ludwig and Phillips (2008) also analyze the 2010 Department of Health and Human 
Services Head Start National Impact Study by Westat. Their analysis finds that all cognitive 
skills effect estimates point in the right direction (focusing on treatment on the treated) although 
they are not statistically significant. Ludwig and Phillips claim this is likely due to measurement 
error as a result of poor reliability of assessment criterion (particularly for noncognitive abilities). 
When evaluating pooled estimates of outcomes for three and four year olds, they do find 
statistically significant cognitive outcomes.  
The Westat study (Westat 2010) is arguably the most rigorous evaluation of the Head 
Start program to date.  This report to HHS assessed differences in cognitive development, social-
emotional development, and health status and services for children participating in Head Start (at 
age three or at age four) relative to very similar children ( a control group) who did not 
participate in Head Start. It also investigated parenting practices and the quality of the Head Start 
programs themselves. Compared to the control group, the study found that children who attended 
Head Start programs had higher-quality early care and education environments, including teacher 
qualification, classroom literacy and math instructional activities, teacher-child ratios, the nature 
of teacher-child interactions, and others. At the end of the Head Start year, both the three- and 
four-year-old Head Start cohorts demonstrated better literacy and language abilities than their 
counterparts, and were more likely to have received dental care. Three-year-olds were also found 
to have stronger pre-writing and more advanced math skills than their control group at the end of 
the Head Start year, and also showed less hyperactive and problem behavior. Parenting practices 
and parent-child relationships were also healthier for the three-year-old cohort compared to their 
counterparts.  
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However, the Westat Head Start Impact Study (2010) found that most Head Start benefits 
had disappeared by the end of first grade. The few differences that remained at the end of 1st 
grade for the four-year old cohort included increased receipt of health insurance, less withdrawn 
behavior, and better receptive vocabulary. The three-year old cohort maintained benefits in oral 
comprehension, parenting practices and social-emotional development. Thus, one key takeaway 
from this research is that, as purported by neurobiological and economic research, earlier 
childhood interventions appear to be more effective than later ones. It also indicates that 
changing parenting practices sooner may result in improvements in children’s behavior and 
longer-term outcomes (as behavior is tied to long-term academic success). 
Several issues with Westat’s research methodology may have led to underestimation of 
the true effects of Head Start. First, 60% of the children not participating in Head Start 
participated in non-parental childcare or early education programs. In fact, the Head Start non-
participants actually spent more hours per week in non-parental care, on average, than the Head 
Start participants did. Additionally, about 15 percent of the control group children did end up 
receiving Head Start services, while not all children selected to enroll in Head Start did so, 
making it even less likely that significant differences between the control group and the Head 
Start group would arise. Thus, the fact that any positive outcomes were found for Head Start 
participants relative to non-participants is impressive. Also, the study did not assess the impact of 
variation in program quality on program outcomes. The researchers found that 70 percent of 
Head Start programs were rated as having a “good” or “better” quality environment and only 60 
percent of the programs provided an emphasis on language, literacy, and math activities. Finally, 
the social-emotional and health outcomes were not robustly measured, as they were based on 
parent and teacher self-reports, and hence were subjective (Westat 2010). 
Another major concern posed by researchers is that the long-term benefits of Head Start 
can be identified only for those children who participated in its first few decades of operation, 
and studies of long-term benefits may not be relevant if effects of Head Start may be changing 
over time (more preschool options now than previously). Given these caveats, Ludwig and 
Phillips postulate that Head Start might pass a cost-benefit test if the short-term effects on 
achievement test scores were as small as 0.1-0.2 standard deviations (assuming current average 
Head Start costs of around $9,000 per child) (Ludwig and Phillips 2008) and that its benefit-cost 
ratio could be comparable to those in the model program.   
The Early Head Start program was established much more recently, in 1995. Early Head 
Start (EHS) endeavors to provide high-quality child and family development services to low-
income pregnant women and families with children ages three and under. The program promotes 
healthy prenatal behavior and family functioning to enhance the development of infants and 
toddlers (“About the Office of Head Start” 2010). EHS allows each community to design the 
program to best meet the needs of its low-income families.  
Little longitudinal research has been done on the Early Head Start program to date. The 
research available shows that EHS programs that provide a mix of in-home and center-based 
services produced more significant impacts on a wide range of child and parent incomes, 
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including: increased children’s higher cognitive and language function, which may reduce 
likelihood of needing remedial services upon school entry; reduced early aggressive behavior in 
children, which lessens the risk of later behavior problems and difficulty in school achievement; 
and improved home environments, which support children’s learning and development when 
children are not in child care (Love et al 2005).  
 
3. Cost-Benefit Analysis Methodology 
 
3.1. Early Head Start & Head Start - Early Childhood Education 
 
We performed a basic Cost Benefit analysis of funds allocated to Head Start and Early 
Head Start expansion. We decided to focus only on those funds because they could be linked to a 
specific amount of students to be served. 
We take as cost the funds awarded by ARRA to the expansion of services. According to 
the City of Chicago, this amounts to $7.8 million. In our analysis we will not include the 
additional cost to the government of providing schooling to those students who would have 
dropped out had they not been in the program. 
To estimate benefits we reviewed the literature and found impacts (in percentages) in 
Treatment versus Control groups due to attending other early childhood programs that have 
served as models for Head Start and Early Head Start. We acknowledge that model programs 
vary in size, scope and curriculum so the results of Head Start will not match the exact results of 
these programs but they can give a general idea of a ceiling impacts might have in the long run. 
Evidence has shown that early childhood education does have an impact on students’ outcomes, 
so we will assume there is not a No Impact scenario.  
The Expansion had a goal of serving 590 additional children in the City of Chicago. To 
estimate the impacts on these children based on the literature findings we took impact measures 
from both HighScope/ Perry Preschool and the Abecedarian model and multiplied them by the 
number of additional children the expansion will serve. We only took impact measures of 
outcomes that had been measured in both programs. Additional measures not included will only 
improve the amount of benefits. 
 
Table 1. Impact Measures 
 
 
Outcomes Abecedarian1 High Scope/ Perry2 
 Dif T v C # participants* Dif T v C # participants* 
Special Education -23% -136 -13% -77 
Retention -24% -142 -5% -30 
High school grad 16% 94 20% 118 
Arrested as juvenile 0% 0 -9% -53 
Smoker -16% -94 -11% -65 
*Based on 590 new children served 
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Table 2. Assumptions 
 
Note: Dollar amounts in constant 2009 dollars adjusted when needed using the CPI Inflation 
Calculator provided by the Bureau of Labor Statistics. 
 
To estimate the present value of additional earnings due to an increase in high school 
graduates we estimated the present value of a deferred annuity based on the difference in 
earnings of High School Graduates versus those who did not complete High School (U.S. 
Department of Education, National Center for Education Statistics (NCES). 2010). The Annuity 
would start when children turned 18 and continue until they retired at 67. For simplicity of 
calculation we assumed that the additional income per year for being a High School graduate 
would be the same each year and that all additional students who graduated lived and worked 
until retirement age. To get the present value of the annuity at age 3 we used a real discount rate 
of 3.2%. We did not include additional earning of those who graduated high school and then 
went on to graduate from college nor do we include the additional tax dollars the government 
will receive due to this increase in earnings.  
To estimate health benefits we used the cost reduction due to a decrease in smokers for 
participants in both programs. To estimate the value of a decrease in smokers due to early 
childhood education we multiplied the decrease in smokers by the present value of the cost of 
smoking (private and social cost). Based on findings by the Sloan et al 2004 study “The Costs of 
Smoking” we estimated the average lifetime cost for men and women as $194,069 per smoker. 
We do not include in our analysis any other health benefit that might come from these programs. 
We also estimated as a benefit cost saving for early childhood education for parents of 
the students chosen. If Head Start had not been available they would have had to pay for these 
services themselves. The cost savings increased money available to spend on other items. We 
estimated that parents of 3 year olds chosen would have to pay for 2 years of preschool and 
Assumptions  
Kids served EHS 300 
Kids served HS 290 
Total served by expansion 590 
Discount rate (real) 3.20% 
  
Av annual Full time day care 3 year olds $6,801 
Av annual Full time day care 4 year olds $6,291 
  
Cost of smoking lifetime women $120,386 
Cost of smoking lifetime men $249,858 
Cost of smoking lifetime average $185,122 
  
Median annual earnings HS grad $29,893 
Median annual earnings HS dropout $23,416 
Difference in earnings $6,477 
Years economically active from 18 to 67  49  
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parents of 4 year olds for only 1 year. Cost of preschool was estimated using Child Care costs in 
the State of Illinois as presented by the National Association of Child Care Resource & Referral 
Agencies (2011). Average annual full time day care for 4 year olds was $6,290 and average 
annual full time day care for 3 year olds was $6,801. We assume that these cost were the same in 
2009 and 2010.  
We do not take into account in our analysis benefits from crime reduction due to decrease 
in juvenile and adult arrests and benefits from a decrease in welfare use. We also do not take into 
account other benefits attributed to early childhood education such as a reduction in special 
education and grade retention. 
 
4. Cost Benefit Analysis Results 
Table 3. Head Start Cost Benefit Analysis Results 
 
 
We estimate that funds allocated to Head/ Start and Early Head Start expansion could 
produce Net Benefits that range from $22.37 million to $25.4 million, with Benefit Cost ratios 
around 3.8 - 4.2  
 
Homeless Prevention and Rapid Re-Housing 
2. Literature Review 
Common impact measures were developed to evaluate both the Homelessness and Rapid 
ReHousing program, and the Community Service Block Grants aimed at mitigating problems 
associated with homelessness and mental health.  The American Recovery and Reinvestment Act 
(ARRA) funds allocated to housing relocation will decrease the costs associated with case 
management, and increase efficiency in processing and placing homeless into subsidized 
housing.  A review of the literature shows a high correlation between homelessness, substance 
abuse, and homelessness.  
 
 
 
  
Scenario 1 
(Abecedarian) 
Scenario 2  
(Perry Preschool) 
Costs     
ARRA Funds Awarded for Expansion $7,802,335 $7,802,335 
      
Benefits     
Pre k/ k costs savings $6,030,050 $6,030,050 
Health $17,475,509 $12,014,413 
Increase in Earnings for Additional HS 
Graduates $9,701,473 $12,126,842 
      
Total Benefits $33,207,033 $30,171,304 
      
Net Benefits $25,404,698 $22,368,969 
B-C ratio 4.26 3.87  
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2.1. A New Approach to Homelessness 
 
The passage of ARRA redirected the national approach to addressing homelessness by 
focusing on prevention of homelessness rather than on those individuals and families who are 
already homeless.  The new Homelessness Prevention and Rapid ReHousing Program (HPRP) 
provides support to at-risk individuals and also attempts to move homeless households into 
permanent living situations.  The HPRP does not support shelters and other traditional services.  
While studies of prevention programs in European countries have demonstrated positive 
outcomes for participants, much more research will be necessary in order to understand the how 
effective these programs will be in the U.S. (Culhane et al 2010).  In their paper, “A Prevention-
Centered Approach to Homelessness Assistance: A Paradigm Shift?”, Dennis Culhane, Stephen 
Metraux, and Thomas Byrne cite the most important goals for homelessness programs as 1) 
providing affordable and accessible housing to all; 2) eradicating poverty; and 3) preventing 
substance abuse.  These broad ideas can be focused into specific impact measures to be measured 
in a cost-benefit analysis.  Two main measures should be the focus: efficiency and effectiveness 
(Bush 2005).  A successful homeless prevention program will reduce overall homelessness in the 
target area, reduce costs associated with public health, and a decrease substance abuse rates.   
 
2.2. First-time Homelessness versus Repeat Homelessness 
 
Specifically insightful to the analysis of the value of Homeless Prevention funds was the 
paper distributed by the U.S. Office of Housing and Urban Development titled, “Costs 
Associated with First-Time Homelessness for Families and Individuals”, which, using research 
from seven cities, attempts to estimate the cost of first-time homelessness, a new focus on the 
area of homelessness studies. The HUD report measures costs associated with first-time 
homeless families and individuals incurred by homeless and mainstream service delivery 
systems in six communities. Unaccompanied individuals were studied in Des Moines, Iowa; 
Houston, Texas; and Jacksonville, Florida. Families were studied in Houston, Texas; Kalamazoo, 
Michigan; Upstate South Carolina; and Washington, DC. 
The first-time homeless individuals in the communities studied were predominantly male 
(73 to 81 percent) and had an average age of 39 to 41 years at program entry. African-Americans 
are over-represented among first-time homeless individuals in comparison to the general 
population of individuals in poverty. The first-time homeless families in the study primarily had 
only one adult member (80 to 89 percent), were comprised of female adults accompanied by 
children (82 to 90 percent), and had on average 3 to 3.5 members. On average, adults were 30 to 
32 years old when they first used a homeless program, and 41 to 50 percent of the children were 
6 years old or younger.6 The majority of individuals studied (55% – 67%) were only homeless 
for a very short period of time, ranging from one to three weeks, and their use of emergency                                                         
6 "City of Chicago :: Basic Needs (Health & Human Services)." City of Chicago. Web. 28 March 2011. 
<http://www.cityofchicago.org/city/en/progs/recovery_reinvest/education3.html> 
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shelters represented the best use of funds – given that these shelters are very low cost for 
individuals.  
The findings from the study provide a broad-base for understanding of homelessness and 
its associated costs; it presents ideas about opportunities for cost savings and lays out the 
groundwork for communities to successfully deal with their homeless, and at-risk families. The 
study identified the various costs associated with first-time homelessness and how they vary by 
region and user; emergency shelters are the lowest-cost option for individual adults, but the 
highest cost option for families, as they frequently require their own rooms or special 
accommodations. The highest cost savings were identified for those individuals and families that 
use these services for longer terms, which quickly deplete funds and reduce the opportunity for 
turnover or helping many individuals (Abt Associates Inc, et al 2010). Lastly, further research 
areas are identified such as evaluations of program size or structure as related to cost savings, 
using characteristics to identify at-risk individuals before they become homeless and the need for 
further research involving the mainstream costs associated with homeless individuals. 
Determining the value of preventing homelessness presents a challenge in that there is no 
easy way to measure the cost of an individual or family becoming homeless. Estimates vary from 
$0 to hundreds of thousands of dollars, depending upon the duration of homelessness, the 
medical and mental condition of the individual, where they are located, and many other factors.  
 
2.3. Homelessness and Mental Health 
 
Homelessness and mental health problems are highly correlated (Gelberg 1988).  A 2000 
study on service interventions for mentally ill homeless people (outreach, case management, and 
housing placement) showed positive effects across measures of health and housing outcomes, but 
major additional costs are also associated with such programs (Rosenheck 2000).  A 2003 cost-
effectiveness study performed a random control trial experiment on 96 study participants in 1991 
to 1993.  The treatment group was assigned to a critical time intervention.  The study produced 
significant positive results for the treatment group: they received services at a cheaper rate than 
the control group for acute care services, outpatient services, housing and shelter services, 
criminal justice services, and they spent less homeless nights (Jones et al 2003).   
A second 2003 study focused specifically on supported housing that integrated clinical 
services for homeless veterans with mental illness and substance abuse issues.  In 1992, 460 
participants were assigned to one of three groups 1) a voucher and intensive case management 
program, 2) a case management only program, and 3) a standard VA care program.  Outcomes 
measured were days housed vs. days homeless, mental health status, community adjustment, and 
costs.  Findings showed that veterans receiving vouchers and intensive case management had 16 
percent more days housed than the case management only group, and 25 percent more days 
housed than the standard care group.  Additionally, the first group was served more cost 
effectively, but it did not show better outcomes in measures of substance abuse, mental health or 
community adjustment (Rosenheck 2003). 
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3. Cost Benefit Analysis Methodology 
 
3.1. Homeless Prevention in the United States 
 
In order to determine the impact of the ARRA funding for homeless prevention, we 
worked with the Emergency Fund to collect data on the funds they have distributed thus far to 
participants in their homeless prevention program. This data would be used to calculate the 
average cost of homeless prevention in Chicago. To contrast what was spent with the estimated 
cost of first-time homelessness, we worked primarily with data from HUD’s report, “Costs 
Associated with First-Time Homelessness for Families and Individuals”. The key impact 
measure then was the direct-savings of preventing homelessness; other non-direct costs are 
noted, but not included in the final analysis. From this study we used their low and high 
estimates of the direct cost of first-time homelessness and calculated an overall average cost of 
$2,202 for an individual and $12,935 for a family with children (see table 1). To conduct a 
baseline analysis we decided to use the HUD report noted above to find an average cost of first-
time homelessness. 
Table 1: Estimated cost of first-time homelessness from HUD report (2010) 
Note: Average calculated using data given from HUD report page ES-7 
 
These cost estimates are of the direct cost of first-time homelessness and include only 
services that are targeted to and used solely by those who become homeless such as shelters, 
emergency shelters, street outreach programs, transitional housing, and other services created 
only for the consumption of homeless individuals and families. 
The indirect costs of homelessness are all mainstream costs that are not exclusive to 
homelessness which cannot be easily separated from the costs of non-homeless users. 
Mainstream costs include items such as medical expenses, often in the form of emergency room 
visits, use of law enforcement and the criminal justice system, mental health treatment, drug 
rehabilitation, and other such services. Various studies of the mainstream costs of homelessness 
have estimated the cost per individual or family much higher than just the first-time costs we 
consider further below, these increased costs that could impact the true estimate of first-time 
homelessness.  
 Estimated cost of first-time homelessness 
 Low Cost Estimate 
High Cost 
Estimate 
Average Cost 
Estimate 
Individual $1,831  $2,572  $2,202  
Family $3,548  $22,322  $12,935   
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A Massachusetts study found that the average medical cost of a homeless person was 
$26,124/year. 7 The New England Journal of Medicine found that Homeless people spent an 
average of four days longer per hospital visit than comparable non-homeless people, costing 
approximately $2,414 more per hospitalization.8 And a two-year survey of homeless individuals 
conducted by the University of Texas found that each person cost the taxpayers $14,480 per 
year, primarily for overnight jail.9 While these numbers do not directly translate to Chicago, or to 
all homeless, they highlight the significant costs of homeless to individuals and society as a 
whole and illustrate that the cost of first-time homelessness can be much higher and frequently 
depend on who becomes homeless. 
 
3.2. Homeless Prevention in Chicago 
 
Using the Emergency Fund data on the distribution of ARRA funds from January 2010 to 
March 2011, we were able to calculate the average amount of money distributed to prevent 
homelessness in various situations (see table 2). The total amount distributed for homeless 
prevention was a little over $5 million ($5,076,312), and a total of 713 families (adults with at 
least one child) and 889 adults were helped and kept in their homes. In our analysis we assume 
the counterfactual is that if these funds were not distributed, these individuals and families would 
become homeless, incurring costs on the system. 
 
Table 2: Cost of Homeless prevention in Chicago based on distribution of ARRA funds 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on data provided by the Emergency Fund for homelessness 
prevention funds distributed from 1/10 – 3/11 
 
4. Homeless Prevention Cost-Benefit Analysis Results 
 
The results of the analysis on funding for Homeless Prevention show that investing in 
homeless prevention is economically sound. In the analysis, which used the average cost of 
homeless prevention from the data from the Emergency Fund and the average cost of 
homelessness based on the HUD report, we found that preventing homelessness always led to 
cost savings. Through the emergency fund’s prevention of homelessness we estimate a cost 
savings of about 7.5 million dollars (or $7.1 million in 2009 dollars).  
                                                        
7 MA homelessness study 
8 New England Journal of Medicine study 
9 UTexas study 
 Individual Adult Family with children 
Average assistance given $1,295  $3,653  
Individuals or families helped 889 713  
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These savings were derived using the Emergency fund data indicating they had assisted 
889 individuals and 713 families with children, costing an average of $1,295 and $3,653 
respectively. We then used the average cost of homelessness from the HUD report and 
subtracted the average cost in Chicago, which always lead to cost savings, with a savings of $907 
per individual and $9,282 per family, again, assuming that the counterfactual is that the 
individual/family would have become homeless had it not been by the ARRA-funded support 
from the Emergency Fund. To find the overall impact of the funding we multiplied the savings 
per unit by the total units (either individuals or families) that were prevented from becoming 
homeless and found savings/ prevented spending of approximately $7.5 million dollars ($7.1 mil. 
in 2009 dollars) about $800 thousand for individuals and 6 million for families. This is about 
$2.4 million in net benefits ($2.24 mil. in 2009 dollars). Extrapolating the preceding data for the 
number of potentially homeless individuals and families served leads to a savings of 
approximately $7.5 million dollars or a return of $1.46 ($1.39 in 2009 dollars) for every $1.00 
spent for prevention. See table 3 for calculations in 2011 dollars, relevant outcomes converted to 
2009 dollars in preceding paragraph. 
 
 
In these calculations we opted to focus on averages rather than breaking out the data to 
individuals or families receiving one-time assistance versus receiving assistance more than once, 
as we initially thought would be valuable, because the program is not yet complete and funds are 
still being distributed. Dividing the data in such a manner prior to the completion of the program 
would skew the cost of one-time assistance, likely higher, as many of the individuals who are 
currently marked as ‘one-time’ users, may need assistance again before the funds are spent, 
especially since the data used ends in March 2011.  
 
 
 
 
Table 3: Savings realized by preventing homelessness in Chicago
Note: Calculations completed by author, using data  from tables 1 and 2. 
 Individual Adult Family with children 
Average cost of first-time homelessness $2,202  $12,935  
Average assistance given $1,295  $3,653  
Average savings  
(cost - assistance) $907  $9,282  
Individuals or families helped 889 713 
Savings to date 
(Average savings x number helped) $805,878.50  $6,618,066.00   
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5. Conclusion and Recommendations 
 
5.1. Title I and SFSF funds 
 
Based on our analysis of the results we find that it was a good idea to invest Title I and 
SFSF funds to prevent teacher layoffs and class increases. Because of the rules and regulations in 
place regarding who gets laid off the impact of the possible layoffs would have been on the high 
side. Though evidence on the impacts of class size has been mixed we believe keeping classes 
small does have a positive impact on achievement. If we not only kept the classes small, but also 
retained the best teachers, impact could be even greater. Because the decision on who gets laid 
off is based on seniority and not on performance one area to explore in the future could be 
introducing performance results into this decision. 
Benefits are not only private, but society and the government can experience some of 
them as well. By keeping classes small there is an income gain to students, which then translates 
into higher taxes paid to the government, who in turn invests that additional revenue in programs 
of benefit to society. 
 
5.2. Early Head Start/ Head Start 
 
Based on our analysis of the Head Start Expansion we think it is a good idea to continue 
funding Head Start. The problem with early education program is that benefits are accrued 
throughout the lifetime of the student, with most of them coming long after they finish the 
program so it is difficult to justify the cost in the short term, especially since cognitive gains in 
students have proven to fade out over time. However non-cognitive gains have proven to have an 
even higher impact, with students attending these programs showing, among other benefits, 
lower crime rates and better health outcomes than their peers. These impacts bring clear benefits 
to society and the government. 
For the Head Start programs to have the maximum results that resemble those of the 
model programs, some changes are needed. What these are should be explored further in future 
research. 
 
5.3. Conclusions and Recommendations 
 
Based on our findings, investing in homeless prevention is a good idea and the city 
should continue to fund, or seek funds to keep this program in action after ARRA funds are 
depleted.  Further, we believe our estimates of the benefits of preventing homelessness may be 
underestimated and that the benefits realized by the city are far greater.  While the direct costs of 
these outcomes show it may only cost society a few thousand dollars for an individual or family 
to be homeless, these costs do not include the myriad of non-direct costs that homelessness 
creates.  As noted earlier various studies have found the costs of homelessness can be far greater 
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than the direct costs in the HUD study and our analysis; 26,124 per year in medical costs, 
$14,480 per year in overnight jail and an extra $2,414 per hospital stay are just some of the 
potential increased costs. 
Beyond these costs are the social costs of homelessness that cannot be measured, what is 
the lifetime impact of becoming homeless? How does homelessness impact children? And what 
are the costs to society of allowing people, just like us, to become homeless? While these 
questions cannot be directly analyzed, it is worth considering that the benefits from preventing 
homelessness far outweigh the thousand dollars per person and few thousand per family. 
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Chapter 2. Workforce Development 
  1. Introduction 
 
1.1. Overview of ARRA Workforce Investment Act Funding 
  
The eleven-county metropolitan Chicago region received an allocation of approximately 
$90.4 million for Workforce Investment Act (WIA) Adult, Dislocated, and Youth programs 
through the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA).10 Cook County’s allocation of 
approximately $64.1 million is roughly 68% of total ARRA funds allotted to the metropolitan 
Chicago region for workforce development programs and approximately 39% of Illinois’ 
allocation of ARRA funds for workforce development purposes (Workforce Development 
Boards of Metropolitan Chicago, 2010). Of the $64.1 million allocated to Cook County, WIA 
Dislocated Worker programs received an estimated $26.7 million, WIA Youth programs 
received $25.1 million, and WIA Adult programs received $12.3 million (Workforce 
Development Boards of Metropolitan Chicago, 2010). Between February, 2009, and June, 2011, 
we calculate that an estimated 5194 Cook County residents participated in WIA Dislocated 
Worker programs, 3433 residents participated in WIA Adult programs, and 10,338 residents 
participated in WIA Youth Programs (Metropolitan Workforce Boards of Chicago, 2010). We 
return to how we calculated these estimates in the cost-benefit analysis section below.  
In order to convey the nature of WIA services, it is useful to briefly describe the target 
populations of each constituent program. Passed by Congress in 1998, WIA programs replaced 
the Job Training Partnership Act to create a “comprehensive” set of integrated services, ranging 
from training services to career planning (Heinrich, Mueser, and Troske, 2008). WIA Dislocated 
Worker programs primarily assist workers who have been terminated and have difficulty finding 
employment. Such workers may include individuals who have lost employment due to 
“permanent” plant closures and are unlikely to find employment in their previous occupation 
(Illinois Department of Commerce and Economic Opportunity, 2007). WIA Adult programs 
serve economically disadvantaged adults with weak labor market attachments with entry or 
reentry into the job market (Workforce Development Boards of Metropolitan Chicago, 2010). 
Finally, WIA Youth programs assist primarily low-income eligible youth, ages 14 – 21, who 
encounter barriers to employment. In the metropolitan Chicago region, WIA Youth services 
primarily provided eligible youth with employment opportunities during the summer of 2009 
(Workforce Boards of Metropolitan Chicago, 2009).                                                         
10 The 2010 report by the Workforce Boards of Metropolitan Chicago includes allocations for the 
following counties: Cook, Lake, McHenry, Kane, DeKalb, Kendall, DuPage, Will, Grundy, Livingston, 
and Kankakee. For a list of allocations by county, see: Workforce Boards of Metropolitan Chicago. 2010. 
Status Report: Use of American Recovery and Reinvestment Act Funds Expanding the Workforce 
Investment Act Program. Workforce Indicator Report 09. <http://www.workforceboards 
metrochicago.org/publications/>.  
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1.2. ARRA-Funded Services and Programs  
 
In the metropolitan Chicago region, ARRA funds supported the following kinds of 
services. For WIA Dislocated Workers, 60% of enrollees received classroom training, ranging 
from occupational classroom training to training in green jobs. Private sector training accounted 
for less than 1% of training services, and 76% of enrollees received career planning assistance 
(Workforce Boards of Metropolitan Chicago, 2010). With respect to WIA Adult programs, 
approximately 44% of enrollees received classroom training, and 81% received career planning 
(Workforce Boards of Metropolitan Chicago, 2010). Finally, for WIA Youth programs, 98% 
gained paid work experience through ARRA funding, and 67% received some job search and 
skills training (Workforce Boards of Metropolitan Chicago, 2010). These numbers make clear 
that some enrollees may receive overlapping services and may experience different intensities of 
service provision, which is consistent with the literature on workforce development that we 
discuss below.  
In terms of specific workforce development programs, one of the largest recipients of 
ARRA funds in Cook County was the Workforce Board of Northern Cook County. 11  The 
Workforce Board of Northern Cook County received approximately $3.5 million for WIA 
Dislocated Worker, Adult, and Youth services. In terms of training and job placement services, 
the Workforce Board of Northern Cook County focuses on training and job placement strategies 
in the following sectors: health care, transportation, warehousing and distribution, technology, 
and hospitality. Another large recipient of ARRA funds was the Community and Economic 
Development Association of Cook County (CEDA). CEDA received approximately $2 million 
dollars in ARRA funds and provides both training services and job search/placement services. 
With regard to training services, CEDA offers occupational skills training, on-the-job training, 
job readiness training, and education and literacy services.12 
The analysis proceeds as follows. In the second section, we review appropriate impact 
measures through a discussion of relevant studies and evaluate the comparability of WIA 
participants in the metropolitan Chicago region to participants in these studies. In the third 
section, we present our methodology and findings for a cost-benefit analysis of Cook County 
workforce development programs. Finally, in the fourth section, we offer an assessment of our 
cost-benefit analysis and some considerations for future evaluations of Cook County workforce 
development programs funded by ARRA.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                         
11 Obtained from www.recovery.gov.  
12 Obtained from http://www.cedaorg.net/www2/ETS.html 
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2. Review of Literature, Impact Measures, and Participant Demographics  
 
2.1. Relevant Workforce Investment Act Evaluations  
 
In the realm of workforce development evaluations, experimental designs relying on 
random assignment tend to be costly and politically controversial (Smith, 2000). In this context, 
“quasi-experimental” methods using propensity score matching have become a popular method 
among researchers of workforce development programs (Smith, 2000). Within the array of 
propensity-score matching techniques, the “nearest neighbor” matching method chooses non-
participants that are close to participants on a range of characteristics (Heckman, LaLonde, and 
Smith, 1999). Currently, this matching approach is popular in terms of workforce development 
evaluations, particularly when large sets of administrative data are available (Smith, 2000). In 
our review of the literature, most studies employ the nearest-neighbor matching method or some 
variation on this approach when random assignment is not possible. 
In the first-ever evaluation of WIA programs for the United States Department of Labor, 
Heinrich, Mueser, and Troske use state-level administrative data to conduct a non-experimental 
evaluation of WIA Adult and WIA Dislocated Worker programs across twelve states. Their 
evaluation includes approximately 160,000 WIA participants who entered the program in 2003-
2005 and about three million comparison group members (Heinrich, Mueser, and Troske, 2008). 
Accoring to Heinrich, Mueser, and Troske, they match participants to non-participants based on 
a range of demographic characteristics, such as type and duration of labor market experience, 
receipt of public assistance, and geographic location (Heinrich, Mueser, and Troske, 2008). 
For this evaluation, the authors use the change in earnings relative to the control group as 
the key impact measure, and they do not conduct a full cost-benefit analysis for each program. 
Importantly, they note that participants in both the Adult and Dislocated programs receive a 
range of services, may receive more than one service, and the intensity of such services varies 
across participants. In this vein, they indicate that the impacts or change in earnings that they 
estimate must be viewed as an “average” (Heinrich, Mueser, and Troske, 2008).  In general, the 
evaluation finds stronger, more positive net benefits for participants in the WIA Adult program 
and more mixed results for participants of the Dislocated Worker program. Overall, the authors 
speculate that pre-program dip in earnings is more modest for WIA Adult program participants 
and more “pronounced” for WIA Dislocated Worker participants. Additionally, they indicate that 
the opportunity costs of program participation for individuals in the Adult programs may be 
somewhat less than for their counterparts in the Dislocated Worker programs (Heinrich, Mueser, 
and Troske, 2008). We return to this observation in our cost-benefit analysis and conclusion 
below. 
For both programs, the authors present average impact estimates for quarters 1-5 and 
quarters 11-16 in order to compare earnings immediately after program participation to those 
gained a few years afterward. Importantly, the authors include zero earnings within their 
estimates for all programs. As such, the authors account for changes in wages and whether 
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participants are employed after program participation. Across the 12 states surveyed and 
accounting for both genders, 18 of 24 impact estimates for WIA Adult workers are positive and 
statistically significant with only one impact estimate being negative and statistically significant 
for quarters 1-5. The range of increased earnings varies from a low of $208 per quarter to over a 
$1000 (Heinrich, Mueser, and Troske, 2008). For quarters 11-15, the authors find 18 statistically 
significant estimates with all being positive. The increases in earnings range from a low of $158 
to high of over $1400 (Heinrich, Muesker, and Troske, 2008). Overall, the authors report that the 
average return over all 16 quarters is $500 to $600 for women and about $400 for men (Heinrih, 
Mueser, and Troske, 2008).  
For WIA Dislocated Workers, the results are more mixed. In quarters 1-5, 13 of 24 
estimates on changes in earnings are statistically significant. Of these statistically significant 
estimates, 8 out of the 15 are negative changes in earnings. For WIA Dislocated Workers in the 
first five quarters, the report shows that changes in earnings range from a low of -$1813 to a high 
of $888. For quarters 11-16, 17 of the 24 impact estimates are statistically significant and only 3 
are negative. These changes in earnings range from a low of -$345 to a high of $1292 (Heinrich, 
Mueser, and Troske, 2008). Overall, the study finds that WIA Dislocated Workers experience a 
change in earnings that is $200-300 below the comparison group for quarters 1-5 and an increase 
in earnings for quarters 11-16 that surpass the comparison group by about $400 (Heinrich, 
Mueser, and Troske, 2008).  
In a three-state report of workforce development studies in Indiana, Washington, and 
Virginia, Hollenbeck reports that all studies use propensity score matching and the nearest-
neighbor matching technique (Hollenbeck, 2009). In short, the studies statistically match 
participants of WIA programs to enrollees in Labor Exchange programs in each state with the 
latter acting as the control group (Hollenbeck, 200).  In contrast to the Heinrich study, 
Hollenbeck reports outcomes for participants in WIA Youth programs, which is important to our 
analysis below.  
All three state studies use changes in earnings as a key impact measure to evaluate the net 
benefits of the program. Also, each study uses overall public benefits, including increases in tax 
revenue and decreases in public supports like unemployment insurance, as impact measures. 
Accounting for the effect of taxes, earnings impacts are based on after-tax wages and income 
(Hollenbeck, 2006). As in the Heinrich study, Hollenbeck includes zero earnings in the case of 
post-program unemployment in all earnings averages (Hollenbeck, 2009).  
In conducting cost-benefit analyses for each WIA program, Hollenbeck estimates 
changes in earnings over the first 10 quarters after program participation and over the lifetime. 
Over the lifetime, all net benefits tend to be positive when discounted at the 3% level 
(Hollenbeck, 2009). By contrast, during the first 10 quarters after program participation, 
Hollenbeck finds greater net benefits for WIA Adult programs. By contrast, he reports more 
mixed results on net benefits for WIA Dislocated Worker programs and WIA Youth programs 
(Hollenbeck, 2009). We find Hollenbeck’s cost-benefit analyses for WIA programs over the 10 
quarters after the program to be more compelling than the lifetime estimates, and we use 
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Hollenbeck’s method and values for opportunity costs, public benefits, and private benefits in 
our cost-benefit analysis below.  
 
2.2. Demographics for Metropolitan Chicago Program Participants  
 
Overall, the demographic makeup of the metropolitan Chicago ARRA WIA programs is 
roughly similar to the demographic breakdowns of other WIA programs throughout the country. 
Table 1 below summarizes the demographics for each WIA category.  
 
Table 1. Workforce Boards of Metropolitan Chicago  (2010) 
WIA Program Male Female Black White 
Adult 38% 62% 62% 24% 
Dislocated 57% 43% 34% 50% 
Youth 45%  55% 71% 16% 
 
In comparison, the twelve-state study reports approximately 58% of WIA Adult program 
participants as female and 44% of participants as black (Heinrich, Mueser, and Troske, 2008). 
Although the Chicago region is consistent with these findings in that program participants tend to 
be female, it is clear that the WIA Adult programs in the Chicago region tend to consist more of 
black participants than is true across the nation. In general, greater representation of blacks in the 
program may have earnings implications for local programs. Nationally, whites’ median personal 
income earnings are about 20% higher than for blacks (U.S. Census Bureau, 2008). This implies 
that the earnings impacts for participants of Cook County WIA Adult programs may be lower. 
We account for this issue by reporting both a high and low estimated net benefit in our cost-
benefit analysis below.   
With regard to Dislocated Workers, the twelve-state study of WIA programs for the U.S. 
Department of Labor reports roughly 49% of dislocated worker participants as male and 33% of 
participants as black (Heinrich, Mueser, and Troske, 2008). In this vein, the demographic 
makeup of metropolitan Chicago WIA Dislocated Worker program participants is fairly 
consistent with these more “national” findings in that workers tend to be more represented by 
whites and more evenly split among genders than the WIA Adult programs.   
Finally, in terms of WIA Youth programs, about 99% are classified as low-income with 
53% of participants being food stamps recipients (Workforce Boards of Metropolitan Chicago, 
2009). Overall, the data suggest that ARRA WIA Youth participants in Cook County are largely 
low-income, and this is consistent with the eligibility requirements of the program (Workforce 
Boards of Metropolitan Chicago, 2009). What differs between ARRA WIA Youth programs in 
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the Chicago region to other evaluated WIA Youth programs is that the Chicago programs have 
consisted of primarily of paid employment rather than training services.  
 
3. Methodology and Cost-Benefit Analysis   
 
3.1. Methodology  
 
For our cost-benefit analysis, we break down the analysis into two different categories: 
how we estimated the number of participants for each program and how we derived the costs, 
benefits and subsequently the net benefits for each program. The 2010 report by the Workforce 
Boards of Metropolitan Chicago details how much money was spent on each specific program 
from February 2009 through June 2010, how much was to be allocated by the end of the ARRA 
funding term, and how many individuals participated in the WIA Adult, Dislocated, and Youth 
program, respectively.  For the estimates of benefits and costs, we obtain our data from the 
Hollenbeck (2009) and Heinrich, Mueser, and Troske (2008) evaluations that we reference 
above.  
Additionally, the 2010 report details the number of participants and amount of ARRA 
money spent up until June 2010. At this time of the report, approximately 90% of all funds had 
been spent for all programs (Workforce Boards of Metropolitan Chicago, 2010). Importantly, the 
majority of funds for WIA Youth programs were spent in the summer of 2009. Owing to this 
fact, we extrapolate the amount of participants through the end of the funding period, June 2011, 
for only the WIA Adult and Dislocated Worker programs, as our counterfactual is that WIA 
Youth programs were simply not funded beyond that of summer 2009. Given the report provides 
a detailed breakdown of the money spent as of June 2010 by each of the Chicagoland Counties 
(Lake, McHenry, Kane, DeKalb, Kendall, DuPage, Cook, Will, Grundy, Livingston, and 
Kankakee), we are able to isolate the amount of money spent within Cook County specifically 
for each program.   
We use this data to estimate the amount of participants of each WIA program in Cook 
County and the cost per participant for each program. First, we calculate the per participant cost 
for the total spent on each program over the metropolitan Chicago region.  For the Adult 
program, $14,297,759 was spent on 3,959 program participants, resulting in a $3,611 cost per 
participant. For the Dislocated Worker program, $30,631,743 was spent on 5,956 program 
participants, resulting in a $5,143 cost per participant.  Finally, for the Youth program, 
$31,772,192 was spent on 13,059 participants, resulting in a a $2,432 cost per participant cost 
(Workforce Boards of Metropolitan Chicago, 2010). With the per participant cost, we use the full 
allocation of ARRA funds to be spent by June 2011 for each program in the Cook County and 
divide by the per participant cost. Our calculations show an estimated 3,433 participants in the 
Adult Disadvantaged program, 5,194 in the Dislocated Workers program, and 10,338 in the 
Youth program.  These costs generally align with what was reported as the direct ‘public’ cost 
per participant in the research.  Our Adult program cost fell within the average of the costs 
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reported in the literature cited above, while our Youth and Dislocated programs each were close 
to the higher end of the costs reported.   
Next, we consider the private costs to the individual. Overall, our research indicates a 
fairly consistent consideration of an opportunity cost burden on program participants, which is to 
be considered as the forgone earnings to the individual as a result of program participation 
(Hollenbeck, 2009). The research considers this to be a one-time cost of forgone earnings a 
program participant has to bear while enrolled in the program. The participant is matched to a 
statistically similar individual in the Labor Exchange program (who is earning income) and 
matched income is considered to be what the program participant is foregoing. As such, this is a 
one-time cost incurred while only in the program.  As an important note, we take a lower and 
upper bound from all researched costs and benefits in order to provide a range of values. We 
base our final opportunity costs for each separate program primarily on Hollenbeck’s findings: 
Adult $0 and $1,350, Dislocated Workers $6,440 and $13,640, and for the Youth participants $0 
and $495 (Hollenbeck, 2009). Hollenbeck and Huang’s Washington state study show that 
participants in the WIA Adult and Youth programs on average do not demonstrate any forgone 
earnings while being a part of the WIA program (Hollenbeck and Huang, 2006). As such, we use 
$0 as a reasonable lower bound. These private costs and private/social benefits are all in terms of 
2006 dollars, but we convert the numbers into 2009 dollars for our cost-benefit analysis below. 
With the estimated amount of participants in each program, the program cost per 
participant for each program, and the opportunity cost per participant, we next evaluate the 
benefits per participant. We report on two different types of benefits: private and public. With 
regard to the private benefits accruing to participants, we use the impact measure of change in 
earnings by quarter. As we explain above in our discussion of both the Heinrich, et al., and 
Hollenbeck studies, the change in earnings is the statistically significant difference in earnings 
realized by a program participant that is not realized by someone who is statistically matched to 
the program participant but who does not enroll in the WIA program. With regard to the public 
benefit, the three-state Hollenbeck study in particular quantifies a benefit to the public in which 
he computes as increases in tax revenues and decreases in transfer programs, such as 
unemployment insurance, due to upticks in employment and earnings (Hollenbeck, 2009).   
Due to the fact that changes in earnings vary across quarters after program participation, 
we establish a time horizon for our benefits. One point of general agreement in the research is 
that in the short term, defined as 1-5 quarters after program exit, increases in earnings will be 
smaller and any net benefits may be lower or negative. This is due to the fact that the benefits 
from the program take some time to increase and accumulate to a point where the net benefits 
start to become unequivocally positive.  Although some studies, such as the Heinrich, et al., tend 
to extrapolate the benefits into ‘lifetime’ benefits, this seems optimistic. As a result, we follow 
more closely the comprehensive cost-benefit analysis of Hollenbeck and calculate long-term 
benefits as 8-12 quarters after program exit (Hollenbeck, 2009).  This also appears to be the 
critical point at which the increases in earnings for the average participant tend to level off, and 
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there is generally no more increase in benefit to the participant. The figure below from the 
Hollenbeck study illustrates this point.  
 
Figure 1  
 
 
Similar to our values for costs, we use a high and low value for both private and public 
benefits.  For the change in earnings over 10 quarters, we determine these average changes in 
quarterly earnings for each program: $455 and $658 for the WIA Adult program participants, 
$310 and $1,009 for the Dislocated Worker participants, and finally $0 and $325 for the Youth 
program participants.  Over the accumulation of 10 quarters, we determine the following public 
benefits per participant: $2,916 and $3,989 for the WIA Adult program participants, $882 and 
$5,770 for the Dislocated Worker participants, and finally $0 and $1,864 for the Youth 
participants. Importantly, the Hollenbeck study from which we derived these values indicates 
some level of statistical significance associated with the change in quarterly earnings between 
the treatment group and the control group (Hollenbeck, 2009). Finally, it is important to note that 
private and public benefits are discounted at a rate of 3% (Hollenbeck, 2009).  
 
3.2. Cost-Benefit Analysis  
 
Using the values we report above, we calculate the following net benefits for ARRA 
WIA programs in Cook County in Table 2 below. 
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Table 2 
 
 
A. Private cost per participant is the forgone earnings of a participant for the duration of the 
program, which a statistically similar worker received  that was not in the program. 
B. Public cost per participant is the amount of money allocated to the Cook County and 
Chicago area for the specific program divided by the number of participants. 
C. Private benefit per participant is the difference in earnings between the program 
participants and a control group of statistically similar non-participants for a duration of 8-12 
months after the program. 
D. Public benefit per participant is an average of increased tax revenue from the increased 
wages plus a reduction in transfer benefits, aggregated for 8-12 months after the program. 
Net Benefit = (C*10 + D) – (A + B), 10 is used as the average of 8-12 quarters. HIGH calculated 
using high benefits and low costs, while LOW calculated using Low benefits and high costs.  
These numbers were derived from (Hollenbeck, 2009) and (Workforce Boards of Metropolitan 
Chicago, 2010) and are reported/converted into $2009. 
 
For the low net benefits, we multiply the low private benefit by 10 (representing the 
number of quarters) and then add to it the low public benefit, since the public benefit is already 
an accumulation of 10 quarters as reported.  From this we subtract the public cost and the high 
private cost.  For the high net benefits, we perform a similar calculation, but use the high private 
and public benefits and the low private cost.  Next, we determine the total net benefit of each 
program by multiplying the net benefit per participant for a program by the estimated number of 
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participants within that particular program.  This results in the following range(s) of net benefits 
per WIA program: 
 
Table 3 
 
 
Again, the costs and benefits have been calculated in terms of 2009 dollars, although 
initially reported in 2006 dollars.  Through the cost-benefit analysis, we observe that the only 
program that potentially guarantees a positive total net benefit is the WIA Disadvantaged Adult 
worker program, where the total net benefits range between $10.2 and $26.2 million.  The 
Dislocated worker program appears to potentially have the lowest total net benefits, ranging 
between -$80.1 and $25.3 million, using either our high or low estimates.  This appears to be 
primarily due to the potential high private cost a participant of this program may bear in foregone 
earnings.  Finally, the Youth program almost has an average total net benefit of $0, where the 
range is from -$30.5 and $31.0 million. We attribute this finding to the lower bound of the 
private benefits or change in earnings being $0, meaning that the participants may not 
statistically differentiate their income within the 2.5 years following the program compared to a 
control group of matched peers.  In this vein, even though their opportunity cost is potentially 0, 
their increase in earnings could be small. However, given that ARRA-funded WIA Youth 
programs offered paid work experience to 98% of participants, the overall net benefits of the 
program may be positive.  
 
4.  Final Considerations    
 
Given the weaker labor market attachment of WIA Adult workers in general, it is 
surprising that our results and the other research suggest WIA Adult programs have higher net 
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benefits on average than WIA dislocated worker programs. It is important to explain the reasons 
behind these results and why it may be necessary to interpret such findings cautiously. We 
attribute the relatively lower net benefits for WIA Dislocated workers to a pre-program dip in 
earnings or “Ashenfelter’s dip” (Heckman, LaLonde, and Smith, 1999). As the 2008 report for 
the Department of Labor evidences, WIA Dislocated Workers display lower average earnings 
than their comparison groups by about $200 to $300 in quarters 1-5 (Heinrich, Mueser, and 
Troske, 2008). By quarters 11-16, these same workers tend to display higher earnings relative to 
comparison groups at a level of about $400 on average (Heinrich, Mueser, and Troske, 2008). By 
contrast, Adult workers who tend to have less labor market attachment demonstrate almost 
unequivocally positive earnings in quarters 1-5 and quarters 11-16 relative to comparison groups 
(Heinrich, Mueser, and Trosker, 2008). Similarly, Hollenbeck reports that WIA Dislocated 
Workers tend to demonstrate fairly high opportunity costs of participation relative to WIA Adult 
program participants (Hollenbeck, 2009).  
In general, WIA Dislocated Workers tend to perform worse than Adult workers in cost-
benefit analyses even though participants in Adult programs tend to have weaker labor market 
participation prior to the program. At first, these results may seem perplexing. However, given 
the methodologies of the studies we review and our own cost-benefit analysis, this conclusion is 
not entirely striking. Overall, both the Heinrich and Hollenbeck studies suggest that WIA Adult 
workers do better than WIA Dislocated workers because Adult program participants’ comparison 
groups are likely to have lower earnings (or little earnings). This seems to have the dual effect of 
depressing the opportunity costs for Adult program participants during the program and 
augmenting the positive changes in earnings that these participants tend to enjoy after the 
program compared to their peers. However, over time Dislocated Worker participants tend to 
enjoy stronger benefits from program participation than their peers (Heinrich, Mueser, and 
Troske, 2008). If we had extrapolated the changes in earnings over the lifetime, WIA Dislocated 
participants in Cook County would likely net higher benefits in a cost-benefit analysis.  
There are additional reasons to be cautious about the results we find for both Cook 
County WIA Adult programs and WIA Youth programs. As we indicate above, ARRA-funded 
WIA Adult programs in Cook County tend to consist of more blacks than is true nationally 
(Workforce Development Boards of Metropolitan Chicago, 2010). Given this demographic 
difference and the issue of lower median earnings for blacks, net benefits for WIA Adult 
programs in Cook County may be closer to our lower bound estimate than the higher one. 
Finally, ARRA-funded WIA Youth programs in Cook County tend to be unique in comparison 
to other programs nationally given that the ARRA funds primarily supported paid employment in 
the summer of 2009. Given that participant youth obtained earnings and had little to no 
opportunity cost, the net benefit of the Cook County program would likely be positive within our 
range of estimated net benefits.  
In sum, the ranges of net benefits for WIA Adult, Dislocated, and Youth services provide 
a glimpse of the possible returns to ARRA funds allocated to these programs. Although Cook 
county WIA Adult participants tend to be comprised of more blacks, our findings suggest that 
 40 
the overall net benefits to this program are likely positive given that the lower bound of our 
estimated range is positive.  Moreover, because Cook County WIA Youth programs offered paid 
work experience to 98% of participants, the net benefits of this program are more likely to fall on 
the positive rather than negative side of our range. Finally, WIA Dislocated Workers programs 
tend to experience higher opportunity costs to program participation and lower earnings relative 
to their peers within the 2.5 years following program participation. Overall, this has the effect of 
driving down net benefits for this particular group of workers.                                               
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Chapter 3. Public Safety 
1. Overview of Programs 
The public safety funds granted to Cook County from the American Recovery and 
Reinvestment Act (ARRA) totaled $61.8 million. This money was allocated through seven 
different grants, each with a different focus. Those grants were: the COPS program, the Byrne 
Justice Assistant Grant (JAG), a Transit Security Grant, a Rail and Transit Security Grant, an 
Assistance to Firefighters Grant, a Port Security Grant, and a Break the Code of Silence Grant.  
The types of programs funded by the ARRA funding can be grouped into: police 
expenditures, transit expenditures, fire expenditures, and port security. The police expenditures 
included the hiring of police officers, extra money to fund overtime pay, new police vehicles, in-
car cameras for existing police vehicles, and an anti-gang awareness campaign. The transit 
expenditures covered increasing CTA station security cameras, as well as the salaries of 
additional transit officers. The fire expenditures were dedicated to one program, the partial 
funding for a new fire station. Similarly, the port security program funded a single grant, to 
improve port infrastructure. There was also a catch-all category within the Byrne JAG grant 
which provided “personnel and various initiatives” for Cook County. 
 
Table 1. Grant Overview 
Grant Description Amount 
COPS 50 police officers for 3 years $13.3M 
Byrne JAG 175,000 police overtime hours $9.1M 
Byrne JAG New vehicles $8.7M 
Byrne JAG Personnel and various initiatives in Cook County $7.2M 
Transit Security  New CTA security cameras $6.9M 
Rail and Transit Security 12 transit officers for 3 years $4.9M 
Assistance to Firefighters  Partial financing for new fire station $4.8M 
Byrne JAG In-car cameras $3.7M 
Port Security Grant  Improved port infrastructure $2.8M 
Break the Code of Silence Anti-gang campaign $0.5M  
The rest of this section will break down further the grants awarded to Cook County, and 
report sources for the baseline level of funding or infrastructure in each area. In this way, our 
analysis can report not just the absolute increase in, for example, police cars, but the percentage 
increase that the ARRA funds facilitated. 
The majority of the ARRA funds, $33 million, went towards funding public safety 
personnel, either police officers or transit security officers. COPS grant provided money to hire 
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50 police officers for 3 years, and cost $13.3 million13. The Byrne JAG grant provided enough 
money for 175,000 police overtime hours to the Chicago Police Department and for nearly 
65,000 overtime hours to suburban police departments 14 . In total, this translated into an 
additional 89 full-time officers for two years and nine officers the third year15. The Rail and 
Transit Security grant provided money for 12 transit officers for three years. Since there are 
20,742 sworn officers currently in Cook County, those extra hours represented a 0.73% increase 
in the police force for the first and second years after the passage of ARRA and 0.34% in the 
third year after the ARRA funds. 
The second largest use of ARRA funds was to purchase new vehicles for the Chicago 
police department (CPD). This came from two different Byrne JAG grants, totaling $9 million. 
In 2008 (which serves as the base year for all of our comparisons) the CPD fleet included 3,611 
vehicles total16. The JAG grant is expected to spend almost half the money on 125 SUV’s17, 
compared to the 79 SUVs owned by the CPD. The rest of the grant is slated to purchase 108 
police cruisers (compared to 1,867 marked and unmarked squad cars owned by the CPD 
originally, 10 squadrols (compared to 68), and five operations utility trucks (compared to 42).  
The catch-all category of “personnel and various initiatives” inside of the JAG grant was the next 
largest grant, with $7.2 million awarded. $2.7 million of this has already been accounted for 
above, as it went to subsidize overtime hours for police officers or to purchase new vehicles. The 
remaining $4.5 million was spent on: 
• New staff hires: 9 FTE for 3 years and 22.53 FTE for 2 years  
• Miscellaneous Travel  
• 1 Segway, 10 tasers and cameras, 10 radios, 5 rifles 
• Substance Abuse and Crime Prevention Services for 673 individuals 
• Substance Abuse and Crime Prevention Services as well as Legal Training for prosecutors 
•  Funds for management of grant and other educational and training materials: 
This $4.5 million spending can be compared to the overall CPD budget. In 2008, this budget was 
$1.2 billion.18 
The next biggest grantee was $6.9 million for CTA security cameras. These cameras had 
a stated intent to:  
                                                         
13 
http://www.recovery.gov/Transparency/RecipientReportedData/pages/RecipientProjectSummary508.aspx
?AwardIdSur=8508&AwardType=Grants 
14 http://www.cityofchicago.org/content/dam/city/narr/Transition%20Reports/Police.pdf 
15 FTE calculated using Government Accountability Office standard; 2,080 hours per year equals one 
FTE, http://www.gao.gov/htext/d10223.html 
16 https://portal.chicagopolice.org/portal/page/portal/ClearPath/News/09AR.pdf 
17 http://recovery.cityofchicago.org/etc/medialib/stimulus_site/pdf_s.Par.51442.File.dat/CHICAGO-
COOK%20ARRA%20JAG%20Budget%20Worksheet%20Narrative.pdf 
18 https://portal.chicagopolice.org/portal/page/portal/ClearPath/News/09AR.pdf 
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Harden CTA's Subway & Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) 
systems and will offer multi-user, high-density key infrastructure protection. To 
protect underground rail system assets and particularly underwater assets from 
terrorist attack by improvised explosive devices (IEDs) or other threats that can 
damage or significantly breach such assets. Designs for SCADA project have been 
prepared in-house.19 
 
For a monetary comparison, the 2008 annual report lists $33.6 million spending on security by 
the CTA.20 The almost seven million dollar investment in security cameras from the ARRA 
funds therefore represented a more than 20% increase over that. 
The next largest award was $4.8 million for partial funding of a new fire station in 
Chicago. This added a new station to a department with 92 stations total21. In a city with a 
population of 2,695,598 in 201022, this increased the density of firehouses to 3.413 firehouses 
per 100,000 residents from 3.376 firehouses per 100,000 previously. 
The next largest grant was $3.7 million for in-car cameras in Chicago Police Department 
cruisers. This bought 59423 additional cameras for the CPD. We could find no official count of 
how many cameras are in the CPD fleet, but it is possible that there were very few cars with 
cameras before the ARRA grant. For example, one news article24 mentions a baseline of 340 cars 
with cameras within the CPD in 2010, and this release25 from the CPD mentions then-governor 
Rod Blagojevich contracting for the first 30 in-car cameras in 2006. 
The $2.8 million awarded for “improved port infrastructure” through the Port Security 
Grant Program has been the most difficult to describe further. None of the other sources, which 
yielded information about the previous programs, provided any details about how that money 
was spent. Even the recovery.gov website for this grant gives no information on activity except 
for somewhat cryptic descriptions in quarterly reports26. The project is currently listed as “less                                                         
19 http://stimuluswatch.org/2.0/awards/view/9448/american-recovery-and-reinvestment-act-rail-and-
transit-security-grant-program-capital-projects 
20 http://www.transitchicago.com/assets/1/board_presentations/07102008budget.pdf mentions “reduced 
costs” due to security cameras, so maybe getting in touch with CTA would help get a hold on how they 
thought cameras would translate into reduced costs 
21 http://www.cityofchicago.org/city/en/depts/cfd/dataset/fire_stations.html 
22 http://2010.census.gov/news/releases/operations/cb11-cn31.html 
23 http://recovery.cityofchicago.org/etc/medialib/stimulus_site/pdf_s.Par.51442.File.dat/CHICAGO-
COOK%20ARRA%20JAG%20Budget%20Worksheet%20Narrative.pdf 
24 http://www.policeone.com/police-products/communications/articles/2031129-In-car-cameras-make-Ill-
cops-uncomfortable/ 
25https://portal.chicagopolice.org/portal/page/portal/ClearPath/News/Department%20Publications/TechU
pdate07.pdf 
26 For example: “Award letter was received on 9-30-09. During this period, the City completed the 
Environmental Historic Preservation (EHP) Forms for the approved projects and upon approval of those 
projects, funds are expected to be released. Identified potential vendors for projects and submitted for 
review to the City's Department of Procurement Services.” 
http://www.recovery.gov/Transparency/RecipientReportedData/pages/RecipientProjectSummary508.aspx
?AwardIDSUR=47840&qtr=2009Q4 
 44 
than 50% complete.”  Perhaps most helpful is the Port Security Grant Program description in the 
2010 Homeland Security Grant overview. This document states that DHS requires that any 
grants have the purpose of “enhancing maritime domain awareness, enhancing risk management 
capabilities to prevent, detect, respond to, and recover from attacks …as well as training and 
exercises and TWIC implementation.”27   
The smallest expenditure was $0.5 million to fund the Campaign to Break the Code of 
Silence, an anti-gang initiative in Chicago. Its stated purpose is to “create public discourse about 
the ‘Code of Silence’ that stands between police and community.”  In effect, it is a marketing 
campaign, including wallet-sized “Speak-Up” cards with directions on how to use TXT2TIP and 
the Police hotline, and paid for the full-time salary of one Program Director for three years28. 
Breaking out CPD expenditures on anti-gang initiatives is impossible, so we can only compare 
this to the pre-ARRA spending on this particular initiative, which was zero. 
 
2. Literature Review 
 
While there may be many benefits associated with additional police personnel, the 
primary objective of our research is estimating the benefit associated with avoiding the crimes 
that do not occur as a result of the increased police presence.  
 
2.1. Value of Reduced Crime  
To estimate the magnitude of the benefit, we rely on three different studies that are 
frequently cited in the literature on the cost of crime.  
2.1.1. Accounting-Based Method  
The first two studies reviewed here, Cohen and Piquero (2009) and McCollister, French, 
and Fang (2010), use accounting-based methods to estimate the cost of crime. They both break 
down each type of crime into sub-categories, placing a dollar value on each sub-category, and 
then adding the components into a single estimate. The first of these papers, a 2009 study by 
Cohen and Piquero, updates previous research performed by Cohen in 1998. The authors divide 
the cost of crime into three categories: victim costs, criminal justice-related costs, and the 
opportunity cost of offenders.  
For victim costs, the 2009 study uses an updated version of the results from Miller, 
Cohen, and Wiersema (1996), which breaks victim costs into two categories: tangible losses and 
intangible losses. Tangible losses include property damage and loss, medical care, mental health 
care, police and fire services, victim services, and lost productivity. Most of the data for the                                                         
27 http://www.iaem.com/committees/governmentaffairs/documents/FY2010DHSPreparednessGrantProgra
msOverview051310.pdf 
28 Cook County ARRA statistics, pulled by Professor Worthington. 
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Miller et al analysis is taken from the National Crime Victimization Survey (NCVS), which is 
one of the government’s main sources of information on the impact of crime on victims. 
Intangible losses for crimes that resulted in death were taken from Miller’s (1990) analysis of the 
literature on the value of a statistical life (VSL). Adjusted to 1993 dollars, this 1996 study uses 
$2.7 million for a VSL, of which $1.9 million was determined to measure the lost quality of life 
component. For nonfatal crimes, Miller et al. used jury awards to victims of crime to estimate a 
value for pain and suffering. They used the particular demographic variables of their national 
dataset on crime to model what the average jury award would be for the typical crime in their 
dataset. Using the estimates from this paper, for tangible and intangible losses, Cohen and 
Piquero simply update the estimates to 2007 dollars. 
Because Miller et al. (1996) did not focus on the other components of crime such as 
criminal justice-related costs and the opportunity cost of offenders, for these measures, Cohen 
and Piquero use the methodology developed by Cohen (1998). In that paper, the author estimates 
the cost per offense of criminal justice system costs and of punishment costs. These estimates are 
based on the likelihood of a criminal advancing to each step of the adjudication process 
multiplied by the cost of each level. Additionally, the cost to federal, state, and local 
governments of housing inmates is included. For the opportunity cost of offenders, Cohen and 
Piquero estimate the pre-conviction legitimate wage of an inmate to be $14,626 in 2007 dollars.  
This estimate is used as a proxy for the true opportunity cost of criminals. It does not 
include the costs borne by family members of those incarcerated because of the difficulties in 
accurately measuring those costs. There is uncertainty as to whether removing criminals from 
their family would have positive (through removing a negative role model) or negative effects on 
families. 
Summing the victim costs, criminal justice costs, and offender productivity costs for each 
type of crime, Cohen and Piquero estimate the benefits of each averted crime.  
 
Table 2. Cost of Crime Estimates from Cohen and Piquero, 2007 Dollars 
 
McCollister, French, and Fang (2010) follow a similar accounting-based methodology 
used by Cohen and Piquero. The biggest difference in the approach taken by McCollister et al. is 
in the chosen dollar value of a statistical life. As can be seen in Table 2, taken from Cohen and 
Piquero, victim costs make up the largest share of the total crime cost for violent crime. Of these 
victim costs, the intangible cost calculated using the VSL makes up the largest share. Therefore, 
Crime Victim Costs CJ Costs
Offender 
Productivity Total
Murder $4,600,000 $300,000 $140,000 $5,000,000 
Rape $135,000 $8,300 $4,500 $150,000 
Robbery $12,000 $7,400 $4,000 $23,000 
Aggravated Assault $37,000 $13,500 $6,400 $55,000 
Burglary $2,000 $2,300 $1,000 $5,000 
Larceny $450 $1,700 $700 $2,800 
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all measures of the cost of crime are highly sensitive to the VSL utilized. Using Viscusi and 
Aldy’s (2003) aggregated estimate and inflating it to 2008 dollars, McCollister et al. find the 
pain-and-suffering cost of murder to be much higher: about $8.4 million.  The higher VSL used 
by McCollister and coauthors can explain most of the difference in their estimates (Table 3 
below) and Cohen and Piquero’s estimates.  
 
Table 3. Cost of Crime Estimates from McCollister et al, 2008 Dollars29 
  
Neither McCollister et al. nor Cohen and Piquero include estimates of individual or 
community efforts to minimize crime in their cost of crime calculations. While this may appear 
to be an important omission, in excluding these factors the authors actually estimate the marginal 
cost of crime (which, as will be described later, is what we want), rather than the average cost of 
crime. Cohen argues that his estimate of “marginal costs exclude such important costs as fear of 
crime, private security expenditures, and ‘averting’ behavior such as taking cabs instead of 
walking or changing one’s lifestyle due to the risk of victimization. We exclude these costs since 
they are not affected by any one criminal’s actions.30”  Essentially, there is a threshold effect, 
where society is going to have to bear the burden of those types of costs even if there is a small 
decrease in crime. Since the expected decrease in crime due to the ARRA funds is small, using 
the marginal rather than average cost of crime is a necessary step. 
However, these estimates are still not a perfect approximation of the marginal cost of 
crimes. For example, the authors’ calculations rely on estimates of the lost productivity of the 
average crime victim rather than the lost productivity of a victim on the margin. Though the 
accounting-based method includes the tangible and intangible costs that are necessary to 
calculate the marginal cost of a crime, these costs are estimated using the average estimate and 
not the marginal estimate due to data restrictions. This could lead to a biased estimate of the true 
cost to society if the marginal and average estimates differ.  
 
                                                         
29 For some of the offenses in the table, the tangible and intangible costs do not sum to equal to the total 
cost because the tangible costs include a ‘risk of homicide’ component that was include in both tangible 
and intangible costs. It was removed from tangible costs to avoid double counting. 
30 Cohen (1998), p. 8 
Type of Offense Tangible Cost Intangible Cost Total Cost
Murder $1,285,146 $8,442,000 $8,982,907
Rape/sexual assault $41,252 $199,642 $240,776
Robbery $21,373 $22,575 $42,310
Aggravated Assault $19,472 $95,023 $107,020
Burglary $7,974 N/A $7,974
Larceny/theft $3,523 $10 $3,532
Motor vehicle theft $10,534 $262 $10,772
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2.1.2. Contingent Valuation Method  
Cohen et al. (2004) use a contingent valuation approach to estimate the benefit of 
averting crime. Contingent valuation techniques use surveys to measure willingness to pay, in 
this case, the willingness to pay to avoid crime.  Researchers ask individuals for their valuations 
of a service and estimate the respondents’ willingness to pay for the service using information 
obtained from the survey.  
The authors use a nationally representative sample of 1,300 U.S. residents. They asked 
the respondents if they would be willing to pay a certain amount of their own money for a crime 
prevention program that would prevent one in every ten of a specific type of crime. By varying 
the bids from $25 to $225 and the crimes in their questions, the authors then used econometric 
techniques to convert the yes/no responses into willingness-to-pay estimates. These willingness 
to pay estimates were then converted into cost per crime estimates based on the total number of 
crimes in the United States. The authors give a brief example of how this works in the context of 
burglaries: 
 
For example… we estimate that a 10-percent reduction in burglaries would prevent 
426,123 burglaries. Because the average household is willing to pay $104 for a 
program that reduces burglaries by 10 percent and there are 103 million households 
in the United States, collectively $10.7 billion would be spent on such a program… 
Dividing this figure by the 426,123 crimes averted yields WTP per crime of 
$25,000.31 
 
The same procedure is used for other types of crimes. The authors’ willingness to 
pay estimates are shown in Table 4 below. 
 
Table 4. Cost of Crime Estimates from Cohen et al, 2001 Dollars 
  
The contingent valuation method has benefits as well as limitation over 
accounting-based methods. One benefit is, unlike in the accounting-based method, if 
respondents internalize the different costs of particular crimes when they either accept or                                                         
31 Example from Cohen et. al (2004), p. 99 
Type of offense Implied WTP
Murder $9,700,000
Rape/Sexual Assault $237,000
Robbery 105,454
Aggravated Assault 70,000
Burglary 25,000
Larceny/Theft N/A
Motor Vehicle theft N/A
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reject the bids in the survey, then an analyst does not have to worry about forgetting to 
include a difficult-to-calculate cost. However, contingent valuation does not allow us to 
break costs down into sub-categories as in the accounting-based method and attribute parts 
of the estimate to tangible costs and intangible costs. Another drawback is that when 
survey participants respond, contingent valuation assumes that individuals are factoring in 
the possibility that they or their families are victims of crime and the fear that comes with 
it, but it is impossible to tell if respondents are internalizing larger social costs such as 
adjudication and incarceration. In a follow up paper, Cohen (2009) argues that individuals 
do include adjudication and incarceration in their estimates but he notes that there are 
those who believe otherwise. For example, Donohue (2007) concludes that individuals 
ignore social costs when responding to CV surveys.  
In another limitation, contingent valuation surveys only deal with ‘hypothetical’ 
situations. People may experience a non-commitment bias and overestimate their true 
willingness to pay since they do not actually have to pay the amount they quote. Beyond 
that, even if individuals report their true valuation, there are concerns that respondents are 
making these decisions on poor information. Reported willingness to pay for crime 
prevention may vary depending on individuals’ perceptions of their community’s crime 
levels. If respondents were informed of the true levels, they may change their valuation.  
As we have no reason to privilege the results of one study over another, we decided to use 
the average cost of crime from our three sources as we proceeded with our analysis. A 
table of these averages is shown below. 
 
Table 5. Average of the Three Cost-of-Crime Estimates, 2009 Dollars32  
Crime Type Cost Per Crime Homicide $8,49,353 Rape $225,426 Robbery $69,612 Serious Assault $90,265 Burglary $13,550 Larceny $2,213 Motor-Vehicle Theft $9,394                                                           
32  Inflation calculated using Bureau of Labor Statistics’s Inflation Calculator, derived from CPI, 
http://www.bls.gov/data/inflation_calculator.htm 
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2.2. Effectiveness of Adding More Officers  
As important as discerning the value that society places on averting crimes is, being able 
to quantify how effective a given intervention is at producing that benefit is just as important. 
For example: do we expect that adding one police officer to a police force eliminates homicide in 
that town?  Do we expect adding that officer to reduce homicide by one-half?  Would that one 
officer reduce motor vehicle theft at all? When the academic literature has addressed this 
question, the researchers have typically framed the answer in the form of elasticities. Elasticity is 
the percentage reduction in crime that is expected for a percentage increase in police officers.  
Most of the more credible studies done on this issue have dealt with the issue of endogeneity: the 
outcome (crime rate) and independent variable (police officers) are correlated in both directions. 
It is true that more police officers may bring down a previously steady crime rate. It is also true, 
however, that a high crime rate may spur the hiring of more police officers. Without dealing with 
this endogeneity, an analyst can misstate the causal effect of hiring’s effect on crime.  
The most common way to deal with this endogeneity is with instrumental variables (IV). 
Using the IV method, a researcher finds a third variable, called an instrument, that is associated 
only with the independent variable. In this way, if the instrument has a change in value, and all 
else is held equal, if there is any change in the outcome of interest, then the researcher can 
conclude that change is only due to the independent variable. 
The most-often cited work on the elasticities of crime with respect to police force is 
Levitt’s 1997 paper “Using Electoral Cycles in Police Hiring to Estimate Effect of Police on 
Crime.”  In this paper (and his 2002 correction to it), he uses the natural experiment of the 
exogenous increase in police hiring that happens before municipal elections. He argues that since 
the hiring has to do with political reasons, rather than in response to any crime wave, the election 
can be used as an instrumental variable to remove the endogeneity problems. 
Evans and Owens, in 2007, took a different approach to try to untangle the effect on 
crime of adding extra police officers to a force. Their analysis uses the monetary value of a 
federally-funded grant meant to increase police officer hiring. Using this as an instrument is less 
convincing than that of Levitt’s, since the value of the grant may be less exogenous to underlying 
risk of crime (and thus crime rates), than municipal elections. Despite the weakness of their 
instrument, however, this study is very relevant to the Chicago analysis since it analyzes the 
COPS program. The COPS program is the same program implemented by Chicago to hire 
$13.3million worth of full-time police officers with ARRA funds, as discussed above. 
Similar to the Levitt paper, Klick and Tabarrok (2005) also found a credible exogenous 
shock to police personnel to use as an instrument: the federally-set terror alert. Using crime data 
taken by the Washington DC police department, the authors analyzed the effect of the extra 
public safety officers who are deployed when the terror alert was raised by the Department of 
Homeland Security. 
Di Tella and Schargrodsky (2004) also used the IV approach. Their paper analyzed 
motor-vehicle theft in Israel in the time period after a terrorism attack against Jewish targets in 
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Argentina. In the weeks after the terrorist attack, police presence was increased around Jewish 
institutions in Buenos Aires, and this seemed to have a localized but statistically significant 
deterrence against motor vehicle theft. Rather than use an IV, Corman and Macan (2000) used 
analytically sophisticated time-series techniques. Their dataset was a detailed list of crimes in 
New York City over 30 years, and they estimated elasticities of violent crime with respect to 
police staffing for several different categories of crime. 
Since we have no reason to privilege the conclusions of one of these studies over the 
others, we use the average elasticities from these five studies in our analysis. The summary of 
this literature review is below, in Table 6.  
 
Table 6. Elasticities of Crime With Respect to Police Officers33 
 * Estimates are significant at the 95% level (1) Levitt, 2000 (2) Evans and Owens, 2007 (3) Corman and Macan, 2000 (4) Klick and Tabarrok, 2005 (5) Di Tella and Schargrodsky, 2004 
3. Case Study: Increased Police Personnel in Cook County  
3.1. Methodology  
In estimating the net social benefits of increased police personnel in Cook County, we 
adopted the framework outlined by Heaton (2010). First, we used as the baseline level of violent 
crimes the average of each type of crime in Cook County from 2006 to 2008.34  The crimes that 
we focused on were Type 1 crimes, as defined by the FBI:  homicide, rape, robbery, serious 
assault, burglary, larceny, and motor-vehicle theft.  
                                                        
33 The elasticity measures estimate the impact of a 1% increase in police personnel on each crime type. 
For example, the average for Homicide tells us that a 1% increase in police personnel is associated with a 
0.927% decrease in homicide. 
34 The seven different types of crime we will focus on are homicide, rape, robbery, serious assault, 
burglary, larceny, and motor-vehicle theft. Data on crime levels is from illinoisdata.com. 
Crime Type
Election-Cycle 
IV  (1)
COPS Grant 
IV (2)
Time-Series 
(3)
Terror Level  
IV (4)
Terrorism IV 
(5) Average
Homicide -0.914* -0.84* -1.385 -0.927*
Rape -0.034 -0.42 -0.170
Robbery -0.452* -1.34* -0.526* -0.592*
Serious Assault 0.397 -0.96* -0.288 -0.292*
Burglary -0.195 -0.59* -0.419* -0.30* -0.404*
Larceny -0.135 -0.08 -0.103
Motor-Vehicle Theft -1.698* -0.85* -0.452 -0.86* -0.33* -0.440*
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Second, we used data from the Illinois State Police to determine the baseline number of 
police in Cook County at the end of 2008.35 The baseline level of 20,742 officers included all 
full-time sworn officers from the 120 police departments listed for Cook County as well as the 
Cook County Sheriff’s Department.  
Third, we used this 2008 baseline of officers to calculate the percentage change in 
officers resulting from ARRA funds. We focused on the additional officers added as a result of 
the Rail and Transit Program, COPS Program, and Byrne Grant. These three programs added a 
total of 151 officers for 2009 and 2010 and 71 officers for 201136. This translated into a 0.73% 
increase in the first two years and a 0.34% increase from our baseline in the third year. 
Fourth, we used the average elasticity measures from the articles mentioned previously to 
determine the expected number of each type of crime that would be averted as a result of 
increasing police personnel. 
Fifth, we multiplied the above result by the baseline number of crimes (calculated earlier) 
to determine the number of crimes that are expected to be averted as a result of increased police 
personnel. We only used those elasticities that are statistically significant at the 95% level. We 
therefore assumed that increasing personnel would have no effect on the amount of rape or 
larceny37. 
Sixth, we used the average of the cost of crime estimates found in the literature and 
inflate to 2009 dollars to estimate the value of each averted crime. We multiplied the number of 
averted crimes for each type by the benefits of an averted crime of that category to find the 
expected savings for each crime.  
Seventh, we summed the total protected savings for each type to find our gross benefits 
of increased personnel. Steps one through seven are repeated for each year with the appropriate 
adjustment for personnel levels to find each year’s gross benefits. 
Finally, we subtracted each year’s program costs from the estimated gross benefits to calculate 
yearly net benefits. The net benefits were discounted using a 3.2% discount rate to give us our 
present discounted value of the programs’ net benefits. We conclude that the initial $32.65 
million investment yields $110.28 million in discounted gross benefits for a net benefit of $77.63 
million.  
 
 
 
                                                         
35  Data for police levels taken from 
http://www.isp.state.il.us/docs/cii/cii08/cii08_Section_V_Pg213_to_236.pdf 
36 Overtime hours were assumed to be divided evenly between the first two years and were computed to 
full-time equivalents with 2,080 hours equal to 1 FTE. 
37 None of the studies we examined offered a hypothesis as to why the elasticities for rape and larceny 
were not statistically significant. We speculate that these crimes might be more likely to occur between 
people who are somewhat acquainted with one another and therefore be more difficult to prevent through 
a larger police presence. 
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3.2. Results 
 
Tables 7, 8, 9, and 10 present our specific calculations. Table 7 reports our benefits 
calculations for year one. Table 8 reports our present value calculations for the three years 
studied. Table 9 reports the yearly breakdown of additional officers for the three programs. Table 
10 reports the net benefits calculation. 
 
Table 7. Year one costs savings (year one benefits) of 0.73% Increase in Police Personnel in 
Cook County 
* Indicates statistical significance at 95% level Note: Cost Per Crime estimates are found in Table 4 and Elasticity estimates are found in Table 5  
 
Table 8. Present value of cost savings (benefits) over three years of ARRA funding  
Year 1 $45.8 
Year 2 $44.3 
Year 3 $20.2 
Total $110.3  
Table 9. Additional Personnel Per Year and Costs 
 
 
Table 10. Summary of Costs and Benefits, in millions 
Gross Benefits $110.3 
Cost $32.7 
Net Benefits $77.6 
 
Crime Type
Average Yearly 
Number of 
Crimes, 2006-2008 Elasticity
Projected Crimes 
Averted from 
Increase in Police Cost Per Crime
Projected 
Cost 
Savings 
Homicide 560 0.927%* 3.78 $8,949,353 $33,864,814
Rape 2,254 0.17% 0 $225,426 $0
Robbery 18,898.33 0.592%* 81.55 $69,611 $5,676,961
Serious Assault 20,644 0.292%* 43.94 $90,265 $3,966,246
Burglary 37,080 0.404%* 109.2 $13,550 $1,479,680
Larceny 137,949.00 0.10% 0 $2,213 $0
Motor-Vehicle Theft 25,729.00 0.440%* 82.52 $9,394 $775,207
$45,762,909Aggregate cost savings
Program Officers Year 1 Officers Year 2 Officers Year 3 Cost
Rail and Transit Program 12 12 12 $4,869,000 
COPS 50 50 50 $13,256,100 
Byrne JAG 89 89 9 $14,528,590 
Total 151 151 71 $32,653,690 
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We also repeated this analysis, confining the benefits and costs only to those accrued by 
the city of Chicago. We found that $27.2 million of the $32.6 million in spending was focused in 
Chicago. The city of Chicago-level analysis included full-time sworn officers from the Chicago 
Police Department and a fraction of the Cook County Sheriff’s Department.38 Following the 
same methodology used for Cook County, we find that the $27.2 million in spending yields 
$95.1 million in discounted gross benefits and $67.9 million in discounted net benefits.  
Comparing the two geographic analyses, we see that the additional $5.4 million spent 
outside of Chicago yielded $15.16 million in gross benefits. This gives us a benefit-cost ratio of 
2.79. As a comparison, when restricting the standing only to Chicago, the benefit-cost ratio 
increases to 3.49. Because of the high cost of homicide, most of the benefits come from averted 
murders. The higher benefit-cost ratio for Chicago compared to the suburbs is due to the fact that 
Chicago has a higher ratio of homicides per police officer. An additional police officer therefore 
has a larger effect in Chicago than the rest of Cook County. Increased police personnel both in 
Chicago and outside of Chicago yield positive net social benefits, but the higher benefit-cost 
ratio is found when limiting the analysis to spending and benefits within Chicago.  
This analysis is not a study of the most efficient deployment of police resources, but the 
results here are suggestive. Because the elasticities of crime with respect to police presence differ 
significantly across types of crime, and since a prevented homicide is so much more valuable 
than any other crime, this suggests that any given level of police resources could “add more 
value” (or provide more benefits) by being directed to homicide prevention activities. This is 
relevant to the comparison of police allocation between Chicago and the rest of Cook County as 
well as to the allocation within Chicago. A more thorough study of the allocation of resources 
should also account for the degree to which various crimes are correlated- whether police 
strategies that reduce homicide, for example, are also likely to impact other crimes as well.  
3.3. Sensitivity Analysis  
Our calculation of net benefits is highly dependent on the estimates that we use of the 
cost per crime and of elasticity. To test the robustness of our results, we use high, medium, and 
low estimates for both elasticity and cost per crime (the medium estimates are the same values 
used in our earlier analysis). The estimates for cost per crime are taken from Tables 2, 3, and 4 
and the estimates for elasticity are taken from Table 6. Table 11 shows the discounted present 
value net benefits in nine possible scenarios. In all scenarios we find positive net benefits with 
the results ranging from $15.1 million to $253.2 million. 
 
 
 
                                                        
38 The Illinois State Police Report estimates that 53% of Cook County population is in Chicago. We 
therefore included 53% of the Cook County Sheriff Department in our base estimate of police in Chicago. 
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Table 11. Sensitivity Analysis  
 
3.4. Discussion  
The validity of our results is highly dependent on the accuracy of our assumptions and of 
our model. This section describes several ways in which both our assumptions and model may be 
inadequate and how future sensitivity analysis could provide us with an appropriate range for our 
results39. First, in calculating our costs, we assume that there were no additional costs to Cook 
County besides salaries. Cook County received additional ARRA funding for equipment, but it is 
likely that police departments needed to bear additional overhead costs as a result of hiring 
additional officers. Until we determine the true costs of adding additional officers in this way, 
our estimate may be overstating the program benefits.   
Second, ideally our analysis would use the cost of the marginal crimes averted. As 
discussed in the literature review, our estimates of the cost of crimes only approximate the 
marginal crime costs. Some of the components of our crime estimates rely on averages and 
therefore likely overstate the true net benefits, if the marginal crime averted is of a lower value 
than the average.  
Third, our data on crime levels were taken from the Illinois State Police, and therefore 
only uses reported crimes. This is likely an understatement of the number of crimes committed.  
Other data sources, such as the National Crime Victimization Survey, use surveys to estimate the 
actual number of crimes rather than just the reported number. It is likely that using the NCVS 
instead of the state police data would yield a higher crime baseline and thus larger net benefits. 
Fourth, police likely produce benefits besides just reducing the seven crimes we focus on. 
To the extent that we do not include these estimates, we are underestimating the true benefits of 
increased personnel.40  
Finally, we defined our relevant population as Cook County. It is unclear if crimes are 
actually completely prevented in Cook County or just shifted elsewhere. If shifted elsewhere, it 
is also unclear if we should concern ourselves with the status of those outside of our region of 
focus.                                                          
39 Part of our discussion of elasticities is adapted from Levitt (1997). For a more detailed description of 
the problems associated with using crime elasticities to measure net social benefits, see Levitt (1997).  
40 Cohen (1996) estimates that of the $450 billion of the estimated annual cost of crime in the United 
States, $426 billion comes from violent crimes and only $24 billion from property crimes. Therefore 
focusing our analysis on violent crimes seems warranted.  
High Medium Low
High $253,236,310 $126,350,983 $87,841,604
Medium $164,087,638 $77,630,871 $53,144,955
Low $77,117,063 $28,269,757 $15,056,935
   
 
 
Cost 
per  
Crime 
Elasticity 
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4. Conclusion  
 
Building on the academic literature, we designed and implemented a cost-benefit analysis 
of the increased police personnel in Cook County resulting from ARRA grants. Using our 
preferred estimates, we find net benefits of $77.64 million. Using a range of additional estimates, 
we continue to find positive net benefits, from a low of $15.1 million to a high of $253.2 million, 
lending support to the robustness of our results. In total, we focused on $32.7 million in ARRA 
grants. This comprises 53% of all public safety grants. Further research should build on our 
analysis and estimate the impact that the remaining 47% of public safety ARRA grants had on 
Cook County.  
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Chapter 4. Housing   
1. Introduction 
 
1.1. The U.S. Housing Crisis 
 
Since its beginnings in 2006, the housing crisis has continued to challenge communities 
across America in what is now recognized to be one of largest economic recessions in the 
nation’s history. Despite countless efforts to counter the negative impacts of the housing crisis, 
by 2010 home prices had declined by almost 30 percent from their peak in 2006, according to the 
Case-Schiller Home Price Index, and over a million homes have been repossessed by banks 
(Marketwatch 2010 & RealtyTrac 2010). Notwithstanding, it is expected that the peak of 
foreclosure activity will not come until well into 2011, with RealtyTrac predicting that the 
number of U.S. homes receiving a foreclosure filing is likely to peak through an increase of 20 
percent from 2010 levels (2010). Already, one in every 593 housing units has received a 
foreclosure filing by April of 2011 corresponding to a total of over 1.8 million foreclosed homes 
(RealtyTrac 2011). Additional proof that the housing crisis is far from over is provided by a 
recent report that estimates a further 1.8 million homes seriously delinquent, in the foreclosure 
process or Real Estate Owned (REO) that are not currently listed for sale – also known as 
shadow inventory (Core Logic 2011).  
1.2. The Housing Crisis in Chicago 
As would be expected, Chicago has not been spared from this countrywide trend. In 2010, 
the City had the second highest decline in home property values among 20 U.S. metropolitan 
areas - 7.6 percent from the previous year’s 8.5 percent annual drop (Chicago Sun Times 2011). 
As a result, in 2010 the City had a total of 23,364 foreclosure filings, corresponding to 41.1 
filings per 1,000 mortgageable properties – the second highest for the Chicago six county region 
(Woodstock Institute 2011). Overall for the Chicago six county regions, 79,986 new foreclosure 
cases were filed in 2010, corresponding to a 38.1 percent increase over 2008 (Woodstock 
Institute 2011). Already, first quarter foreclosure filings for 2011 show an increase of 7.2 percent 
compared to the first quarter of 2010 for Cook County. In addition, there were 18,320 properties 
on the City's vacant building index as of September 2010, of which 69.2 percent were associated 
with a foreclosure filed between 2006 and the first half of 2010 (Smith & Duda 2011a). 
Interestingly, recent trends show that foreclosure filing seem to be concentrated in the 
region’s middle and upper-income urban and suburban communities. For example, according to 
the Woodstock Institute (2011), the greatest increases in new foreclosures fillings between 2009 
and 2010 include McHenry County (33 percent) and Will County (21.4 percent). Similarly, 
although the City of Chicago as a whole saw only a small increase in foreclosure filings (3 
 57 
percent) in 2010, neighborhood increases varied dramatically, with the Loop (53.7 percent), the 
Near South Side (44.9 percent) and Lincoln Park (34.6 percent) experiencing sharp increases. In 
contrast, foreclosure filing rates declined in some of the regions’ modest-income communities of 
color that were the most affected in the early years of the crisis. Thus, Washington Park 
experienced a 19.3 percent decrease in foreclosure filings, while Hermosa (16.7 percent) and 
West Englewood (16.2 percent) followed closely behind. Notwithstanding, the region’s South 
Cook County (50.9 per 1000 mortgageable homes) and City of Chicago (41.1 per 1000 
mortgageable homes) continue to have the largest number of new foreclosure filings per property.  
Historically, the communities most heavily impacted by Chicago's foreclosure problem 
were mostly concentrated on the west and south sides of the City. As shown by recent evidence, 
this continues to be the case. For example, as we have already noted, citywide data for 2010 
shows that there were 41.1 foreclosure filings per 1000 mortgageable properties. However, in 
communities such as Austin, Englewood, Humboldt Park, Washington Park, West Englewood, 
West Garfield and Woodlawn, foreclosures among 1,000 mortgageable properties ranged from 
46.3 to over 134 (Woodstock Institute Factbook)41.  
Furthermore, access to mortgage refinance loans has sharply declined in communities of 
color across the country. In Chicago in particular, while conventional refinance originations in 
predominantly white neighborhoods increased by 102 percent from 2008 to 2009, for the same 
period, these declined by 41 percent in communities of color (California Reinvestment Coalition 
et al 2011). Similarly, women are making up a larger share of bankruptcy filings in Cook County 
with the share in African American communities being substantially larger. Between 2006 and 
2010, women filed for bankruptcy at a rate of 2.6 per 100 adult women, while in African 
American communities this figure was 5.1 per 100 adult women. Overall, households headed by 
women in African-American communities represented the largest share of bankruptcy filings – 
16.7 percent of all cases in Cook County between 2006 and 2010 (Smith & Duda 2011b).  
1.3. American Recovery and Reinvestment Act Funding for the Housing Sector 
As we have seen, the concentrated numbers of foreclosures have been threatening 
communities across the country, and Chicago has been no exception. Where some analysis 
suggest the housing crisis was primarily driven by predatory lending and inflated real estate 
prices, the continued rate of foreclosures has been exacerbated by the prolonged economic 
decline and the resulting job losses. Regardless of the cause, the continued flow of foreclosed, 
vacant and abandoned homes has a substantial effect on local housing markets and threatens the 
vitality of affected communities.                                                         
41  The following are the corresponding figures by community: Austin (46.3), Englewood (50.3), 
Humboldt Park (56.7), Washington Park (134.3), West Englewood (51.4), West Garfield (65) and 
Woodlawn (87.6).  
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As a result, the U.S. Congress, through the Department of Housing and Urban 
Development (HUD), has undertaken a number of unprecedented actions in an effort to stabilize 
the housing and financial markets while preventing future job losses and promoting economic 
recovery. In 2008, as part of the Housing and Economic Recovery Act, the Neighborhood 
Stabilization Program (NSP) was created to provide over $3.9 billion in funding targeting the 
hardest hit areas while helping communities address the problems of vacant, abandoned and 
foreclosed homes. In May 2009, as part of the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act 
(ARRA), the NSP was extended for a second phase - referred to as NSPII – providing over $1.9 
billion in federal grants. Although a third phase was approved in September of 2010 as part of 
the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act for an additional $1 billion in 
funding, the program to be analyzed in the remainder of this chapter refers solely to funding 
provided through the NSPII.  
For the City of Chicago, three main housing programs – the NSPII and two Community 
Development Block Grants for Foreclosure Prevention Counseling and Outreach Events - 
received a total of $101 million dollars of ARRA funding to support innovative foreclosure 
prevention and neighborhood stabilization strategies at the local level in Chicago (See Table 1). 
Of note, all three programs were pre-existing initiatives directly related to foreclosure prevention 
and neighborhood stabilization, which allowed for swift incorporation of the additional ARRA 
funding by taking advantage of pre-existing platforms. 
Table 1. ARRA Housing Sector Funding for Chicago 
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1.3.1. The Neighborhood Stabilization Program II ($ 98,008,494) 
The NSPII was by far the largest component of ARRA funding for the housing sector, 
corresponding to close to 98 percent of all housing-related funding for the City. The program 
goal was to reverse the decline in home sales and support local economic development in 
targeted neighborhoods by purchasing and redeveloping foreclosed and vacant housing (City of 
Chicago 2011). Mercy Portfolio Services was selected to manage the funds as a sub-recipient 
under the Department of Community Development (recently renamed the Department of 
Housing and Economic Development). Mercy is responsible for negotiating discounted property 
purchases with the lending institutions that hold those properties. This agency acts to hold and 
maintain the property for the short term and oversees a broad network of pre-approved 
development partners on property rehabilitation and development. Once the sale is complete, 
Mercy adjudicates a transfer (acting much like a subsidy) to the corresponding development 
agency. Overall, more than 50 competitively selected developers, both non-profit and for-profit, 
are already working on NSPI and are pre-qualified for NSPII.42  
According to the NSP quarterly reports, NSPII is using the pre-existing platform of NSPI 
to distribute the additional ARRA funding. These funds will be funneled to specifically targeted 
neighborhoods, which include 36 census tracts in 12 communities, spanning the South, West and 
North Sides. These tracts have an average of 66.6 foreclosure filings per 1000 mortgageable 
homes in 2010, a median of 53.7 as well as a minimum of 39.2 in South Lawndale and a 
maximum of 134.3 in Washington Park (Own Calculations based on Woodstock Institute 
Factbook) 43. While these communities are not necessarily the hardest hit by foreclosures and 
face different levels of difficulty responding to the foreclosure crisis, they share the common 
challenges of widespread foreclosures, job losses, declining populations and low education levels 
(NSPII Application Form). Overall, using adjusted cost estimates from the first round of 
implementation, the City intends to: (1) Rehabilitate and reuse 1,331 housing units; (2) Demolish 
182 blighted, residential structures; and, (3) Construct 27 homes on demolished sites (Chicago 
NSP 2010).  
1.3.2. Foreclosure Prevention Counseling ($1,875,000) 
Through a community development block grant, the Department of Community 
Development directed the funds towards the efforts of 25 pre-existing counseling agencies 
intended to prevent or mitigate foreclosures in Chicago neighborhoods (See Annex 1). While 
increasing the means for general program support, a majority of the allotted funds were used to                                                         
42 http://recovery.cityofchicago.org/stimulus/en/narrative/investment_categories/housing/neighborhood_st
abilization0.html 
43 The 12 communities are: Albany Park (53.8 foreclosure filings per 1000 mortgageable homes in 2010), 
Chicago Lawn (60.9), Englewood (50.3), Grand Boulevard (130.8), Greater Grand Crossing (47.3), 
Hermosa (53.6), Humboldt Park (56.7), Logan Square (41), South Chicago (44.1), South Lawndale 
(39.2), Washington Park (134.3) and Woodlawn (87.6).  
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pay the salaries of 28 additional housing counselors who provide foreclosure prevention 
counseling to individuals at risk of losing their homes, pre-purchase counseling to new 
homebuyers, and counseling assistance to renters evicted due to building foreclosure (City of 
Chicago 2011b). Even though each organization may have a different approach to foreclosure 
prevention counseling, they all offer free services that focus on communication with lenders, 
clear explanations of financing solutions and provide trained housing counselors that help 
evaluate the client’s financial situation (Neighborhood Housing Services 2011a). 
1.3.3. Foreclosure Prevention Outreach and Events ($1,025,000) 
The ARRA funds allocated for foreclosure prevention outreach and events were directed 
to the Neighborhood Housing Services of Chicago in order to support program service delivery 
costs, marketing/outreach materials, and site and equipment rental for events designed to connect 
homeowners facing foreclosure with assistance within targeted areas in Chicago (City of 
Chicago 2011b). This particular program assists homeowners in completing and submitting loan 
modification applications, as well as providing support for follow-up and further processing 
procedures. These free events are typically two hour workshops hosted by various community 
centers across the City that provide one-on-one assistance and financial services for up to 30 
community members in several languages (Neighborhood Housing Services 2011b). 
 
2. Literature Review 
2.1. NSP Program Evaluation 
 
The NSP program is a relatively new initiative that is yet to be the subject of an 
interdependent program evaluation by a reputable agency. As indicated earlier, the first round of 
NSP funding was allocated in 2008. According to the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago, 
Community Affairs researchers across the Federal System began a study in 2009 evaluating the 
planning and implementation of the program at the federal level. The study, initially planned for 
release in the Fall of 2010, was to include interviews and other data on local capacity as well as 
early program outcomes in order to analyze various implementation challenges and possible best 
practices (MORE Report 2010). The MORE report mentions that this planned study will also 
provide the first nationwide examination of the early stages of the NSP44. 
Additional reports that solely focus on the NSP program are predominantly interested in 
providing case studies and implementation strategies, rather than evaluating the impact of the 
program on neighborhoods and communities. NeighborWorks America (2010, 2011a & 2011b) 
has provided several reports of this type, offering detailed information on over 20 case studies in 
towns and municipalities throughout the country.   
 
                                                        
44 To date, we have no knowledge that this report has been released or made available to the public. 
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2.2. Foreclosure Prevention Counseling Evaluations 
According to Hornburg (2004), there is a relatively limited body of research on the 
effectiveness and impact of homeownership counseling. The homeownership counseling industry 
is situated within a rapidly changing and growing financial services industry that has witnessed 
an array of developments, including an increase in specialized financial services, within the last 
two decades. This growing industry has engendered the need for consumers to become 
increasingly more informed about the financial options available to them, resulting in a 
heightened interest in financial literacy programs. These include pre-purchase counseling 
programs and delinquency-default programs, with foreclosure prevention counseling most often 
referring to the latter.  
In the numerous studies examined by Hornburg (2004) and Strauss (1997), it is often 
implied that foreclosure prevention counseling is effective, without empirically stating the 
positive effects. Hornburg points out that the lack of good empirical evidence is often attributed 
to a high degree of heterogeneity among the different programs. Furthermore, McGilvray (2000) 
highlights that the main barrier to researching the counseling effectiveness of foreclosure 
prevention programs remains the lack of a consistent standard for data collection. As the author 
points out, many practitioners have an aversion to providing data for formal research since it may 
require that the various institutions offering counseling services redirect their often limited 
resources towards outside interest, as opposed to concentrating on counseling service provision. 
Notwithstanding, this is not always the case as demonstrated by the Neighborhood 
Housing Services (NHS) of Chicago, an organization that places a profound importance on data 
collection, including the provision of an annual report indicating foreclosure prevention activities 
and outcomes. In 2010, the NHS provided personal counseling services to over 4,000 families, 
with an additional 2,800 families attending a foreclosure prevention class (NHS 2010). Similarly, 
the NHS assisted 1,010 families in avoiding foreclosure in Chicago with about 76 percent of 
these “saves” achieved through personal counseling services (NHS 2010). Even though the data 
provided by NHS may be quite narrow in scope, they have developed a standard method of 
counseling and data collection that can serve as a starting point for similar organizations and/or 
initiatives. 
3. Cost-Benefit Analysis Methodology 
 Foreclosed and vacant homes affect neighborhoods in many ways. Besides causing 
financial, emotional and physical effects on those who are losing their home, foreclosures also 
harm surrounding neighbors. Recent studies by Immergluck & Smith (2006a) and Harding et al 
(2009) have shown that each foreclosed or vacant property reduces the values of other properties 
within 1/8 of a mile or closer by roughly one percent, while others (see Mallach 2009) have 
indicated even larger effects for those properties directly adjacent to blighted structures. The 
decrease in property values can result in lower tax revenues for local government, which in 
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response may need to cut back city services provided in the area. Notwithstanding, government 
could also increase the tax rate to compensate for the windfall and possibly adversely affect 
already depressed areas. Furthermore, vacant properties also attract elements of crime and may 
pose safety concerns for nearby residents, while also increasing municipal costs in a variety of 
ways. As foreclosures become concentrated within a neighborhood, these negative trends can 
spill beyond the immediate area to the wider community, causing a downward spiral that affects 
cities on a greater scale (Levi 2009).  
 From this literature we derive the main impact measures that will be used in the analysis 
of NSPII. In addition, we also include a measure of the municipal costs that are associated with 
the foreclosure process in the City of Chicago as based on estimates derived from Apgar and 
Duda (2005). Finally, it is important to note that one of the main ways that foreclosures harm 
neighborhoods is through violent crime generated by extended vacancies and abandoned 
buildings. For instance, Immergluck and Smith (2006b) using data from foreclosures, 
neighborhood characteristics and crime from the City of Chicago, conclude that higher 
foreclosure levels contribute to higher levels of violent crime. Overall, the author’s findings 
suggest that a one percent increase in the foreclosure rate is expected to increase the number of 
violent crimes in a census tract by as much as 2.33 percent. Though, Immergluck and Smith find 
that the results for property crime are not statistically significant. Notwithstanding, for the 
remainder of the analysis it is deemed reasonable to assume that much of the costs associated 
with increased criminal activity in the corresponding communities will be reflected on the price 
of the housing units.   
3.1. Estimating Decreases in Property Values  
 In order to estimate the decreases in property values resulting from the existing stock of 
foreclosed properties, a composite methodology developed by the previously mentioned 
literature will be implemented. Building on a recent study by the Center for Responsible 
Learning (CRL) (2009) we assess the impact of foreclosed or vacant properties on neighboring 
homes by using data on the density of local housing units and median house prices for each 
census tract. Assuming that the predicted foreclosures within each census tract are evenly 
distributed throughout the tract, we calculate the number of foreclosures expected to be within 
1/8 of mile of each non-foreclosed home. In other words, for a given census tract: 
Let A be the total area in square miles; 
B be the imputed number of NSPII houses rebuilt or rehabilitated in each tract that is assigned 
proportionate to the number of foreclosures; 
C be the total number of housing units; 
D be the median house price by tract; 
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The variable G is equal to 64A/π. This measure tells us the number of circles with a 1/8th of a 
mile radius that can fit into each tract.  
Then the number of foreclosed homes within1/8th of a mile of any given home in the tract 
experiencing devaluation is given by: H = B/G (CLR 2009). Correspondingly, the dollar amount 
of the decrease in house value from the foreclosure effect is given by the estimated percentage 
decrease in house values due to neighboring foreclosed properties. Based on findings by Harding 
et al (2009), if there are 3 or more foreclosed properties, it is assumed to correspond to a 3 
percent decline in property values, while if there are less than 3, a 1 percent decline per 
foreclosure is used.45.  
 For the NSPII impact effect on property values, we will use the number of purchased, 
rehabilitated and rebuilt or demolished properties (1513) to recalculate the number of foreclosed 
or vacant properties and estimate the effect of taking these properties off the "vacant list." This 
will give us the costs avoided by preventing the decrease in property value of surrounding 
structures by rehabilitating those problematic properties. 
3.2. Municipal Costs of the Foreclosure Process 
 As previously mentioned, Apgar and Duda (2005) review the foreclosure process in the 
City of Chicago and isolate 26 separate costs which are incurred throughout the foreclosure 
process as well as related services. These costs reflect actions taken by 15 separate governmental 
units that are part of the overall municipal infrastructure underlying the foreclosure process. The 
paper provides an in depth look at the range of characteristics that foreclosures can exhibit and 
the related costs which may include demolition fees, building inspections, legal expenses, court 
costs and an increased burden on fire departments due to vandalism.  
 In a "simple foreclosure," which the authors define as a property that has completed the 
foreclosure process without ever being vacant, as many as six separate Cook County departments 
are involved. As the process of foreclosure encounters complications, the costs and number of 
governmental units involved often increase dramatically. According to Apgar and Duda, the 
foreclosure process typically lasts 13 months in Illinois, which means a building may remain 
vacant and unsecured for months. For as long as a unit is vacant, it is often accessible to “vandals, 
squatters, and criminals” regardless of any efforts to board and secure it, which can often be 
ineffective. The various costs that the local government can accrue due to complications during 
the foreclosure process, depending on the state of the housing unit, are summarized in Table 3. 
 Based on these estimates, we calculate the NSPII impact effect on municipal costs, using 
the different states of the properties within our sample. That is, for the City of Chicago, vacant                                                         
45 Thus, if H > 3, then 3 percent*C*D, if H < 3, then 1 percent* H*C*D. In essence, this provides the 
basis for a calculation of total averted losses from prevented foreclosures.   
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and secured properties are estimated to incur municipal costs of $430, vacant and unsecured 
properties sustain charges valued at $5,338 and vacant, unsecured to be demolished properties 
experience costs of $13,452 (Adgar and Duda 2005). 
Table 3. Costs of Foreclosures to Local Government (Apgar and Duda 2005) 
 
4. Cost-Benefit Analysis Results 
Our preliminary results show that the impact on averted property value losses results in a 
gross benefit of approximately $114.47 million. Importantly, it is worth noting that the analysis 
only focused on owner-occupied housing and not on rentals or commercial property. Table 4 
provides insight into the averted property value calculations with an additional and more detailed 
analysis provided in Annex 2.  
Table 4. Averted Property Value Declines (or “Losses”) 
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To estimate the municipal costs associated with properties in foreclosure, we first 
calculated the proportion of properties under each of the possible scenarios. According to Smith 
and Duda (2011) since the City of Chicago strengthened its vacant building ordinance in 2008, 
requiring owners of properties that are vacant over 30 days to register their properties with the 
City and pay a $250 registration fee, it is sensible to assume that those properties not registered 
are likely not secured up to the standards defined by the City. As a result, Smith and Duda 
estimate that of the 4,478 single-family properties still in the REO inventory in Chicago at the 
end of the third quarter of 2010, 2,558, or 57.1 percent, were not registered with the City as 
vacant buildings. Using these estimates, we estimated that there are a total of 572 vacant and 
secured properties in the City of Chicago accruing municipal costs of $430, 759 vacant and 
unsecured properties with municipal costs corresponding to $5,358 and 182 properties that are 
currently vacant, unsecured and to be demolished at a cost of $13,452. Given these numbers, the 
total of avoided municipal costs from the NSPII program is  $7.88 million46.  
Finally, by considering the NSPII grants as a transfer scheme, it can be regarded as 
providing a benefit equal to the total amount of grants administered, which is approximately $98 
million. Consequently, adding these benefits we obtain a gross benefit for the NSPII program of  
$220.35 million and a net benefit of $122.35 million. Notwithstanding, even if we consider the 
transfer to be a cost, as opposed to neutral, the benefits of the program remain positive ($24.35 
million) although substantially reduced. 
Table 5. Summary Results 
 
 
 
 
 
5. Conclusions and Recommendations 
In 2010, banks foreclosed on a record number of properties and it is predicted that the 
peak of foreclosure activity will not come until well into 2011. Over the course of the crisis, high 
concentrations of distressed foreclosed properties have threatened neighborhood stability and 
economic opportunities, resulting in costs far greater than the values of these homes. With 
declining property values and increasing vacancies and abandonment, the social and economic 
fabric of entire neighborhoods is deteriorating. Rebuilding that fabric is a complex and costly 
endeavor, which often requires broader steps than simply removing or blighted and vacant 
properties from a neighborhood (Mallach 2009). Notwithstanding, as we have seen with the 
NSPII, such initiatives can provide benefits to distressed communities that can further have a                                                         
46 These benefits are presented in 2009 US dollars, as are the rest of the figures in the CBA. The original 
estimates derived from Adpgar and Duda (2005) use 2003 US dollars as their base.  
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stream of positive spillover effects. In the case of the NSPII, the net benefits of the program, 
$121.23 million, by far exceeded the investments.  
Furthermore, one of the ways that ARRA funds have been distributed to deal with 
deteriorating neighborhood effects is to offer foreclosure counseling and outreach for owners and 
renters that are struggling to stay in their homes. This attempt to stabilize the community by 
mitigating the disruption of neighborhood flight is a key component to addressing the effects of 
the recent foreclosure crisis. Despite this, given methodological and data limitations, the benefits 
of such programs are difficult to assess and are not reflected in our net benefits figures above. 
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Chapter 5. Transportation and Infrastructure 
1. Introduction: Program Overview and Funding 
 
Cook County and the City of Chicago received $692 million in America Recovery and 
Reinvestment (ARRA) funds for transportation and infrastructure projects.47  Figure 1 and Table 
1 summarize ARRA transportation and infrastructure funding by program.  Annex 1, Chapter 5 
in the Appendix has a more detailed breakdown of transportation and infrastructure funding by 
source.  Due to a number of conflicting data streams, the total funding calculated was compiled 
based on only externally validated numbers. 
 
Figure 1. Breakdown of ARRA funding by category.  The City of Chicago received a total 
of $692 million of ARRA funding for transportation and infrastructure projects. 
 
 
According to the Illinois Recovery Act database, road projects received the largest share 
of ARRA transportation and infrastructure funds.  $269.6 million went to road projects, with 
road resurfacing projects receiving the greatest share of funds (State of Illinois 2011).  The 
second largest share of ARRA funds went to the Chicago Transit Authority (CTA), which 
received $248.7 million for a variety of projects (City of Chicago 2011).  Approximately, $90                                                         
47 According to the Third Quarter 2010 Dashboard, a total of $499.6 million ARRA transportation and 
infrastructure funding had been awarded, and $312.2 million had been invested (62%).  We believe that 
the programs included in this number are a subset of the programs we considered to be part of the ARRA 
funded transportation and infrastructure umbrella. 
(in millions) 
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million of the funds were used for capital improvements to CTA facilities, as well as bus and rail 
infrastructure.  Chicago committed $87.8 million to the Dearborn Subway track renewable 
project, which repaired nearly nine miles of track.  Last, about $52 million of CTA funds were 
invested to purchase 58 new hybrid buses. 
 
Table 1. Summary of ARRA transportation and infrastructure funding by project. 
 
 
Chicago dedicated $133 million of ARRA funds to an ongoing high speed rail project, 
though none of the funds have been obligated.  Aviation projects received $24.7 million under 
the Airport improvement Program (FAA 2001) of which the largest funding share went to the 
Chicago O’Hare runway rehabilitation project.  Last, water infrastructure projects such as water 
main and sewer improvements received $16 million (IEPA 2011). 
The following literature review looks at the standard economic impacts in each of the 
transportation and infrastructure programs.  We then present our estimates of the benefits of 
three ARRA funded transportation and infrastructure projects: the CTA purchase of 58 hybrid 
Chicago O'Hare Noise Mitigation 5,000,000$                
Chicago O'Hare Runway Rehab 12,294,387$              
Chicago/Rockford Renovations 4,672,000$                
Midway Cameras 2,734,418$                
Total 24,700,805$              
Water Main Replacement 6,051,467$                
Sewer Replacement 10,000,000$              
Total 16,051,467$              
Street Lighting 2,191,967$                
Street Resurfacing 159,820,774$            
Traffic Signals 576,742$                    
Highway Construction 90,552,887$              
Engineering 11,066,522$              
Other 5,406,433$                
Total 269,615,325$            
Total 133,000,000$            
Dearborn Subway Track 87,800,000$              
Cermak/Chinatown Station 12,500,000$              
Hybrid Buses 51,500,000$              
CTA Maintenance 89,931,915$              
Other 6,944,528$                
Total 248,676,443$            
Highway Planning & Construction
ARRA TRANSPORTATION & INFRASTRUCTURE 
FUNDING SUMMARY
Grand Total =
Aviation Improvement
Water Maintenance
CTA/Transit
High Speed Rail Investment
692,044,040$          
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buses, the Chicago O’Hare Runway Rehabilitation project, and the Dearborn Subway 
Renovation project.  These cost-benefit analysis case studies were chosen in part by consistent 
reporting of awarded funding, available information and data, and measureable economic 
impacts. 
2.  Literature Review 
2.1.  Aviation 
 
Chicago ARRA funds were channeled through the Federal Aviation Administration’s 
Airport Improvement Program (FAA AIP) which provides grants to public and private agencies 
for public airports included in the National Plan of Integrated Airport Systems (City of Chicago 
(a) 2011). The grants target medium to large sized airports, and cover 75% of eligible project 
costs and 80% of noise mitigation project costs.  The FAA prioritizes grants based on the 
National Priority Rating (NPR), which is scaled from 1-100, with a higher rating signifying 
greater priority.  NPR thresholds are often overridden when projects address important state and 
local priorities, environmental issues, safety, airport growth and pavement conditions.  A higher 
than usual NPR threshold 48 of greater than or equal to 62 was applied to ARRA projects.  
Despite the higher standard, only half of the ARRA aviation projects listed in Table 7.1 met the 
higher NPR criteria (FAA (a) 2011). 
Most of the ARRA aviation funded projects were for capacity improvements.  The FAA 
recommends large capacity projects when an airport approaches 60-75% of capacity.  The 
evident impacts of capacity related projects are reductions in congestion and delay. The direct 
costs of delay are increased fuel costs and crew time, while the indirect costs include passenger 
travel time, air emissions and second order network delays (i.e. delay propagation multipliers) 
(Welman et. al. 2010).  According to the Department of Transportation (DOT), a “delay” is 
considered to be a flight whose arrival or departure time exceeds 15 minutes.  Among the 35 
busiest U.S. airports contained in the Operational Evolution Plan, the average delay per operation 
is four minutes.  Airport specific data is available via the Bureau Transportation Statistics. 
In addition to capacity projects, Chicago used ARRA aviation funds for noise mitigation 
projects and safety enhancements.  According to the FAA, efforts to reduce noise pollution 
provide an economic benefit to society. The benefits of noise mitigation are quantified in terms 
of physical units such as area, number of dwellings, and the population that is impacted (noise 
footprint).  Then the before and after noise levels are considered.   Sound measures include Day-
Night Average Sound Level, which is the cumulative impact of noise (in decibels) over a 24 
hours period.  The FAA has an alternative model for noise abatement called the Area Equivalent 
Method, which estimates the size of a land mass impacted by a given noise.  Lastly, FAA 
guidance on aviation cost-benefit analyses places significant weight on safety benefits; they                                                         
48 As of 2005, discretionary grants require an NPR of 41. 85% of grants issues from 2005-2009 met that 
criteria. 
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recommend monetizing safety benefits in terms of the value of statistical life of reduced 
accidents and fatalities (Hoffer et. al. 1998; FAA (b) 2008). 
2.2.  Water 
 
The City of Chicago falls within the Northeastern Illinois region, where Lake Michigan 
provides 68.8% of water resources (Chicago Metropolitan Agency for Planning 2010).  The 
remainder of the region’s water is supplied by groundwater (16.9%) and local rivers (14.3%).  A 
1967 U.S. Supreme Court decision placed a cap on Illinois’ share of water from Lake Michigan.  
The diverted amount of water covered by the statute includes rainfall and storm water destined 
for Lake Michigan, whether or not it was captured, treated or consumed.  2005 water data shows 
that Illinois only diverted 85% of its water allowance, relative to 120% during the 1990’s (Beyer-
Clow et. al. 2009).  In 2005, 60% of the diverted water was pumped for use, and 28% was lost as 
storm water runoff (U.S. Army Corps of Engineers 2005).  Given that the water supply in the 
region is fixed, while demand is growing, strategic planning and management of water resources 
is essential.   
The water management projects funded by ARRA reflect the critical goals of water 
infrastructure investment in Chicago: efficiency and conservation.  Efficiency gains come from 
achieving the same level of output with less inputs into the system, whereas conservation 
attempts to reduce overall water consumption (Beecher 2010).  Capital investments in water 
infrastructure help to reduce water loss or leakage in the system, which promotes efficiency.  
Chicago’s water system has more than 8,000 miles of distribution pipes, 47,600 fire hydrants and 
263,000 catch and value basins.  Most of the water main system was installed between 1890-
1940 are in need of repair.  The City is looking to ramp up the replacement rate up to 75 miles 
per year, which is forecasted to save 40 million gallons of water a day by 2016 (Beecher 2010).  
Further, some studies consider infrastructure improvements with respect to land use.  The 
intention is that more strategic decisions regarding development in the context of current water 
infrastructure capacity could help reduce the strain on current resources. 
Sturm and Thorton (2011) contend that water loss control programs, which concentrate 
on water distribution, are a cost effective way to promote efficiency and conservation.  In the 
realm of water control programs, costs are fairly easy to quantify, while benefits are more 
difficult, making cost effectiveness a more practical measure.   Sturm and Thorton define cost 
effectiveness as the comparison of costs with its benefits, expressed in physical units (i.e. dollar 
per acre foot of savings).  The authors recommend several interventions such as active leak 
detection, pressure management and district metering.  Lastly, they provide data demonstrating 
cost differences between demand management strategies and distribution programs (water loss 
controls).  The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency also has a comprehensive report on 
mitigating water losses related to drinking water systems (EPA (b) 2010). 
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2.3.  Roads 
 
There is a spatial mismatch between where people live and where they work. 
Compounding this is the uniformity of when people travel. The common adage of “working from 
nine to five” is more than just maxim, as it highlights the capacity shortage of traveling in 
America that manifests through traffic and congestion. One solution lies in a decrease in travel 
time through improvements in current infrastructure, such as ensuring high road quality and 
traffic control infrastructure.  
 Roads help to transport people between points, but not without its own deterioration.  
Deterioration is determined by two main factors: road quality and the level of traffic. Quality 
refers to the grade of pavement, the capacity design of the road (whether suburban or highway), 
and the vertical and horizontal set of the road that predicts how environmental conditions will 
cause road fractures (Archondo-Callao 2011).  Traffic volume, including weight, average speed 
and presence of pedestrians, all affect how pressure is applied to the road and how it will degrade 
over time (TX DOT 2010).  Deterioration of roads results in slower traffic and increased travel 
time, which can be monetized as an opportunity cost. The addition of more roads also 
encourages more traffic through an increase in road capacity; the increased flow of traffic causes 
congestion, in turn resulting in economic and environmental consequences (Gazis 2002). 
2.4.  Rail 
 
A popular method of transit infrastructure is high speed rail. Compared to bus 
transportation systems, rail is more expensive to both construct and operate.  However, it is 
generally more successful in attracting new passengers, and is more efficient in situations with 
high levels of ridership.5 Furthermore, rail produces denser development around connection 
nodes that result in more environmentally friendly land development (Todorovich et. al. 2011).    
As of February 2011, the federal government has begun the initial stages of intercity (or city to 
city) high-speed rail.  The proposal includes connecting Chicago to six neighboring cities, 
Detroit, St. Louis, the Twin Cities, Kansas City and Iowa City, with possible extensions to 
Oklahoma City and Omaha (FRA 2011).  It is relevant to note that this design is not to boost 
exurban commuters, but to re-invigorate national train travel and encourage greater bonds 
between these cities.  
 In a case study of Amtrak in Texas, 77% of all trips concluded out of state (Morgan et. 
al. 2009), indicating the train’s viability as a mode of travel.  Chicago’s central location makes it 
a hub for most modes of transit, and making it the hub of a Midwest high-speed rail network is 
not surprising. However, there is no available public ridership forecast, only quantifications of 
Chicago’s travel market (Todorovich et.al. 2011).  There are millions of travelers who ferry 
between Chicago and their destinations, but very little concrete evidence that they would take 
rail rather than their current mode of transportation. 
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2.5.  Transit 
 
Aside from road expansion, augmenting traffic volume and reducing congestion can be 
tackled by expansion of public transit. Transit systems can increase efficiency by reducing traffic 
and congestion (as fewer people will be driving personal vehicles) resulting in lower levels of 
particulate matter (PM) emissions. High levels of PM emissions are highly correlated with severe 
complications of the heart and lungs, especially for children under eighteen and those over sixty-
five (EPA (c) 2011).  These particles can cause cancer and at the most extreme, premature death 
(EPA (d) 2003).  Diesel hybrid buses with the federally mandated filters produce less PM 
emissions then normal diesel buses (San Francisco MTA 2011). 
The federal government provides partial funding for environmentally-friendly, public 
transport, so long as projects meet public transit design requirements.  The criteria include six 
cost effective measures: 1) incremental cost per hour of transportation system user benefit; 2) 
transit and mobility performance measured by user benefits per passenger mile; 3) number of 
transit dependents using the project; 4) transit dependent user benefits per passenger mile; 5) 
share of user benefits received by transit dependents compared to share of transit dependents in 
the region and 6) environmental benefits measured in air quality (DOT 2010).  The DOT is 
currently reviewing its metrics to widen the scope of measured benefits, but this review is still 
on-going and currently not publicly available (FTA 2010). 
In the absence of revised federal criteria, many municipalities and organizations have 
developed techniques to quantify these transit design metrics.  Often a travel demand forecast is 
conducted; a travel demand predicts the estimated ridership levels during peak hours, and also 
compares traffic flow between a forecast with the system against a baseline without the system, 
using an input output model (Blonn 2006; Litman 2011).  A number of reports relied on the 
metrics cost of carbon dioxide emissions and cost of traveling.  The most common metric was 
vehicle miles traveled (VMT), which measures the number of cars traveling on an average day.  
VMT figures are then extrapolated to determine crash and fatalities statistics and traffic density 
(EIA 2002). 
Based on the reviewed literature, we have derived a set of economic impact measures for 
each transportation and infrastructure ARRA funding category. Table 2.1 summarizes our 
recommendations. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 73 
Table 2.1. Summary of literature review 
Summary of Literature Review for ARRA funded projects in Chicago 
Source Impact Measure ARRA CBA 
Aviation 
Capacity improvement 
Runway rehabilitation & terminal expansion: delay 
reduction 
Noise mitigation Reduction in noise footprint 
Safety 
Midway cameras: increased security and reduced 
fatalities 
Water 
Conservation & 
Efficiency 
Water mains: increased water flow due to population 
growth 
Sewer: reduced leakage per gallon through sewage 
system 
Roads 
Mobility 
Street resurfacing, traffic signals, highway engineering 
& construction: improved travel time, less emissions, 
congestion cost decline 
Rail Capacity increase 
Building high speed rail: reduced price for interstate 
travel, reduced pressure on other transportation modes 
Economic development Economic growth of adjacent areas 
Transit 
Capacity improvement Improved ridership, increased revenue 
Congestion reduction 
Reduction in congestion measured by travel time cost 
savings 
3. CBA: Purchase of Hybrid Buses 
3.1. Introduction 
 
In 2009, the CTA committed $51.5 million of ARRA funds to purchase 58 60-foot 4000- 
Series New Flyer Hybrid Buses.49  The hybrid buses arrived in the fall of 2009.  This analysis 
focuses on monetizing the four key benefits of the new hybrid buses: 
 
1) Fuel cost savings: Transportation agencies perpetually struggle with increasing fuel costs.  
According to the 2011 CTA Budget, fuel costs represent 4.6% ($58 million) of the total 
2010 operating budget (CTA 2011).  Research indicates that hybrid buses offer a 28-48% 
increase in fuel economy which makes them attractive to the CTA (EESI 2007).   
                                                        
49 The Chicago ARRA data cites $51.5 million for 52 buses meanwhile other sources reference $49 
million for 58 buses.  We confirmed that 58 buses were purchased and delivered. 
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2) Environmental and climate change benefits: Fuel consumption savings translate into 
environmental and climate change benefits from the reduction in diesel emissions and 
greenhouse gases. 
3) Health Benefits: The reduction in particulate matter (PM) emissions reduces the risk of 
negative health outcomes.  A study conducted by the World Health Organization reveals 
that at 10 PPM, there is a 6% increase in risk of PM related deaths (WHO 2005). 
4) Maintenance cost savings: In general, hybrid buses are cheaper to maintain than the 
conventional diesel buses given the reduced stress on brakes and electric drive, requiring 
fewer repairs than regular transmission buses. The CTA estimates that the hybrid bus 
technology will save the agency nearly $2.3 million annually in maintenance, parts and 
labor costs over the current bus fleet in service (CTA 2009). 
The calculated total net present value also includes the ARRA grant for the purchase of 
hybrid buses. Since the CTA is continuously replacing its bus fleet with hybrid buses, without 
ARRA funding, the purchase of additional buses would have otherwise transpired in a short time 
horizon. The ARRA grant was essentially a “free gift” to the CTA and included in the total 
monetized benefit. 
 
3.2. Methodology & Results 
 
According to the CTA’s Presentation on Alternative Fuels (2009), prior to the arrival of 
the ARRA funded hybrid buses, the CTA bus fleet consisted of 2024 buses.  With the addition of 
the 58 new hybrid buses, we assumed the bus fleet grew to 2082 buses, with no additional buses 
being added or retired from the fleet.  For our baseline counterfactual, we assumed that without 
ARRA funding, 58 new diesel buses would have been purchased and added to the fleet, with no 
additional buses being added or retired from the fleet.  In our sensitivity analysis we address a 
number of alternative counterfactuals, including the case when diesel buses are retired and 
capacity is reduced.  Table 3.2.1 summarizes the CTA bus capacity at the end of 2009. 
 
Table 3.2.1. Inventory of 2009 CTA bus fleet under ARRA funded (addition of 58 new 
hybrid buses) and counterfactual (addition of 58 new diesel buses) scenarios. 
 
 
30 ft Diesel 500 Series Optima Opus 45 45 3.300
40 ft Diesel 6000-series Flxible Metro 299 299 3.375
40 ft Diesel 6400-series NOVA Bus LFS 480 480 3.375
40 ft Diesel 1000-series New Flyer D40LF 1088 1030 3.280
40 ft Hybrid 800-series New Flyer DE40LF 10 10 3.650
40 ft Hybrid 900-series New Flyer DE40LF 10 10 3.650
60 ft Hybrid 4000-series New Flyer DE60LF 150 208 3.700
Total 2009 CTA bus fleet = 2082 2082
COUNTERFACTUAL: FLEET 
WITH 58 NEW DIESEL BUSES
ARRA FUNDING: FLEET WITH 58 
NEW HYBRID BUSES
BUS TYPE MODEL MPG BUS
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Figure 3.2.1. Outline of ARRA funded hybrid bus benefit calculations. 
 
 
Figure 3.2.1 outlines our methodology in calculating the benefits from the ARRA funded 
hybrid buses.  Under the ARRA funded and counterfactual scenarios, and from the diesel and 
hybrid bus capacity, we estimate CTA bus fleet mileage and then fuel consumption.  We use the 
difference in fuel consumption between the two scenarios to estimate the expected benefits from 
the hybrid buses. 
 
In addition, we made the following baseline assumptions: 
 
• The lifetime of a hybrid bus is 15 years.  The ARRA funded hybrid buses became 
operational at the end of the 2009, we calculate the lifetime of the hybrid bus from 2009-
2023. 
• During this time frame, there is no change in ridership demand, nor change in bus route 
or route frequency (fleet mileage is constant). 
• Each bus (regardless of its fuel economy) drives the same number of miles per year. 
• The City of Chicago diesel fuel contract price stays constant at $3.49/gallon.50 
 
According to the CTA’s Presentation on Alternative Fuels, prior to ARRA funding, the 
average weekday miles for the CTA bus fleet was approximately 220,000 system miles per day.  
Using the CTA Annual Ridership Report’s (2011) percentage of weekday and weekend 
passenger boardings, we extrapolate this number and estimate that the CTA bus fleet drove a 
total of 69,110,089 miles per year.  This equates to 34,145 miles per year per bus.  With the 
addition of the 58 new buses, holding miles/year per bus constant, this equates to 71,090,516 
system miles. 
 
  
                                                         
50 The City of Chicago diesel fuel contract price expires in September 2013.  We assume the contract does 
not expire for the 15 year hybrid bus lifetime.  In our sensitivity analysis we assume an increase in diesel 
fuel prices. 
 Mileage of 
Fleet 
Fuel 
Consumptio
 
Fuel Cost 
Savings 
Environmen
tal and 
 
 
Number of 
hybrid/dies
  
Maintenanc
e Cost 
 
Health 
Benefits 
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Fuel Cost Savings:51 
 
From total fleet miles calculated, we determined the percent share of miles per bus.  For 
example, according to Table 3.2.1, under the ARRA funding scenario there are a total of 208 60-
foot hybrid buses, and under the counterfactual there are 150 60-foot hybrid buses.  Since there 
are a total of 2082 buses, the percent share of the 60-foot hybrid buses from the ARRA funded 
scenario is 9.99%, while in the counterfactual it is 7.20%. 
Since we assumed that each bus drives the same number of miles per year, using the 
estimated 71,090,516 miles per year for the CTA bus fleet, for each of the 60-foot hybrid bus 
fleets, we can then determine the number of miles per year for the ARRA funded and 
counterfactual scenarios.  From miles per year, using the buses’ fuel economy from Table 3.2.1, 
we calculated the difference in fuel consumption, in gallons per year, between the ARRA funded 
hybrid buses and the counterfactual.  Based on the $3.49 per gallon diesel price, we then 
calculate fuel cost savings per year. 
Table 3.2.2 summarizes the differences in fuel consumption for the various types of CTA 
buses.  After summing up the difference in fuel costs per year for each type of bus, we 
determined the total discounted fuel cost savings over the fleet’s 15 year lifetime, at a 3.2% 
discount rate.  Overall, the total discounted fuel cost savings from the ARRA funded hybrid 
buses is $2,904,729. 
                                                        
51 Detailed fuel cost, environmental and health benefit example calculations are located in Chapter 5, 
Section 2 of the Appendix. 
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Table 3.2.2: Summary of fuel cost savings between the ARRA funded 58 new hybrid buses, and counterfactual of 58 new diesel 
buses.
58 DIESEL BUSES 58 HYBRID BUSES 58 DIESEL BUSES 58 HYBRID BUSES 58 DIESEL BUSES 58 HYBRID BUSES 58 DIESEL BUSES 58 HYBRID BUSES
30 ft Diesel 2.16% 2.16% 1,536,539            1,536,539              465,618               465,618                 0 $1,625,006 $1,625,006 $0
40 ft Diesel 14.36% 14.36% 10,209,445          10,209,445            3,025,021            3,025,021             0 $10,557,322 $10,557,322 $0
40 ft Diesel 23.05% 23.05% 16,389,744          16,389,744            4,856,221            4,856,221             0 $16,948,210 $16,948,210 $0
40 ft Diesel 52.26% 49.47% 37,150,087          35,169,660            11,326,246         10,722,457           603,789                 $39,528,599 $37,421,376 $2,107,223
40 ft Hybrid 0.48% 0.48% 341,453                341,453                  93,549                  93,549                   0 $326,485 $326,485 $0
40 ft Hybrid 0.48% 0.48% 341,453                341,453                  93,549                  93,549                   0 $326,485 $326,485 $0
60 ft Hybrid 7.20% 9.99% 5,121,795            7,102,223              1,384,269            1,919,520             -535251 $4,831,099 $6,699,123 -$1,868,025
Total 71,090,516          71,090,516            21,244,472         21,175,933           68,538                   $74,143,206 $73,904,007 $239,198
Discounted fuel cost savings for 15 years with a 3.2% discount rate = $2,904,729
DIFFERENCE IN FUEL 
COST/YEAR
DIFFERENCE IN 
GALLONS/YEAR
BUS TYPE PERCENT SHARE OF FLEET MILES PER YEAR GALLLONS/YEAR FUEL COST/YEAR
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Environmental and Climate Change Benefits: 
 
In order to calculate the environmental and climate change benefits from the ARRA 
funded 58 hybrid buses, we make the following assumptions in Table 3.2.3:  
 
Table 3.2.3. Summary of emissions per gallon diesel and emission price assumptions.  
Source for emissions (lbs/gallon): Hill (1996) 
 
 
From Table 3.2.2, the total difference in diesel fuel saved between the ARRA funded 
hybrid buses and the counterfactual is 68,538 gallons per year.  Using this value, we calculated 
the yearly savings in fleet emission output for CO2, NOx and SOx summarized in Table 3.2.4.  
Total emissions saved per year, from the ARRA funded hybrid buses is $1866.58 per year.  
Therefore, the total discounted emission cost savings over the fleet’s 15 year lifetime, at a 3.2% 
discount rate, $22,667.  Using the low and high carbon price, the total discounted environmental 
and climate change benefits from the ARRA funded hybrid buses range from $7,574 - $72,114. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
EMISSIONS PRICE
(lbs/gallon diesel ($/short tons)
CO2 2.22 $7.25, $23.59, $77.11
$23.59: weighted-average global carbon 
price estimate (Point Carbon 2011).  For 
sensitivity analysis we used $7.26 
(Nordhaus 2007) and $77.11 (Stern 2007)
NOX 0.00256 $750
Estimated average price for NOx (EPA 
2009) price trends 2005-2009.  While we 
believe these prices reflect environmental 
externalities (ozone formation) in 
addition, we assume this value accurately 
portrays the price of cl imate externalities.
SOX 0.000371 $500
Estimated average price for SOx (EPA 
2009) price trends 2005-2008.  While we 
believe these prices reflect environmental 
externalities (acid rain), in addition, we 
assume this value accurately portrays the 
price of cl imate externalities.
PM10 0.00111 NA
EMISSION PRICE SOURCE
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Table 3.2.4 Summary of emission cost savings per year, based on the baseline scenario of 
68,538 gallons diesel saved per year.  
 
 
Health Benefits: 
 
In order to estimate health benefits from the ARRA funded hybrid buses, we first 
estimate the number of premature deaths in Cook County due to PM emissions.  There are an 
estimated 15,000 premature deaths per year in the U.S. due to PM emissions (Esworthy 2006). 
Based on the 2010 U.S. population of 309,000,000 (Census Bureau 2010) and 2009 Cook 
County population of 5,287,037 (Census Bureau 2010), we pro-rate the number of premature 
deaths due to PM to 256.65 people per year in Cook County. 
In Table 3.2.5, based on the difference in fuel consumption per year from the ARRA 
funded hybrid buses and the counterfactual, we determined a 0.32% percent reduction per year of 
PM emissions.  We can now estimate the impact of premature deaths in Cook County; a 0.32% 
reduction in the number of premature deaths in Cook County results in 0.8307 fewer deaths per 
year.  Based on Viscusi (2003), we use $8,442,000 as the value of a statistical life to monetize 
the PM reduction benefits from the hybrid buses.  Overall, the total discounted health benefits of 
the ARRA funded hybrid buses, over a 15 year lifetime, at a 3.2% discount rate, is $89,530,574. 
 
Table 3.2.5. Summary of health benefits per year, based on 256.65 premature deaths due to 
PM per year in Cook County 
 
 
Maintenance Cost Savings: 
 
To estimate maintenance cost savings from the hybrid buses, we examined CTA fleet 
maintenance cost budget data from 2002 – 2006 (CTA (c-g)). We selected this time period for 
two reasons. First, CTA purchased their first hybrid buses in late 2006; hence, the maintenance 
cost data from 2007 and later would contain a fleet mix of diesel and hybrid buses. Second, CTA 
emissions saved/year (lbs) savings ($/year)
CO2 152,154.79 $1,794.42
NOX 175.46 $65.80
SOX 25.43 $6.36
Total emissions savings/year = $1,866.58
Total discounted lifetime emissions savings = $22,666.96
(based on 68,538 gallons diesel saved/year)
Scenario Gallons consumed/year PM 10 (lbs/year)
ARRA Funding 21,244,472 23,581
Counterfactual 21,175,933 23,505
% Change PM from ARRA funding = 0.32%
Reduction in premature deaths in Cook County = 0.8307 people/year
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reported its budget in a consistent format over this period. Using CTA budget information on 
garage and heavy maintenance for its bus fleet, we derived an annually increasing maintenance 
cost per diesel bus, and averaged out this rate over 15 years.  This resulted is a 2.5% annual 
increase in fleet maintenance costs.  
To predict the increase in fleet maintenance costs through 2023, we use 2005 as our 
baseline year.  The CTA budget reports maintenance values from five years back (i.e. 2010 
budget report includes data for 2005 – 2010) (CTA (h) 2010).  One concern is that the CTA 
budget reporting lacks consistency; maintenance data in the 2010 budget report do not match 
reported maintenance costs in the 2005 budget report.  As a compromise, we use a 2005 
maintenance expense per diesel bus ($78,767) from the 2010 budget report, to derive increasing 
maintenance costs (2.5% yearly growth) for the 15 years lifespan of a hybrid bus.  
An Environmental and Energy Institute study (2007) reported that the operational cost for 
hybrid buses is 15% lower than for diesel buses, based on a year-long evaluation of New York’s 
hybrid bus fleet.  However, since hybrid buses were recently introduced on a wide scale to the 
public transit market, information regarding its actual maintenance cost savings over a 
significant time period is limited, and varies by the bus manufacturer; we address this concern in 
our sensitivity analysis.  In sum, the total discounted maintenance cost savings from the ARRA 
funded hybrid buses, over the fleet’s 15 year lifetime, at a 3.2% discount rate, is $10,944,612. 
Table 3.2.6 summarizes the total discounted benefits of the ARRA funded hybrid buses.  
The impact of fuel cost savings, environmental and climate change benefits, health benefits, and 
maintenance cost savings sum up to $103,402,582 (using the low and high carbon price, this total 
benefit ranges from $103,387,496 to $103,452,030).  With the addition of the ARRA grant, the 
total benefit of the hybrid buses is $154,902,582.   
 
Table 3.2.6: Summary baseline results, assuming a counterfactual of 58 new diesel buses 
purchased, and no change in passenger demand, diesel price or fleet capacity. 
 
 
Sensitivity analysis 
 
In our baseline scenario, we assumed that without ARRA funding, the city would instead 
purchase 58 new diesel buses.  We also hold constant diesel price and passenger demand over 
CO2 $23.59/short ton
Fuel Cost Savings $2,904,729
Environmental Benefits $22,667
Health Benefits $89,530,574
Maintenance Cost Savings $10,944,612
Total = $103,402,582
ARRA grant $51,500,000
Total NPV $154,902,582
HYBRID BUS BASELINE CBA SUMMARY
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the lifetime of the hybrid bus.  The baseline scenario fails to take into account the changing state 
and age of the CTA bus fleet.  For example, in 2009 many of the 40 foot Diesel 6000-Series 
Flexible Metro buses had exceeded their life expectancy and were due to be retired.  Further, 
according to the 2010 budget recommendations, the CTA is pushing to eventually replace its 
entire fleet with hybrid buses (CTA (h) 2010).  Any change in bus capacity or bus route will shift 
the stress of each individual bus; for example, lost capacity can mean that each bus has to drive 
more miles per day, or that routes are modified such that fleet miles per day stays constant. 
In our sensitivity analysis we test 22 alternative scenarios which impact fuel cost savings, 
environmental and climate cost savings, health benefits and maintenance cost savings.  First, we 
assumed that fleet mileage would stay constant, increase or decrease.  Then, under these three 
categories, we examined different sets of parameter assumptions for capacity, passenger demand, 
diesel prices and maintenance cost as listed in Table 3.2.7.  Since we vary two variables at a 
time, we can not necessarily discern trends across categories (i.e. we cannot directly compare 
benefits from a scenario with an increase in miles from an increase in passenger demand, to a 
scenario with no change in miles from constant passenger demand).  By comparing benefits 
derived by changing each variable, ceteris paribus, we found that in general, an increase in 
passenger demand, bus capacity, diesel prices or maintenance cost savings resulted in an increase 
in hybrid bus benefits. 
When fleet mileage increases, through an addition of 12 buses per year, benefits 
decreased by approximately $5 million (1d-e).  In contrast if mileage increased due to a growing 
passenger demand (3.5 – 14% increase over 15 years), benefits decreased by approximately 2% 
(1a-c).  Scenarios decreasing fleet mileage mirror the scenarios increasing fleet mileage.  We 
found that a decrease in capacity results in a 1.3% decrease in benefits (3d), while a reduction in 
passenger demand lowers benefits on average by 2% (3a-c).  When fleet mileage remains 
constant, benefits increased if CTA continues to retire its old diesel buses (2f); this is consistent 
with the fact that retirement of one diesel bus impacts all benefit categories except for 
maintenance cost savings.  In addition, an increase in diesel prices yields benefits between $101 
and $102 million (2h-j).  Last, the variation in benefits from the various maintenance cost 
savings scenarios range from -7% to 9% (2k-n); this is important to note due to the age of hybrid 
technology. 
The selected scenarios were chosen to capture realistic situations that the CTA could be 
faced with.  Figure 3.2.2 and Annex 2, Chapter 5 in the Appendix, shows that the benefits from 
the ARRA funded hybrid buses, in the alternative scenarios, ranged from $96,106,173 to 
$114,347,193.  Benefits fluctuated between -7% to 9% of the baseline scenario, demonstrating 
the robustness of our analysis.  Overall, even with uncertainty regarding the future development 
of CTA public transit, there were substantial benefits in purchasing the hybrid buses. 
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Table 3.2.7. Summary of sensitivity analysis alternative scenarios.  Scenario (2a) is the 
original baseline scenario. 
1a 0.25%/year (3.5% over 15 years)
1b 0.5%/year (7% over 15 years)
1c 1%/year (14% over 15 years)
1d increase number of diesel buses
1e increase number of hybrid buses
2a
passenger demand 
remains constant
2b increase number of diesel buses
2c increase number of hybrid buses
2d
no buses 
retire/replaced
2f
decrease diesel buses 
(12 buses retired/year)
2h $0.10/year ($1.50 over 15 years)
2i $0.15/year ($2.25 over 15 years)
2j $0.25/year ($3.75 over 15 years)
2k maintenance cost savings 5%/hybrid bus
2l maintenance cost savings 10%/ hybrid bus
2m maintenance cost savings 20%/hybrid bus
2n maintenance cost savings 30%/hybrid bus
3a 0.25%/year (3.5% over 15 years)
3b 0.5%/year (7% over 15 years)
3c 1%/year (14% over 15 years)
3d
decrease diesel buses 
(12 buses retired/year)D
EC
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ILE
S
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decreases
increase buses  (12 
additional buses/year)
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increases
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additional buses/year)
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decrease/increase
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Figure 3.2.2. Total discounted benefits by scenario.  The colored estimates calculate benefits with a carbon price at 
$23.59/short tons.  Red = increase in miles, blue = no change in miles, yellow = decrease in miles.  The grey and black estimate 
total benefits from a low and high carbon price.  Scenario (2a) is the original baseline scenario. 
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4. CBA: O'Hare Runway and Taxiway Rehabilitation 
 
4.1.  Introduction 
In 2009, the City of Chicago received $12.2 million in ARRA stimulus money to 
rehabilitate the runway at Chicago O'Hare International Airport.  The grant was awarded by the 
Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) as a first competitive grant funded by ARRA.  The 
stimulus money was used to replace concrete pavement on runway 10/28 and to widen and 
relocate Taxiway M, which is parallel to runway 10/28. This project was completed at the 
beginning of 2010 (City of Chicago (b) 2009). 
O'Hare is one of the busiest airports in the nation. Given the limited capacity and growing 
passenger demand, O’Hare has consistently ranked as having one of the highest delays in the 
U.S.  The $6.6 billion O'Hare modernization plan, approved by FAA in 2005, aims to reduce 
delays by 80%, and increase airport capacity by 60% through additional terminal space and 
airfield reconfiguration.  As part of the airfield reconfiguration, extensive work is being done on 
runway 10/28 (FAA 2005).  For the purpose of this cost-benefit analysis, we consider the ARRA 
funded O'Hare runway rehabilitation project as a part of the modernization plan; given the 
ongoing work on runway 10/28, it is impossible to derive individual benefits without taking into 
account the big picture of O’Hare renovations. 
The O'Hare modernization plan incorporates detailed modeling of future passenger and 
airline demand, and estimates airport delays with and without renovations.  Based on FAA 
Airport Benefit-Cost Analysis Guidance (1999), the standard benefit for runway and taxiway 
reconstruction projects is the “avoided loss of capacity benefits associated with facility failure."  
Increased capacity results in reduced delays at the airport; this CBA considers delay reduction as 
the most significant project benefit.  
 
4.2. Methodology & Results 
 
Airport delays are calculated by comparing airport capacity with airport demand. The 
monetized average cost of delays includes direct costs (such as crew, fuel and oil), total 
maintenance costs, and indirect cost (such as passenger time). According to the Department of 
Transportation, a flight is considered delayed if its arrival or departure time exceeds 15 minutes 
of its scheduled time.  The O'Hare Modernization Program Business Case (2005) estimates that 
for "every additional minute of average annual delay [it] equates to roughly $20 - 40 million" in 
passenger costs.  Using the average of these two estimates and available O’Hare delay data, we 
estimate time cost savings associated with the reduction in delay from the ARRA funded runway 
and taxiway rehabilitation project. 
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The following assumptions were made: 
 
• The counterfactual is that the O’Hare modernization project would not have occurred. 
• Without the modernization plan, there will be no reduction in delays; thus benefits are 
derived through the modernization plan. 
• The ARRA funded portion of the project was utilized at the end of 2009, resulting in 
benefits starting in 2009. 
• Runway rehabilitation (replacement of concrete pavement) prolongs runway life by 20 
years (Eugene Airport 2010); benefits for this project will accrue until 2030. 
• The modernization project is scalable.  The entire project is expected to reduce airport 
delays; thus the ARRA funded portion would be expected to reduce delays by: 
($ARRA grant/total cost of modernization project) * (total reduction in delays) 
 
Figure 4.2.1 shows the forecasted delay development with and without the O’Hare 
modernization plan.  The O'Hare Modernization Program Business Case forecast delay 
developments up to 2016.  Since airport demand is expected to increase linearly by 3% per year, 
and the modernization plan increases airport capacity by 60%, we estimate steady growth in 
delays for both the ARRA funded and counterfactual scenarios. 
 
Figure 4.2.1. Projected delay time at Chicago O’Hare Airport with and without the 
modernization project. 
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 The total benefit of the O'Hara modernization plan was calculated as follows: 
 
yearly total benefit = 
(delay without modernization plan in period t - delay with modernization plan in period t ) * $30 million cost 
ratio for scaling down benefits = ARRA Funding(total cost of modernization plan +  ARRA funding) = 0.18% 
 
Table 4.2.1. Yearly benefits of ARRA funded O’Hare Runway and Taxiway rehabilitation 
project 
 
 
Table 4.2.1 shows the yearly benefits from delay reductions.  The total discounted 
benefits, derived from the runway and taxiway rehabilitation, over the prolonged 20 year 
lifetime, at a 3.2% discount rate is $10,519, 270.  Similar to the purchase of the hybrid buses, the 
ARRA grant towards the O’Hare modernization project ($12,294,387) is considered a free 
rescaling factor = 0.00186
Year
Delay without 
modernization 
program
Delay with 
modernization 
program
Decrease 
in delay
Total Benefits for 
O'Hare Modernization
Discounted re-scaled 
benefit of runway and 
taxiway rehab
2009 16.5 10.8 5.75 $172,500,000 $321,331
2010 17.0 12.1 4.92 $142,926,357 $266,241
2011 17.5 13.4 4.08 $115,020,882 $214,259
2012 18.0 14.8 3.25 $88,708,559 $165,245
2013 18.5 4.0 14.5 $383,504,503 $714,387
2014 19.0 4.5 14.5 $371,612,891 $692,235
2015 19.5 5.0 14.5 $360,090,010 $670,771
2016 20.0 5.5 14.5 $348,924,429 $649,972
2017 20.5 6.0 14.5 $338,105,066 $629,817
2018 21.0 6.5 14.5 $327,621,188 $610,288
2019 21.5 7.0 14.5 $317,462,392 $591,364
2020 22.0 7.5 14.5 $307,618,597 $573,028
2021 22.5 8.0 14.5 $298,080,036 $555,259
2022 23.0 8.5 14.5 $288,837,244 $538,042
2023 23.5 9.0 14.5 $279,881,050 $521,358
2024 24.0 9.5 14.5 $271,202,568 $505,192
2025 24.5 10.0 14.5 $262,793,186 $489,527
2026 25.0 10.5 14.5 $254,644,560 $474,348
2027 25.5 11.0 14.5 $246,748,605 $459,640
2028 26.0 11.5 14.5 $239,097,485 $445,387
2029 26.5 12.0 14.5 $231,683,610 $431,577
Total Benefit = $10,519,270
ARRA FUNDED O'HARE RUNWAY AND TAXIWAY REHABILITATION PROJECT
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monetary gift to O’Hare and included as a benefit in the analysis. Overall, the total benefits 
derived from the ARRA funded runway rehabilitation project is $22,813,657.   
This cost-benefit analysis uses delay and cost data as reported in the O'Hare 
Modernization Program Business Case to ensure consistency in our analysis. The following 
sensitivity analysis addresses scenarios in which values reported in the O'Hare Modernization 
Program Business Case were over or underestimated.  In particular, we examine eight different 
scenarios for delay development, and examine a lower and upper bound in delay costs ($20 and 
$40 million). 
In scenarios 1 and 2 of the sensitivity analysis, the change in delays are based on the 
assumption that the baseline scenario (no modernization plan) can be influenced by external 
shocks such as the economic crisis, an increase in fuel costs, or an increase in competition.  We 
suppose that the demand forecast can vary substantially from our baseline scenario.  The results, 
summarized in Table 4.2.2 and Figure 4.2.2, show that delay reduction benefits increase by 
almost 1/3 when passenger demand is greatly underestimated (1d).  On the other hand, a 
decrease in delays of up to one minute, when passenger demand is overestimated, decreases 
benefits by $750,000 (2b). 
The cost of a one minute of delay can also vary substantially given the different 
valuations of passenger time.  For example, if the majority of passengers are traveling for leisure, 
resulting in a lower valuation of time, the cost of a one minute of delay reduces by 1/3, resulting 
in a 33% decrease in benefits (3a). In contrast, if the majority of passengers are traveling for 
business, this will raise the cost of a one minute delay by up to $14 million in benefits.     
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   86 
Table 4.2.2. Summary of yearly benefits of ARRA funded O’Hare Runway and Taxiway 
rehabilitation project based on an increase and decrease in delay time, and over and 
underestimate of delay costs. 
   
SCENARIO   
BENEFIT FROM 
DELAY 
REDUCTION 
CBA forecasted yearly delay $10,519,270 
      
1 
INCREASE IN DELAY (PASSENGER DEMAND 
UNDERESTIMATED)   
1a increase by 1 additional minute (only baseline) $11,314,432 
1b increase by 2 additional minutes (only baseline) $12,099,445 
1c 
increase by 3 additional minutes (baseline), 1 minute with 
modernization $12,017,363 
1d 
increase by 5 additional minutes (baseline), 1 minute with 
modernization $13,587,388 
      
2 
DECREASE IN DELAY (PASSENGER DEMAND 
OVERESTIMATED)   
2a decrease by 0.5 additional minute (only baseline) $10,136,913 
2b decrease by 1 additional minute (only baseline) $9,744,407 
2c 
decrease by 2 additional minutes (baseline), 0.5 minutes with 
modernization $9,392,942 
2d 
decrease by 2 additional minutes (baseline), 1 minute with 
modernization $9,826,490 
      
3 OVER/UNDERESTIMATION OF DELAY COST   
3a delay cost of 1 minute = $20M $7,019,613 
3b delay cost of 1 minute = $40M $14,039,226 
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Figure 4.2.2. Summary of yearly benefits of ARRA funded O’Hare Runway and Taxiway 
rehabilitation project based on an increase and decrease in delay time, and over and 
underestimate of delay costs. 
 
 
5. CBA: Dearborn Subway 
 
5.1. Introduction 
 
The Dearborn Subway covers 8.67 miles of blue line track from Division to UIC-Halsted, 
including part of the Loop.  Originally constructed in the 1950s, by 2009 rail had deteriorated to 
the extent that 6.8% of the Dearborn Subway were considered slow zones, with some areas 
restricting rail speed to as low as 6 mph (City of Chicago 2010).  In March 2009, 3.39% of track 
was limited to rail speeds less than 15 mph and 3.62% of track was limited to rail speeds 
between 15 – 25 mph, in comparison to the normal speeds of up to 55 mph. 
$87.8 million of ARRA funds were granted for the Dearborn Subway track replacement.  
Renovations began in April 2009, with Phase I and II focused on replacing track between 
Division and Grand, and Phase III focused on track between Clark/Lake and UIC-Halsted.  By 
the end of 2009 year (9 months later) all slow zones had been eliminated (City of Chicago 2010).   
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The Dearborn Subway track renewal project was a “shovel-ready” project; when ARRA 
funding was announced, it became one of the first Chicago transportation and infrastructure 
projects to receive grant funding.  Without ARRA funding it is uncertain when this project would 
have been completed, yet there is a high probability that the necessary renovations would have 
eventually taken place.  Our counterfactual assumes the project would have begun two or five 
years later (Table 3.1.1, the years marked in green).  Thus, when determining the benefit of the 
Dearborn project, we only consider the benefits accrued during the lag time – the time between 
the actual ARRA funded Dearborn project and the counterfactual (the years marked in yellow). 
 
Table 5.1.1. Time frame of the Dearborn Subway track renewal project and 
counterfactuals.  Benefits are calculated only for the lag time between when the ARRA 
project and counterfactual begins. 
 
 
If Dearborn track renovations had not occurred, the CTA projected that slow zones would 
have increase to 33% by December 2009 (City of Chicago 2010).  Thus the benefit of the ARRA 
funded Dearborn project is the earlier experience of saved time due to the earlier completion of 
the project.  Renovating the Dearborn Subway also had a cost; regardless of when the project 
occurs (either from ARRA funding or during the counterfactual), the renovations will cause a 
temporary increase in time delays.  However, since the delays from the ARRA funded project 
occurred in 2009 opposed to two or five years later – the 2009 delays are undiscounted and 
valued at the full cost.  Overall, we aggregated both the time saved and lost from the ARRA 
funded Dearborn project, and monetized this value based on the average Chicago hourly wage. 
 
5.2. Methodology & Results 
 
As displayed in Table 5.1.1, in order to estimate an increase in time costs from a project 
lag of two or five years, we considered the timeframe from 2009-2015.  First we looked at the 
costs accrued during the ARRA funded Dearborn Subway project.  Using the CTA slow zone 
YEAR ARRA LAG2
LAG0 2009 2009
LAG1 2010 2010
LAG2 2011 2011
LAG3 2012 2012
LAG4 2013 2013
LAG5 2014 2014
LAG6 2015 2015
year project begins =
2014
2015
LAG5
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
years benefits are 
calculated =
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maps (CTA (a) 2011) of the Dearborn Subway, we estimated the increase in passenger time 
delays during the renovation period, and then monetized these costs.  In addition, we assumed 
after the completion of the project, from 2010-2015, there would be no additional time delays. 
According to the CTA, at the completion of the project in January 2010, the Dearborn Subway 
reported no slow zones with trains moving at normal speeds of up to 55 mph.  Therefore, for a 
one-way trip through the Dearborn Subway in 2010, with no stops, we assume it takes: 
 8.6777 miles ∗  4.3388 miles one−way trip
8.6777 miles round trip ∗  hour55 miles ∗  60 minuteshour  = 4.733 minutes 
 
Using CTA bus tracker and Google Maps, we estimated the time it takes to get from one 
end to the other of the Dearborn Metro (from Division to UIC-Halsted) is approximately 14 
minutes, with no delays.  In order to reconcile the metro time with and without stops, we 
calculate a rescaling factor: 
 Dearborn Subway time with stopsDearborn Subway time with no stops =  14 minutes4.733 minutes = 2.958 
 
Using this rescaling factor, we can now calculate the travel time through the Dearborn 
Subway during reconstruction.   For example, according to the CTA slow zone map for April 27, 
2009, 8,172 feet of track was limited to rail speeds less than 15 mph, and 4,210 feet of track was 
limited to rail speeds between 15 – 25 mph.   Therefore, the one-way travel time through the 
Dearborn Subway during this time period was: 
  �8,172 feet ∗  4.3388 miles one − way trip8.6777 miles round trip ∗  mile5280 feet ∗  hour15 miles ∗  60 minuteshour �+  �4,210 feet ∗  4.3388 miles one − way trip8.6777 miles round trip ∗  miles5280 feet ∗  hour15 miles ∗  60 minuteshour �+  �33,436 feet ∗  4.3388 miles one − way trip8.6777 miles round trip ∗  miles5280 feet ∗  hour15 miles ∗  60 minuteshour �= 7.506 minutes with no stops   
Rescaled = 7.506 minutes * 2.958 = 22.202 minutes with stops 
 
Table 5.2.1 summarizes the time for a one-way trip through the Dearborn Subway during 
the renovation and for the years following project completion. 
Next, in order to determine the time cost for each passenger, we need to know the number 
of the riders using the Dearborn Subway per day.  According to the Illinois Section of the 
American Society of Civil Engineers (2011), the Dearborn Subway serves over 165,000 
customers per day (the same person using the blue line twice a day would be considered two 
customers).  Yet we do not know how long each passenger uses the Dearborn Subway – while 
some riders may stay for the entire 4.5 mile track, others may hop off half-way.  To account for 
this difference, we make the assumption that each of the ten stops on the Dearborn track are 
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evenly distributed from one another, and ridership time follows a normal distribution.  Then, by 
taking the mean value, we assume that the time spent on the Dearborn Subway is the equivalence 
of 82,500 customers riding the full length of the Dearborn Subway.  In comparison, according to 
the CTA Annual Ridership Report (2010), an average of 579,478 passengers utilized rail on 
weekdays, with 132,325 (22.8%) passengers boarding on the Blue Line, and 57,175 (9.86%) 
boarding at the Loop.  The Blue line is the second most utilized CTA rail line. 
Based on the percentage of customers using the Dearborn Subway on weekends and the 
82,500 customers per weekday value, we estimate that there are 34,599 and 24,821 customers 
utilizing the Dearborn Subway each Saturday and Sunday respectively.  Using the number of 
customers riding the Dearborn Subway each day, and the number of days on the Slow Zone 
maps, we can now calculate the total additional time for a one-way trip. 
For example, for the slow zone dated April 27 – May 18, 2009, there were 16 weekdays, 
three Saturdays and three Sundays.  During this time period, we previously calculated that it 
takes 22.202 minutes, with stops, to ride the full length of the Dearborn Subway.  Thus, the total 
time for this time period is: 
 82,500 customersweekday ∗ 16 weekdays ∗ 22.202 minutes ∗  hour60 minutes = 488,444 hours 34,599 customersweekday ∗ 3 weekdays ∗ 22.202 minutes ∗  hour60 minutes =  38,408 hours 24,821 customersweekday ∗ 3 weekdays ∗ 22.202 minutes ∗  hour60 minutes =  27,553 hours 
Total time = 488,444 hours + 38,408 hours + 27,553 hours = 554,415 hours 
 
Hours become monetized based on the Chicago hourly wage rate of $23.90/hour (BLS 
2010).  Since commuting time is valued less than time spent in the workforce, we monetize time 
costs at 50% of the wage rate, at $11.95/hour.  Therefore, in our example for April 27 – May 18, 
2009, the total time cost, at a discount rate of 3.2% is: 
 
�554,415 hours ∗  $11.95
hour
� ∗  1(1+0.032)0 = $6,517,145 
 
The time cost for each period during the renovation, and at the completion of the 
Dearborn project, is summarized in Table 5.2.2.  Overall, the total time cost of the Dearborn 
Subway renovation project was $446,739,654. 
In our counterfactual, we assumed the same project took place, either two or five years 
later.  The delay in the project means that that the slow zones would have increased to 33% 
starting in December of 2009.  We assume these slow zones hold constant at this rate until 
renovations begin.  Using the same method outlined above, we calculate the time cost due to the 
project delay, during the renovation period and for the years following project completion.  Our 
results for LAG2 and LAG5 are summarized in Annex 3 and 4, Chapter 5 in the Appendix.  The 
difference in time costs between the ARRA funded Dearborn Subway renovation and the 
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counterfactual equal the total time benefits.  Similar to the hybrid bus purchase and O’Hare 
runway rehabilitation analyses, we include the ARRA grant as a benefit. 
Overall, the total benefit of the ARRA funded 2009 Dearborn Subway renovation project 
is $135,434,384 with a counterfactual lag time of two years.  The total benefit of the project is 
$247,075,809 with a counterfactual lag time of five years.  Our results are summarized in Table 
5.2.3 and displayed in Figure 5.2.1.  To check the robustness of our results, we test two 
additional counterfactuals.  The first includes an increase in slow zones to 45% starting in year 
2013.  In the other counterfactual, ridership demand increases to 7% starting in year 2013.  A 
summary of these time costs and total benefits are in Annex 5 and 6, Chapter 5 in the Appendix. 
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Table 5.2.1. Increase in time delay during the ARRA funded Dearborn Subway project and for the years following project 
completion.  The shaded dates indicate the time period when the project took place. 
 
 
 
Rescaling factor = 2.9577
(based on a 14 minute, one-way trip with 0% slow zones )
15 MPH 25 MPH 55 MPH TOTAL SLOW ZONE
CALCULATED TIME FOR 
ONE-WAY TRIP
RE-SCALED TIME FOR 
ONE-WAY TRIP
(FEET) (FEET) (FEET) (FEET) (MINUTES) (MINUTES)
April 1 - 26, 2009 1,816              4,667              39,335             6,483                         14.10 5.812 17.191
April 27 - May 18, 2009 8,172              4,210              33,436             12,382                       27.00 7.506 22.202
May 19 - June 1, 2009 24,945           2,704              18,169             27,649                       60.30 11.940 35.317
June 2 - 15, 2009 18,217           2,704              24,897             20,921                       45.70 10.087 29.835
June 16 - July 6, 2009 13,794           2,704              29,320             16,498                       36.00 8.868 26.231
July 7 - August 4, 2009 14,794           2,704              28,320             17,498                       38.20 9.144 27.046
August 5 - 19, 2009 8,330              2,704              34,784             11,034                       24.10 7.363 21.779
August 20 - 31, 2009 7,255              2,704              35,859             9,959                         21.70 7.067 20.903
September 1 -14, 2009 3,147              2,704              39,967             5,851                         12.80 5.935 17.556
September 15 - October 1, 2009 7,302              2,704              35,812             10,006                       21.80 7.080 20.941
October 2 - 20, 2009 15,342           2,704              27,772             18,046                       39.40 9.295 27.492
October 21 - November 10, 2009 11,823           1,342              32,653             13,165                       28.70 8.157 24.126
November 11 - 24, 2009 11,519           0 34,299             11,519                       25.10 7.907 23.386
November 25 - December 13, 2009 7,197              0 38,621             7,197                         15.60 6.716 19.864
December 14 - 30, 2009 2,968              0 42,850             2,968                         6.50 5.551 16.418
December 31, 2009 - December 31, 2010 0 0 45,818             0 0.00 4.733 14.000
2011 0 0 45,818             0 0.00 4.733 14.000
2012 0 0 45,818             0 0.00 4.733 14.000
2013 0 0 45,818             0 0.00 4.733 14.000
2014 0 0 45,818             0 0.00 4.733 14.000
2015 0 0 45,818             0 0.00 4.733 14.000
ARRA FUNDED 2009 DEARBORN SUBWAY RENOVATION PROJECT, WITH 33% SLOW ZONES STARTING DECEMBER 2009
DATES % SLOW ZONE
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Table 5.2.2. Cost in time (in hours and based on an $11.95/hour) during the ARRA funded Dearborn Subway project and for 
the years following project completion.   Shaded dates indicate the time period when the project took taking place.
 
WEEKDAY SATURDAY SUNDAY
82500 34599 24821
RE-SCALED TIME FOR 
ONE-WAY TRIP
WEEKDAY SATURDAY SUNDAY TOTAL TIME
WEEKDAYS SATURDAYS SUNDAYS (MINUTES) (HOURS) (HOURS) (HOURS) (HOURS)
April 1 - 26, 2009 13 3 3 17.191 307,288                     29,739                      21,334                358,362               4,212,547$              
April 27 - May 18, 2009 16 3 3 22.202 488,452                     38,409                      27,554                554,415               6,517,145$              
May 19 - June 1, 2009 10 2 2 35.317 485,610                     40,731                      29,220                555,561               6,530,620$              
June 2 - 15, 2009 10 2 2 29.835 410,231                     34,409                      24,684                469,324               5,516,905$              
June 16 - July 6, 2009 15 3 3 26.231 541,016                     45,378                      32,553                618,948               7,275,730$              
July 7 - August 4, 2009 22 4 4 27.046 818,138                     62,384                      44,753                925,275               10,876,608$            
August 5 - 19, 2009 11 2 2 21.779 329,406                     25,118                      18,019                372,542               4,379,235$              
August 20 - 31, 2009 8 2 2 20.903 229,933                     24,107                      17,294                271,334               3,189,534$              
September 1 -14, 2009 10 2 2 17.556 241,391                     20,247                      14,525                276,163               3,246,292$              
September 15 - October 1, 2009 13 2 2 20.941 374,325                     24,152                      17,326                415,803               4,887,759$              
October 2 - 20, 2009 13 3 3 27.492 491,427                     47,560                      34,119                573,106               6,736,862$              
October 21 - November 10, 2009 15 3 3 24.126 497,592                     41,736                      29,941                569,269               6,691,752$              
November 11 - 24, 2009 10 2 2 23.386 321,556                     26,971                      19,348                367,875               4,324,373$              
November 25 - December 13, 2009 13 3 3 19.864 355,073                     34,364                      24,652                414,090               4,867,623$              
December 14 - 30, 2009 13 2 2 16.418 293,479                     18,935                      13,584                325,998               3,832,102$              
December 31, 2009 - December 31, 2010 262 52 52 14.000 5,043,500                 419,801                   301,155             5,764,457           65,660,065$            
2011 260 53 52 14.000 5,005,000                 427,874                   301,155             5,734,030           63,288,263$            
2012 261 52 53 14.000 5,024,250                 419,801                   306,947             5,750,998           61,507,314$            
2013 261 52 53 14.000 5,024,250                 419,801                   306,947             5,750,998           59,600,110$            
2014 261 52 52 14.000 5,024,250                 419,801                   301,155             5,745,207           57,693,887$            
2015 261 52 52 14.000 5,024,250                 419,801                   301,155             5,745,207           55,904,929$            
TOTAL TIME COST = 446,739,654$         
ARRA FUNDED 2009 DEARBORN SUBWAY RENOVATION PROJECT, WITH 33% SLOW ZONES STARTING DECEMBER 2009
PASSENGER TIME FOR ONE-WAY TRIP BASED ON PASSENGERS/DAY & 
NUMBER OF DAYS IN TIME PERIOD
DISCOUNTED 
COST OF TIME
TIME PERIOD
NUMBER OF PASSENGERS/DAY BASED ON CTA RIDERSHIP REPORT
NUMBER OF DAYS IN TIME PERIOD
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Table 5.2.3: Summary of total discounted benefits of ARRA funded 2009 Dearborn Subway renovation project, under stated 
counterfactuals. 
 
 
Figure 5.2.1. Summary of total discounted benefits of ARRA funded 2009 Dearborn Subway renovation project (not including 
the ARRA grant) under stated counterfactuals. 
BASELINE ASSUMPTIONS
COST IN 
HOURS
TIME COST IN 
WAGES
COST DIFFERENCE 
IN YEARS FROM 
ARRA 2009
COST DIFFERENCE IN 
WAGES FROM ARRA 2009 
= TOTAL TIME BENEFIT
TOTAL DISCOUNTED 
BENEFITS (TIME COST 
+ ARRA GRANT
ARRA 2009 @ 33% slow zones 41,558,959        446,739,654$      -- -- --
LAG2 2011 @ 33% slow zones 45,895,041        494,374,038$      495                            47,634,384$                             135,434,384$                
LAG5 2014 @ 33% slow zones 56,594,498        606,015,464$      1,716                         159,275,809$                          247,075,809$                
LAG5 2014 @ 2013 45% slow zones 57,894,035        619,483,132$      1,865                         172,743,478$                          260,543,478$                
LAG5 2014 @ 2013 7% ridership growth 58,249,967        622,724,360$      1,905                         175,984,706$                          263,784,706$                
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6. Conclusions 
  
The net present values of the three cost-benefit analyses are summarized below in Table 
6.1.  These cost-benefit analyses reflect approximately $151.6 million (nearly 25%) of ARRA 
transportation and infrastructure investments, and had a total net present value of $313 million.  
Two points should be reiterated.  First, unlike some of the other ARRA funded cost-benefit 
analyses conducted (such as in the energy or housing sector), the ARRA grant is included as a 
long-term capital benefit.  Second, without the ARRA grant included as a benefit, we feel that 
the net present value of a majority of transportation and infrastructure benefits would have been 
negative.  This stems from the fact that infrastructure and transportations repairs are perpetually 
ongoing; without the ARRA grant, in a matter of time, they would have undoubtedly still 
occurred. 
 
Table 6.1. Net present value of three transportation and infrastructure cost-benefit 
analyses. 
CBA SUMMARIES 
Project   
ARRA 
Funding  Impact Measure Net Present Value  
Dearborn Subway Rehabilitation $87.8M $47.6M  $135.4M  
 O’Hara Runway Rehabilitation $12.3M $10.5M  $22.8M  
Purchase of Hybrid Buses  $51.5M $103.4M  $154.9M  
 
In addition, equipped with information regarding the different transportation and 
infrastructure programs funded, we considered the potential economic impacts for each program 
area.  This report includes a literature review of our research into those impacts and measurement 
strategies.  The literature review is intended to motivate future analysis within the individual 
program areas.                   
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Chapter 6. Energy and the Environment 
1. Overview  
The American Reinvestment and Recovery Act (ARRA) signed into law February 2009 
provided billions of dollars for projects aimed at moving the nation toward a greener future.  
Through the Chicago Recovery Partnership, Chicago was able to secure over $170 million for 
local energy and environmental projects.  The funds are being used to help advance Chicago’s 
Climate Action Plan, which is aimed at moving Chicago toward cleaner and more energy 
efficient future52.   
Chicago’s environmental and energy ARRA projects cover a variety of areas, ranging 
from the retrofitting of buildings, replacing streetlights with new efficiently LED lighting, and 
supporting the adoption of alternative fuel vehicle use.  A summary of Chicago’s Environmental 
and Energy projects funded by ARRA stimulus dollars is provided in Appendix A.  This paper 
provides two-detailed Cost Benefit Analyses (CBA) for two projects; the Low Income 
Weatherization Program and the Chicago Area Alternative Fuel Deployment Project.   
1.1. Low Income Weatherization Program  
A national federal program run by U.S. Dept. of Energy (DOE) first established in year 
1976, the Low Income Weatherization Program received an allocation of an additional $5 billion 
in ARRA funding for weatherization activities nationwide.  The funds were distributed to states, 
which then distributed dollars to local agencies for program implementation.  The Community 
and Economic Development Association of Cook County received $90 million from ARRA 
targeted for weatherization of low income homes in the Chicago land area and was tasked with 
overseeing the distribution of funds marked for weatherization of low-income homes in Cook 
County. 
The program’s goal is to reduce energy use in low-income homes.  This can include 
making improvements such as window caulking and insulation installation and acquiring new 
energy efficient equipment such as a new refrigerator, lighting, radiator, etc.  
Given the program’s long history, extensive cost benefit analyses of these weatherization 
programs have already been completed on a national level by the Oak Ridge Laboratory on 
behalf of the Department of Energy.  These reports were reviewed and critiqued as part of our 
preliminary analysis.  In an effort to follow consistency of literature, much of the methodology 
used by the Department of Energy was applied to the CBA of Chicago’s weatherization efforts. 
 
                                                        
52  Chicago Recovery Partnership – The City of Chicago’s ARRA Collaboration with the Chicago 
Philanthropic Community.  Status Report, October 2009. Link 
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1.2. Chicago Area Alternative Fuels Deployment Project  
Funded under the U.S. Department of Energy’s Clean Cities program, the Chicago Area 
Alternative Fuels Deployment Project (CAFD) is part of national effort to transition the nation’s 
vehicle fleet to alternative fuel and reduce America’s petroleum consumption.  The DOE 
program offers funding to support the purchase of alternative fuel vehicles and also helps finance 
the construction of a new network of alternative refueling stations across the country.   
The Clean Cities program is a government-industry partnership that provides cost sharing 
grants to local government or non-profit organizations to support alternative fuel vehicle use.  
The program received an additional $300 million as part of the ARRA program.  Twenty-three 
recipients were selected across the country to receive a portion of the stimulus funds.  Chicago 
was selected to receive a $15 million allocation aimed at increasing the use of alternative 
vehicles within the Chicago land area.  Chicago’s Department of Environment (CDOE) is 
responsible for overseeing the funds distribution and overall project management activities.   The 
Gas Technology Institute and Chicago Area Clean Cities Coalition also provided support 
activities.   
The CAFD project is still in the early phases of execution.  Only 57 of alternative fuel 
vehicles have been deployed, while construction was completed on 38 of the 113 planned fueling 
stations53.  However, the planning stage of the project has been fully completed, allowing data to 
be collected on the total number of planned alternative fuel vehicles and refueling stations.    
2. Cost Benefit Analysis - Low Income Weatherization 
2.1. Background  
Created in 1976, following a spike in energy prices following the 1973 oil embargo, the 
Department of Energy’s Weatherization Assistance Program was designed to cut the country’s 
dependence on foreign oil and lower the utility bills of low income households. The program has 
grown both in size and sophistication.  Originally concentrated on low-cost weatherization 
efforts such as covering windows with plastic sheets and caulking of a house’s external façade, 
the program has now grown to include a wider array of energy saving initiatives.  Households 
with incomes below 200% of the federal poverty level are eligible for the program and must 
register with their local agency responsible for running the weatherization program.  Preliminary 
energy audits are conducted in each eligible household to help determine the most cost effective 
activities that are to be performed on each house.  Homes are then prioritized based on the 
household income and the homes’ potential energy savings.   
                                                        
53 As reported by Chicago’s Department of Transportation, May 2011. 
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2.1.1. Methodology 
 
Our analysis includes homes that were weatherized solely within Cook County and were 
strictly funded through additional ARRA dollars.  As mentioned above, the methodology used to 
measure the benefits and cost of weatherization efforts comes from prior CBA analysis done by 
DOE on a national level.  Two main papers, both published by the Oak Ridge National 
Laboratory on behalf of the DOE, provide the basis for the CBA methods used in our analysis 
(Eisenburg 2010, Schweitzer and Tonn 2002). When possible, measurements were adjusted to 
Chicago specific criteria in an effort to provide a more accurate picture of benefits and cost over 
the national averages used in the DOE papers. 
2.1.2. Direct Energy Savings  
The benefits of home weatherization can be separated into two major groups; direct and 
non- direct energy savings.  Direct energy savings are those received solely by the homeowner or 
resident.  These include lower energy use for heating or cooling and lower electricity in the home 
as a result of the new insulation, window caulking, radiator replacement, or other energy 
efficiency improvements carried out as part of the program.  Heating and cooling savings were 
measured in MBTus (British Thermal Unit), the standard unit of measure of energy needed to 
produce heating or cooling.  Electricity savings were measured in kilowatts (Kwh).   These 
savings were then converted to dollars based on current energy prices for Chicago54.   
The program’s heating and cooling energy savings were estimated nationwide to be 30 
MBTus annually per household based on a 1300 square foot home.  However, Chicago’s harsh 
climate environment allows for the potential of substantially higher heating and cooling savings 
from home weatherization.  The DOE estimate accounts for these variation in potential savings 
by providing specific estimates for each of the nation’s four geographical regions – West, South, 
Midwest, and Northeast.  We applied the more accurate Midwest estimate for our analysis. This 
localized estimate also accounts for the fact that natural gas is the predominate source of heating 
homes in Chicago.  Using these localized estimates, we get a projected energy savings of 48 
MBTus, with a monetized value of $757 in savings per year.  A breakdown of these savings can 
be seen in Table 1. 
Given electricity usage is not greatly influenced by climate variations, we are 
comfortable using the national average used by DOE for estimating a house’s base load 
electricity savings.  The average estimate was an annually savings of 870kwh per household.  
The average price of $.14 per kwh for Chicago residential consumers in December 2010 was 
used to convert these savings to dollars.  The result was $125 annual savings in electricity 
charges per year.                                                         
54 Bureau of Labor Statistics, Midwest Information Office.  Average Energy Prices in Chicago Area – 
December 2010. Link 
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The range of potential non-energy benefits is much broader.  The DOE study names a 
total of seven main non-energy categories, each with a sub section of benefits.  Unfortunately, 
we believe many of these benefits are vulnerable to criticism and if used, open the door to 
criticism of our final numbers.  For example, the DEO reports added monetary value for 
increased national security as a result of lower dependence on foreign oil and also included 
estimates received by fellow utility customers resulting from lower overall market demand 
coming from the newly weatherized homes.  These estimates are incredibly difficult to monetize 
and often result in broad range of estimates.  Furthermore, when combined with the primary 
benefits of home weatherization, these factors only account for a small percentage of the total 
benefits received from a homes weatherization.  For these reasons, we decided to only include 
benefits that were deemed to be the most uncontroversial in hopes of providing an estimate that 
is less susceptible to criticism.  
 
Table 1 – Home Benefits from Weatherization  
 
 
2.1.3. Non-Direct Energy Savings  
 
The first and arguably most publicized non-direct energy benefits, or those shared by 
society, is the environmental benefit of lower pollution from a weatherized home’s lower energy 
use.  Lower pollution benefits require a number of factors be estimated in order to come to final 
monetized numbers.  These include the number of pollutants emitted per MBTu, the number of 
MBTus saved per household weatherization, and the value in dollars associated with reducing 
each pollutant.  The most difficult of these is the task of putting a dollar value on each pollutant.  
The first approach is to use a market valuation method that prices pollutants based on the value 
of emission permits being traded in an emissions market (or the expected value for such permits 
if the market does not yet exist).  The second approach makes an attempt to include a wider area 
of benefits such as direct health improvements, decreased destruction of eco-systems, or the 
decreasing rates of deterioration of exterior buildings and/or other outdoor assets.  While the 
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market approach may result in a much lower overall price for pollutants, it also provides a much 
smaller range of estimates when compared to the comprehensive benefit approach.  For this 
reason, the environmental estimates used in this analysis are driven primarily off a market 
approach of measuring the value of reduced pollution (see Appendix B).  We calculated an 
annual benefit for a 1300 sq foot homes reduced carbon emissions at $69 per year. 
In addition to the environmental benefits, we account for the expected increase in comfort 
and safety to residents of homes that are weatherized.   Replacing old heating and cooling 
equipment reduces the likelihood of these old products malfunctioning that can often lead to fire 
or other damage.  Improved temperature control of households can also lead to a decrease in 
illnesses – especially with the elderly.  Lower illness rates decrease health expenses and can lead 
to fewer lost days of work.  We used the DOE estimate of $10 of annual benefits in a 1300 sq ft 
home to account for these positive factors.     
2.1.4. Lifespan and Discounting 
 
While the costs of weatherization programs are realized in a one-time upfront payment, 
the benefits continued to be received over the long term.  Following DOE guidelines, the 
weatherization benefits were expected to have a lifespan of 20 years.  These benefits must be 
discounted given much of the savings will not be realized until future years.  Following the 
Office of Management and Budget suggestions, a discount rate of 3.2% was used to measure the 
net present value of all weatherization benefits.   
We assume the initial cost estimates we calculated only account for direct weatherization 
cost such as labor and materials.  We believe this omits the significant cost associated with 
administrating the program.  Therefore, we estimate an additional 20% cost for oversight and 
administration activities.  We admit this has potential to ignore any benefit these administrative 
activates create such as job creation or further economic activity.  However, we believe any of 
these benefits are short lived and overall minimal when compared to the larger long-term 
benefits already accounted for in our findings.   
2.2. Key Findings 
 
As of the end of 2010, CEDO had completed the weatherization of an additional 4358 
homes in Cook County as a direct result of the additional ARRA funding, with another 3361 
homes scheduled; bringing the total to 7719 homes 55 .   The total monetized benefits of 
weatherization activities were estimated at $13,817 per household in 2009 dollars.  Over 90% of 
these savings come from direct energy savings received by the resident of the home.  Using 
CEDA’s reported numbers of 4358 homes completed with $18 million in ARRA funding so far, 
we calculate an average cost of $4161 per weatherized home.  A 20% overhead cost was added 
for administrating the program, giving a total average cost of $4993 per house –slightly below 
the $5703 national average reported by DOE.   Aggregating these numbers to the program level,                                                         
55 Assumes these additional 3361 are completely funded by ARRA funds.  
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we expect the $38.5 million of ARRA funding currently scheduled for weatherization of low-
income homes to bring just over $106 million in total benefits to Chicago residents.  A break 
down of these calculations can be seen in Table 1 and 2. Total net benefits come in at $68.1 
million and provide a benefit cost ratio of 2.75.  It was also projected that a total of 227 jobs 
were created or retained as a result of ARRA weatherization program in Cook County56. 
 
 
2.3. Study Limitations 
 
As with any cost benefit analysis, it is important to understand the limitations of these 
results.  Given the incomplete data and limited resources, several assumptions were made in 
order to come to a final monetized value of the Chicago program.  Some of these limitations are 
highlighted below. 
 
                                                        
56 The financial benefits of the jobs were not included in our benefit analysis. See study limitation section 
for further explanation.   
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2.3.1. Jobs 
 
The Illinois Department of Commerce and Economic Development has reported that a 
total of 528 jobs have been created or retained as a result of the additional ARRA funding that 
was allocated to weatherization activities in the State of Illinois.  Given that Cook County 
accounted for 43% of the total homes weatherized in Illinois under the program, an estimate of 
227 jobs created/retained was reported for the final number in Cook County.  We believe this is 
an important statistic and thus cited it in the key findings section, but believe that more specific 
numbers from CEDA should be provided on both number of jobs created/retained and on 
average salaries before a formal financial estimated be included in the benefit factor of home 
weatherization. 
2.3.2. Energy Price Uncertainty  
This study also assumes an unrealistic constant trend in future energy prices.  A quick 
look at historical residential energy prices from 1949-2010 shows a substantial variation in 
prices.   Energy savings will vary with fluctuations in the price faced by consumers.  Clearly a 
spike in energy prices over the next 20 years could have the potential to substantially push up the 
direct energy savings realized by residents, who thanks to the weatherization program, will being 
purchasing less higher priced energy than they would have in the absence of the program.   At 
the same time, lower energy prices as a result of improved technology by energy suppliers could 
result in the estimate of consumer energy savings being over stated.    
 
2.3.3. Exemption of Other Social Benefits Allow for Conservative Benefit Estimates 
 
It is important to also point out that the total monetized benefits for this study is lower 
than it could be due that several potential benefits have been left out of the calculation. These 
items were mainly left out of our analysis due to unavailability of data or to the difficulty of 
putting a monetized value on such benefits.   These potential benefits include items such as the 
increase in property values, savings for non-weatherization resident utility customers, or the 
possible multiplier effect of increased economic activity resulting from the program.  In addition 
the exemption of these possible benefits, the DOE estimates used in this analysis have a built in 
20 percent reduction in heating and cooling savings predicted by their modeling.  This reduction 
was built in to specifically target the risk of any exaggeration in the program’s performance.   
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3. Cost Benefit Analysis – Chicago Alternative Fuel Deployment 
3.1. Program Background 
 
Different from other ARRA grant programs, the Chicago Alternative Fuel Deployment 
(CAFD) project is a cost-sharing project that required private firms to put forth financial 
commitments in order to be eligible to receive a portion of the $15 million.  The program was 
able to generate an additional $24.6 million in alternative fuel investment from the private 
industry, bringing the total project budget to just under $40 million.   
The project plans to purchase or retrofit 546 alternative fuel and/or hybrid vehicles in 
Chicago.  In addition, CDOE plans to support the construction of 113 alternative fueling stations 
to support the growth of alternative fuel use in the future57.   
3.2. Methodology – Vehicle Transformation 
 
To calculate the estimated reduction in CO2 pollution, we used the GREET Fleet 
Footprint Model developed by the Argonne National Laboratory.  Originally developed at the 
request of the Department of Energy in 1998, Argonne developed the GREET tool to assist state 
and local officials with calculating the estimated reduction in pollutants by shifting a fleet of 
vehicles away from petroleum and towards an alternative fuel power.  The tool provides two 
specific calculations for our analysis.  The first is an estimated use of petroleum for a specific 
vehicle fleet.  Secondly, the GREET tool provides a fleet’s estimated CO2 emissions.   
The GREET tool requires four inputs in order to calculate these estimates.  First, the 
number of vehicles in each fleet is entered.  Second, the type of fuel used for each vehicle must 
be specified.  Third, the user must enter the estimated number of annual miles traveled by each 
vehicle.  Finally, miles per gallon (MPG) must be entered for each vehicle type.   
Data provided by the Chicago Department of Environment listed each fleet participant, 
the proposed new vehicle replacement, and fuel type for their new alternative fuel fleet.  Status 
quo fleet vehicle type/model were estimated based on common petroleum vehicle used by 
similar fleet operators.  When the new alternative vehicle fleet involved converting an existing 
vehicles engine, the equivalent petroleum fueled vehicle was assumed.  Annual vehicle miles 
were estimated again based on national averages, with taxi’s having significantly higher annual 
                                                        
57 After additional infusion of funding was received by the City and applied to the CAFD project after the 
initial project kick of in 2010.  This new funding was combined with the original ARRA budget, allowing 
for an additional 280 electric charging stations to be added to original project scope.  However, data was 
not available on what portion of these new stations would be funded by ARRA funds vs. the new funding 
sources and thus are not included in the total station count used for our analysis.  
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mileage use based on their unique use. 58   Finally, the U.S. Department of Energy 
www.fueleconomy.gov website was used to gather MPG estimates.  The majority of vehicles 
were listed on the DOE site.  However, given the uniqueness and relatively early phase of 
adoption for several alternative fuel vehicles, data was not available on some of the compressed 
natural gas (CNG) conversion vehicles.  In these instances, the equivalent petroleum engine mpg 
was used.   
Given this framework, we broke each participant’s fleet into two different categories: 
pre-CAFD fleet and post- CAFD fleet.  The Green Taxi component of the CAFD project 
provides a solid example of how the methodology described above was applied.  The Green Taxi 
component provided funding to replace 250 operating taxis with new hybrid Ford Escape 
vehicles.  Since these were new vehicles and not alternative conversions, a status quo vehicle 
needed to be selected to compare against the new hybrids.  Based on similar operators’ fleets, the 
Ford Crown Victoria is the petroleum vehicle of most use within the industry and thus 
assumingly would be used in the absence of the new hybrid vehicles.  Thus, the Ford Crown 
Victoria was used as the comparable Pre-CAFD fleet vehicles.  Annual mileage estimates were 
recorded, along with MPG statistics for both the Ford Crown Victoria and Ford Hybrid Escape.  
The Greet model was first run with the Pre-CAFD Ford Crown Vic fleet.   These output 
calculations were than compared to a second run of the GREET tool using the Post-CAFD 
Hybrid Escape fleet metrics.  The changes in both petroleum use and CO2 emissions between the 
two fleets were recorded and used in calculating the financial benefit of the fleet transition.  This 
process was then repeated for all 22 fleet transformations. 
3.2.1. Benefits Lifespan and Discounting: 
 
It is expected that all of the CAFD project funds will be expended by December 2013.  
However, as with other green investments, the benefits of using a greener vehicle advances 
continue to be received as long as the cleaner vehicle is used.   A recent R.L. Polk survey shows 
average age of passenger vehicles in the USA to be 10.2-years old.  The same survey claims that 
U.S. Class 8 tractor (semi-truck) average age of 10.3 years –similar to average passenger vehicle 
age.59  As a result, we decided to assume each vehicle would be in operation for 10 years.   In an 
effort to be consistent with other CBA analysis carried out in this paper, a 3.2% discount rate 
was used to calculate the Net Present Value of the lifetime benefits of the new alternative vehicle 
fleet.  
  
                                                        
58  Taxi mileage was estimated at 60,000 per year based on the Taxicab, Limousine & Paratransit 
Association.   All other vehicles average 15, 000 miles per year.  
59 “Polk Finds More Vehicles Scrapped than Added to Fleet”,  RL Polk Co.  March 30, 2010.  Link and 
“Commercial Vehicle Market Intelligence Report” RL Polk Co. December 2009. Link 
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3.2.2. Fuel Prices 
 
An assortment of fuel prices were used to calculate any savings based on the diversity of 
prices each fleet owner may face in the absence of owning a new alternative fuel fleet.  The City 
of Chicago enters into long term fuel contracts to help hedge against price volatility.  As of the 
release of this paper, the city had fuel contracts for $3.37 per gallon of unleaded and $3.49 per 
gallon of diesel fuel.  It is also likely that other fleet owners in the CAFD program have long-
term fuel contracts; however, we were unable to retrieve additional contract fuel price data 
specific to fleet owners for our analysis.  Therefore, for all other fleet owners, the historical 2- 
year average retail price of diesel and unleaded fuel was used in our fuel cost calculations. 
Pricing for compressed gas is usually priced in gasoline gallon equivalent, or GGE.  
Using this metric allows for easy side-to-side comparison to conventional petroleum prices.  As 
with petroleum fuel purchases, the City of Chicago also has a long-term contract for CNG fuel.   
As a result, the City of Chicago faces a price of $2.26 per GGE.  For other fleet owners, the 
historical 2-year average price of a GGE reported by the U.S. Department of Energy’s Clean 
Cities Alternative Fuel Price Report was used.60 
3.3. Methodology – Refueling Station Infrastructure Network 
 
Unlike the vehicle portion of the project, calculating a financial benefit for the refueling 
stations is much more difficult to determine.  Given this is a cost-share project, one simple option 
is to aggregate the total value of all new stations and compare this to the financial contributions 
of the grant.  However, this method ignores any benefit the new stations may have on 
encouraging higher use of alternative fuel vehicles.  As with other network dependent 
technologies, the adoption of alternative vehicles depends as much upon an accessible/robust 
network of refueling stations as it does on the availability of the vehicles themselves.  This 
standard chicken-or-egg first scenario places a value on the expansion of a support network even 
prior to the adoption of the underlying technology.   
Governments and manufacturers of alternative fuel vehicles have long struggled with 
finding the minimum network coverage of refueling stations that is needed to assure potential 
alternative fuel customers that refueling will not hinder their ability to travel in their new vehicle.  
There are several factors that go into understanding this minimum threshold.  First and foremost 
is the alternative vehicles range.  Clearly, a much more robust network than what is provided by 
the CAFD program alone is needed for CNG and EV vehicle use given these vehicles range is 
limited to between 200-250 miles (Brinkerhoff 2009).  A lower threshold is needed for a PHEV, 
whose owner can rely on the vehicles petroleum engine to kick in after the vehicle’s battery is 
depleted and thus can rely on the extensive gasoline-refueling infrastructure already in place.  
Regardless, the threshold is unknown.  These uncertainties compound the difficulty in                                                         
60 U.S. Department of Energy. Average Retail Fuel Prices in the U.S. Table Trend of alternative and 
traditional motor fuel prices from 2000-2010 Link 
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determining if the new CAFD funded stations provide the minimum amount of refueling 
coverage for widespread adoption of alternative vehicles in Chicago.   
Nonetheless, any addition to the alternative fuel-refueling network most likely holds a 
value greater than $0.  Current and potential alternative vehicle owner would prefer the post 
CAFD network to the smaller pre-CAFD network.  In an effort to calculate an estimated 
financial benefit, we looked at a range of levels the new refueling stations may have on enticing 
alternative fuel adoption.  We calculated estimates that the new stations added to the alternative 
fueling network would increase alternative fuel vehicle use in Chicago by 10%, 25% and 35% 
per year over the next 10 years.  We then calculated the fuel savings and CO2 reduction benefits 
of an increased Chicago alternative vehicle fleet. 
However, this type of sensitivity analysis still proves challenging.  First, even if it is 
assumed that expanding the alternative fuel refueling network will help spur alternative fuel 
vehicle use, what type of growth numbers should be used is unknown.  Thus our 10%, 25%, and 
35% estimates are purely arbitrary.  We also assumed the status quo alternative vehicle fleet to 
be that of only vehicles that were part of the CAFD program, given this is the only vehicle data 
we have available.  This does not include any alternative vehicles outside of the CAFD program 
that were already being used in Chicago.  Finally, the calculations do not take into account other 
critical factors that go into a successful refueling network such as utility modernization, 
regulatory approvals, or the need to educate consumers on the new refueling procedures.   
Therefore, while the above calculations maybe interesting to our reader, we believe there 
are too many variables to this methodology to include them in our aggregate calculations. 
However, we believe government leaders and policymakers should understand that there is a 
potential value in building network of alternative fueling stations and therefore have included our 
sensitivity analysis in Appendix C.   
3.4. Key Findings 
3.4.1. Vehicle Transformation  
Given the CAFD project is still in the early phases of deployment, our analysis assumes 
full deployment of all planned vehicles of the original CAFD budget.   The annual direct fuel 
savings were estimated to be $1,533,688 per year for all 546 vehicles.  These savings total 
$12.31 million in 2009 dollars, assuming a ten-year vehicle lifespan and constant fuel prices.  
3662 tons of CO2 emissions are saved each year, equaling $90,822 per year.  Again, over a ten-
year life span the emission savings net present value is equal to $766,884.   
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Total benefits of the program come to $13.1 million.   Comparing this to the $4 million 
portion of the federal grant that was directed toward subsidizing alternative fuel vehicle 
purchases, provides a net benefit of $9.1 million and a benefit to cost ratio of 3.28. 
3.4.2. Refueling Station Infrastructure Network 
 
As mentioned above, we do not feel comfortable calculating a financial value of the 
social benefits of extending Chicago’s alternative fuel refueling network due to the uncertainty in 
the positive externalities that result from increasing the alternative fuel refueling network.  This 
should not lead the reader to conclude that the additional stations provide no benefits.  In fact we, 
believe there some range of social benefit from the increased stations and therefore have 
compiled an Appendix C with a possible range of benefits of the additional refueling stations that 
can be reviewed for informational purposes.  In addition, it is estimated that a total of 77 FTE 
jobs were created/retained for a full year as a result of the CAFD project, mostly from the 
construction of the refueling stations.  
3.5. Study Limitations  
As with any cost benefit analysis, it is important to understand the limitations of these 
results.  Given the incomplete data and limited resources, several assumptions were made in 
order to come to a final monetized value of the Chicago program.  Some of these limitations are 
highlighted below. 
3.5.1. Jobs  
The Chicago Department of Environment has reported job estimates for each component 
of the CAFD project.  These include construction, vehicle conversion, and station on-going 
maintenance activities.  These estimates total 77 jobs over the lifespan of the project.  We believe 
this is an important statistic and thus cited it in the key findings section, but believe that specific 
Total Direct Fuel Savings 94% 
Total Direct CO2 Reduction 6% 
Total NPV Benevits of CAFD Alternative 
Vehicles - $13.1 million 
Total DirectFuel Savings
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salary data should be tracked given the range of positions before a formal financial estimate be 
included in the benefit factor of CAFD program. 
 
3.5.2. Energy Price Uncertainty 
 
This study also assumes an unrealistic constant trend in fuel prices.  A quick look at 
historical fuel prices shows a high level of volatility.   Any dramatic shift upward in petroleum 
prices would result in a higher direct fuel savings benefit to fleet owners.   While at the same 
time, lower prices of unleaded/diesel fuel would lower the benefits of alternative fuel vehicles.   
The U.S. Energy Information Administration does forecast slightly higher gasoline prices in 
2012 and sees higher crude oil prices over the next 25 years, but cautions that such estimates are 
difficult to determine61.   
3.5.3. Elasticity to Participate 
 
Federal assistance ranged from 33%-100% of the additional cost fleet owners faced in 
their decision to purchase/convert their fleet to an alternative fuel vehicle vs. traditional 
petroleum only fleet.  We have made the assumption that none of the mentioned activities of the 
CAFD project would have taken place in the absence of the ARRA grant subsidy.  This may or 
not have been the case.  It is possible that several of the partners involved in the CAFD project 
would have moved forward with transitioning to an alternative fuel vehicle fleet without any 
government assistance.  Oftentimes, the fuel savings resulting from transitioning to an alternative 
fuel fleet can justify the transition cost without any subsidy.   As the number of alternative 
vehicle purchases that would have occurred absent the ARRA subsidy increases, the benefit of 
the program on a whole diminishes.  While we don’t know the share of alternative fuel vehicles 
in the program that fall within this category, we assume it is greater than 0 and thus believe there 
is a risk that benefits may be slightly overstated at some level. 
3.5.4. Mileage Estimates 
 
Variances in driving conditions and annual distances have the potential to significantly 
alter the benefits of the CAFD program.  The 15,000-mile average used for all non-taxi use 
vehicles in this study does not take into account the variance in use across the different vehicles 
followed in this study.  The Chicago Department of Environment is tracking actual mileage of 
each CAFD funded vehicle.  Unfortunately, the project is in the early phases of vehicle 
deployment and therefore the actual mileage data is not yet available.  Once all vehicles have 
been deployed, more accurate mileage data will be available and a more accurate benefit 
calculation can be compiled.                                                           
61 See U.S. Energy Information Administration Short Term Energy Outlook Link and the Annual Energy 
Outlook Report, April 2011.  Link 
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4. Recommendations 
4.1. Low Income Weatherization 
 
The ARRA legislation allowed for slight modifications in the guidelines administrating 
agencies must follow to receive DOE funding.  The most important of the changes was the 
raising of the average cost ceiling for investment per unit to $6500, up from the previous ceiling 
set at $3000.  This can have an important impact on the program’s national funding and the 
formula for disbursing money across states.  With a higher cost ceiling per household, the 
threshold for cost effective households is lowered, resulting in more funding being directed to 
states with more temperate climates.  
Yet, the literature has consistently shown that weatherization projects in locations with 
harsh climates can provide the potential for significantly higher savings than more temperate 
weather. Logically, harsher winters require more energy to heat, multiplying the savings that can 
come from a more energy efficient home.  This assumption is backed up by the DOE study, 
showing that savings coming from homes in the Midwest consistently provide estimates of 
annual heating and cooling savings 60% higher than the nation’s average.  This should be a 
staple argument in any additional request for funding, as dollars allocated to Chicago 
weatherization programs are likely to provide higher energy savings than those that are directed 
to states with more timid climates.  
It is also important that any additional funding support for weatherization programs in 
Chicago be accompanied by increased data tracking efforts.  Currently it is difficult to find 
specific details of the homes that are targeted in Chicago for weatherization activates.  What is 
the average square footage of houses receiving weatherization services in Cook County?  How 
many homes are multi-dwelling vs. single-family homes?  What is the proportion that is rented 
vs. owned? For example, low –income residents are more likely to rent rather than own.  Yet, the 
weatherization program today is structured with incentives that can result in market failure when 
it comes to energy retrofits for rental properties.  Currently the landlord must agree to fund part 
of the cost of the weatherization activities in order to be eligible for weatherization funds, even 
though the tenant may receive the majority of the programs benefits.  The result can be missed 
weatherization opportunities with strong benefit/cost ratios.  More complete data would provide 
program officials with data needed to help address these perverse incentives as well as support 
further analysis in ways that could help the Chicago weatherization programs out perform other 
state programs.   
4.2. Chicago Alternative Fuel Deployment 
 
As with the Low Income Weatherization, the availability of careful data gathering during 
both project deployment and throughout the project deployment can help provide policy makers 
with a better understanding of how to guide future funding.   Fortunately, the CAFD project has 
already established a process for both tracking vehicle mileage and fuel consumption per quarter.   
 110 
In addition, the alternative fuel stations will track the amount of fuel dispensed.  The data 
tracking is part of the Clean City Initiative reporting sent to the DOE for national comparison, 
but can also be used by local authorities to understand which alternative fuel vehicle and stations 
are producing the highest level of use and benefit depending on fuel type, location, vehicle type, 
etc.   
As mentioned above, one of the greatest challenges of our analysis on the CAFD program 
revolves around calculating the benefits of the increased refueling station network.  In the 
absence of a definitive financial benefit value for the additional station, we do have two 
recommendations based on other research related to the importance of alternative fuel refueling 
stating infrastructure.  First, it is important that home charging stations be included in the overall 
strategy of any alternative vehicle adoption plan.  While public charging stations are an 
important factor to driving the growth of alternative fuel vehicle adoption, it is widely expected 
that most charging of electric vehicles will be done at the home.  Home station charging 
availability cannot be overlooked in the City’s effort to make owning an electric car in Chicago 
viable.  Support does not have to be limited to direct subsidy’s toward the purchase of home 
charging stations but should also include educational efforts aimed at informing the public on 
how to transition to electric car ownership.  Such educational programs can help overcome the 
confusion and apprehension hindering electric car adoption – specifically “range anxiety”, often 
cited as a major factor prohibiting greater uptake of electric cars by consumers who are fearful 
that cars will run out of power mid journey.   
The major benefit of adding new alternative fuel refueling stations is the increased 
alternative vehicle adoption resulting from increased station coverage.  One of the clearest ways 
this benefit can be demonstrated is by an increased rollout of alternative vehicles to the Chicago 
market by major automakers.   Makers of electric, hybrid, and CNG vehicles strategically choose 
with markets to rollout these vehicles in based on their analysis of a regions ability to support the 
new technology.  Thus far, Ford Motor Co. is the only major automaker to have included 
Chicago as an initial rollout city for electric car sales, with the planned introduction of the 
electric Ford Focus at the end of 201162.  While automakers have repeatedly said that a robust 
charging structure is important factor in determining rollout cities, they also include the 
importance of both support from the major public utilities and local politicians.  Government 
officials should make an effort to work in conjunction with automakers in their efforts to build a 
friendly alternative fuel city – as the automakers that can provide extensive information on the 
necessary commitments needed to make alternative vehicle use viable for Chicago residents.   
5. Conclusion 
 
It is our hope that this report provides a clearer picture of the benefits received by 
Chicago residents as a result of the infusion of federal stimulus dollars received over these past                                                         
62 The Electric Focus will be rollout in 19 cities across the country including Chicago. 
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few years. In addition to the detailed cost benefit analysis, we also made an effort to provide 
recommendations on further action that we believe has the potential to increase the benefits 
received in future energy and environment programs.  
Finally, this paper is not an inclusive report on all energy and environment stimulus 
projects for Chicago.  As a result, there is ample opportunity to build on the findings of this 
paper in the future.  While the programs analyzed were two of the larger funded programs, it is 
important to not overlook the programs not analyzed in the paper.  We hope that our findings are 
both expanded to include the remaining Energy and Environmental projects in Chicago funded 
by ARRA and will also include an updated analysis at each project’s completion.  Having a 
thorough and comprehensive ex-post CBA report of all ARRA projects will provide the greatest 
value for public officials in their attempt to identify the most beneficial future government and 
philanthropic investments for Chicago residents. 
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Conclusions  
 
Of the nearly $2.35 billion in American Recovery and Reinvestment Act funding 
awarded to Cook County63, we performed cost-benefit analyses on programs that received a total 
of $1.09 billion. Table 1 reports our results for the seven different categories we studied.   
 
Table 1: Summary of Analysis, 2009 dollars 
Area Grant Analyzed 
(millions) 
Discounted Net Benefits 
(millions) 
Benefit-Cost 
Ratio 
Public Safety $32.6 $77.6 3.38 
Basic Needs $12.6 $24.6 to $27.7 2.95 to 3.19 
Energy $42.5 $77.2 2.81 
Housing $98.0 $122.4 2.25 
Transportation $151.6 $313.1 2.07 
Education $688.4 -$688.4 to $2,039.7 0 to 3.96 
Workforce $64.1 -$100.4 to $82.5 -.57 to 2.29 
TOTAL $1,089.8 -$173.9 to $2,740.2 .84 to 3.51 
Our final results are highly dependent on the program estimates for the largest category, 
Education, which received over half of all the ARRA funding that we analyzed.  If the ARRA 
funding that prevented teacher layoffs does not have an effect on future student performance, 
then, as a whole, the net benefits are negative for Cook County. Under the more optimistic case 
that a lower student-teacher ratio does positively impact future student performance, then there 
are positive net benefits for ARRA. Under the optimistic assumption, Education has the highest 
benefit-cost ratio, 3.96. In the pessimistic case for Education, the additional police officers added 
through Public Safety ARRA grants yields the highest benefit-cost ratio, 3.38. Utilizing 
conservative assumptions, we find that the job training programs in Workforce Development 
have the lowest benefit-cost ratio. Because of the potential foregone earnings from participating, 
it is possible that the benefit-cost ratio is actually negative.  
In conclusion, our analysis provides a range for the net benefits of ARRA, from -$173.9 
million as the lower estimate to $2,740.2 million as the upper estimate. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                         
63 Data available at http://recovery.illinois.gov/default.aspx 
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Annexes  
Chapter 1. Basic Needs 
 
Title I/ SFSF Funds 
 
Annex 1.  Teacher retention 
 
Source: Government Accountability Office. “Recovery Act: Status of States’ and Localities’ Use 
of Funds To Ensure Accountability.” December 2009. 
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Annex 2.  Class Size Impact 
 
 
 
Project Star Medium Effect Scenario 1 
Assumptions  Negative Impact on CPS Students’ Lifetime Earnings  
33% decrease in class size over 3 years $3.9 billion ($9,460 * 409,279)  
33% decrease in class size over 2 years  $2.6 billion ($3.9 billion * 2/3)  
(Actual timeframe)    
8.98% increase in class size over 2 years  $702.4 million ($2.6 billion * 8.98/33)  
(Actual timeframe and class size change)    
Avg. Income Saved Per Student  $1,716 ($702 million/409,279)  
  
Project Star Medium Effect Scenario 2 
33% decrease in class size over 3 years $3.9 billion ($9,460 * 409,279)  
33% decrease in class size over 2 years  $2.6 billion ($3.9 billion * 2/3)  
(Actual timeframe)    
11.48% increase in class size over 2 years  $897.94 million ($2.6 billion * 11.48/33)  
(Actual timeframe and class size change)    
Avg. Income Saved Per Student  $1,720 ($897 million/409,279)  
  
Project Star Medium Effect Scenario 3 
33% decrease in class size over 3 years $3.9 billion ($9,460 * 409,279)  
33% decrease in class size over 2 years  $2.6 billion ($3.9 billion * 2/3)  
(Actual timeframe)    
15.92% increase in class size over 2 years  $1.2 billion ($2.6 billion * 15.92/33)  
(Actual timeframe and class size change)    
Avg. Income Saved Per Student  $3,042 ($1.2 billion/409,279)  
 
Project Star High Effect Scenario 1 
Assumptions  Negative Impact on CPS Students’ Lifetime Earnings  
31.8% decrease in class size over 3 years $8.2 billion ($19,971 * 409,279)  
31.8% decrease in class size over 2 years  $5.4 billion ($8.2 billion * 2/3)  
(Actual timeframe)    
8.98% increase in class size over 2 years  $1.5 billion ($5.4 billion * 8.98/31.8)  
(Actual timeframe and class size change)    
Avg. Income Saved Per Student  $3,760 ($1.5 billion/409,279)  
  
Project Star High Effect Scenario 2 
31.8% decrease in class size over 3 years $8.2 billion ($19,971 * 409,279)  
31.8% decrease in class size over 2 years  $5.4 billion ($8.2 billion * 2/3)  
(Actual timeframe)    
11.48% increase in class size over 2 years  $1.97 billion ($5.4 billion * 11.48/31.8)  
(Actual timeframe and class size change)    
Avg. Income Saved Per Student  $4,807 ($1.97 billion/409,279)  
  
Project Star High Effect Scenario 3 
31.8% decrease in class size over 3 years $8.2 billion ($19,971 * 409,279)  
31.8% decrease in class size over 2 years  $5.4 billion ($8.2 billion * 2/3)  
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Homeless Prevention and Rapid Re-Housing  
 
Annex 1: Distribution of Funds for Homeless Prevention and Rapid ReHousing 
 
 
 
 
Agency Award Amount
Access Living of Metropolitan Chicago $127,066
Catholic Charities of Chicago $985,524
Coordinated Advice & Referral Program for Legal Services 
(CARPLS Legal Aid)
$405,000
Featherfist $200,000
Heartland Human Care Services Inc $1,391,569
Housing Opportunities for Women $360,000
La Casa Norte $475,670
Lutheran Child & Family Services of Illinois $155,688
Metropolitan Tenants Organization $59,087
Spanish Coalition For Housing $89,350
Trilogy, Inc. $110,000
Emergency Fund $24,095,696
Distribution of Funds 
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Chapter 4. Housing  
Annex 1.  
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Annex 2 
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Chapter 5. Transportation and Infrastructure 
 
1. ARRA Funding Sources 
 
Annex 1: Summary of ARRA transportation and infrastructure funding by data source and project. 
 
* Aviation numbers came from Funding for Airport Planning Airport Improvement Program (FAA AIP); water numbers came from Illinois Environmental 
Protection Agency ARRA funding report (IEPA ARRA). ** Program totals were calculated by including only the values in bold. 
Source:
Funding Program Awarded Sum Funding Program Awarded Sum Funding Program Awarded Sum Funding Program Awarded Sum
Aviation Chicago O'Hare Noise Mitigation 5,000,000$            Chicago O'Hare Noise Mitigation 5,000,000$           
Runway 10L 5,550,000$          
Taxiwide Widening 6,750,000$          
Aviation Chicago/Rockford Expand Terminal 1,052,000$           
Aviation Chicago/Rockford Runway Rehab 3,620,000$           
Aviation Midway Cameras 2,734,418$          
$24,700,805
Water Capitalization for Clean Water 30,725,882$         
Water Capitalization for Drinking Water 9,634,272$            
Water Quality Management Planning 972,996$                
Water Water Main Replacement 6,051,467$           Water Main Replacement 5,000,000$        Water Main Replacement 5,000,000$          
Water Sewer Replacement 10,000,000$        Sewer Replacement 10,000,000$       
Water Water Metering 5,000,000$          
Water
Water
Water
$16,051,467
Roads Street Lighting 2,191,967$            
31 mile Road Repavement 86,000,000$     
Roads Traffic Signals 576,742$                
Roads Highway Construction 90,552,887$         
Roads Highway Engineering 7,066,522$            
Roads Landscaping 2,447,525$            
Roads Multi purpose 265,303$                
Roads Preliminary Engineering 4,000,000$            
Roads Sidewalk 2,693,605$            
Roads
$269,615,325
Rail CREATE Rail 11,696,542$         
Rail CREATE Rail 18,815,991$         
Rail High Speed 133,000,000$  High Speed 133,000,000$    
133,000,000$                      
CTA/Transit Dearborn Subway Track 87,804,366$     Dearborn Subway Track 87,800,000$       
CTA/Transit Cermak/Chinatown Station 12,500,000$     Cermak/Chinatown Station 12,500,000$       
CTA/Transit Hybrid Buses 51,500,000$     Hybrid Buses 51,500,000$       
CTA/Transit Kedzie Garage Heating System 5,555,204$        
CTA/Transit Preventive Maintenance 75,200,000$     
CTA/Transit Belmot/Fullerton Canopies 1,913,002$        
CTA/Transit Oil/Water Separator 2,379,343$        
CTA/Transit Subway Escalators 4,880,000$        
CTA/Transit Transit Security Cameras 6,944,528$          
$248,676,443
$692,044,040GRAND TOTAL =
ARRA TRANSPORTATION & INFRASTRUCTURE FUNDING RECONCILIATION TABLE
Airport Improvement Program Total** =
CTA/Transit Total =
Surface Transportation - Discretionary Grants for Capital Investment Total =
Roads Street Resurfacing 159,820,774$      
Highway Planning & Construction Total =
Rail 30,512,533$       
CTA Maintenance 89,931,915$       
Water Maintenace Total =
Illinois Recovery Database FAA AIP & IEPA ARRA* Chicago Recovery Partnership Yearly Report City of Chicago Recovery & Dashboard
Aviation Chicago O'Hare Runway Rehab 12,294,387$        
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2. Hybrid Bus Fuel Cost, Environmental & Health Benefit Calculations 
 
Fuel Cost Savings: 
 
In the baseline scenario, from total fleet miles calculated, we determined the percent 
share of miles per bus.  For example, according to Table 3.2.2, under the ARRA funding 
scenario there are a total of 208 60-foot hybrid buses, and under the counterfactual there are 150-
60 foot hybrid buses.  Since there are a total of 2082 buses, the percent share of the hybrid buses 
is: 
 
ARRA funding:208 60-foot hybrid buses/2082 fleet *100 =9.99% for all 60 foot hybrid buses 
Counterfactual:150 60-foot hybrid buses/2082 fleet *100 =7.20% for all 60 foot hybrid buses 
 
Since we assumed that each bus drives the same number of miles per year, using the 
estimated 71,090,516 miles per year for the CTA bus fleet, for each of the 60-foot hybrid bus 
fleets we determine: 
 
ARRA funding:7.20% * 71,090,516 miles/year =5,121,795 miles/year for all 60 foot hybrid buses 
Counterfactual:9.99% * 71,090,516 miles/year =7,102,223 miles/year for all 60 foot hybrid buses 
 
From miles per year, using the fuel economy from Table 3.2.1, we calculated the 
difference in fuel consumption between the ARRA funded hybrid buses and the counterfactual.  
Based on the $3.49 per gallon diesel price, we can then calculate fuel cost savings per year: 
 
ARRA funding:5,121,795 miles/year * gallons/3.7 miles = 1,384,269 gallons/year for all 60 foot hybrid buses 
Counterfactual:7,102,223 miles/year * gallons/3.7 miles = 1,919,520 gallons/year for all 60 foot hybrid buses 
Difference fuel consumption =1,919,520 - 1,384,269 = 535,251 gallons/year for all 60 foot hybrid buses 
Fuel cost savings/year =535,251 gallons/year * $3.49/gallon = $1,868,025/year for all 60 foot hybrid buses 
 
Table 3.2.2 summarizes the differences in fuel consumption for various types of CTA 
buses.  After summing the difference in fuel costs per year for each type of bus, we determine the 
total discounted fuel cost savings over the fleet’s lifetime: 
 
Discounted fuel cost savings for a 15 year lifetime with a 3.2% discount rate for entire fleet= 
$239,198 fuel cost/year + �
�1− 1(1+0.032)14�
0.032 � ∗ $239,198 fuel cost/year = $2,904,729 
 
Overall, the total discounted fuel cost savings from the ARRA funded hybrid buses is 
$2,904,729. 
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Environmental and Climate Change Benefits: 
 
From Table 3.2.2, in the baseline scenario, the total difference in gallons saved per year 
between the ARRA funded hybrid buses and the counterfactual is 68,538 gallons diesel saved 
per year.  Using this number, we calculated the yearly savings in fleet emission output for CO2, 
NOx and SOx: 
 68,538 gallons diesel saved/year ∗  2.22 CO2 lbs
gallon
∗  short ton
2000 lbs ∗  $23.59short ton = $1,794.42 CO2 emission savings/year, entire fleet 68,538 gallons diesel saved/year ∗  0.00256 NOx lbs
gallon
∗  short ton
2000 lbs ∗  $750short ton = $65.80 NOx emission savings/year, entire fleet 68,538 gallons diesel saved/year ∗  0.000371 SOx lbs
gallon
∗  short ton
2000 lbs ∗  $500short ton = $6.36 SOx emission savings/year, entire fleet 
 
Total emissions saved per year, from the ARRA funded hybrid buses is $1866.58 per 
year.  Therefore, the total discounted emission cost savings over the fleet’s lifetime is: 
 
Discounted emission savings for a 15 year lifetime with a 3.2% discount rate for entire fleet= 
$1866.58/year + �
�1− 1(1+0.032)14�
0.032 � ∗ $1866.58/year = $22,667  
 
Overall, the total discounted environmental and climate change benefits from the ARRA 
funded hybrid buses is $22,667. 
 
Health Benefits: 
 
In the baseline scenario, based on the difference in fuel consumption per year from 
ARRA funded hybrid buses and the counterfactual, we determine the percent reduction per year 
of PM emissions.  From there, we can estimate the impact on premature deaths: 
 
ARRA funding:21,244,472 gallons diesel consumed ∗  0.00111 PM10 lbs
gallon
= 
23,581 pounds PM10 emissions emitted/year 
Counterfactual:21,175,933 gallons diesel consumed ∗  0.00111 PM10 lbs
gallon
= 
23,505 pounds PM10 emissions emitted/year 
 
% change PM from ARRA funding =(ARRA funding – Counterfactual)/(Counterfactual) 
% change PM from ARRA funding =(23,581 pounds PM10/year – 23,505 pounds PM10/year)( 23,505 pounds PM10/year)  
% change PM from ARRA funding =0.32% 
 
Reduction in premature deaths in Cook County due to ARRA funded hybrid buses = 
256.65 people/year * 0.32% = 0.8307 people/year 
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Based on Viscusi (2003), using $8,442,000 as the value of a statistical life over 15 years, 
the benefit of PM reductions from the hybrid buses is:  
 
Discounted PM savings for a 15 year lifetime with a 3.2% discount rate for entire fleet= 
�
0.8307 people
year
∗
$8,442,000
person
� + ��1− 1(1+0.032)14�
0.032 � ∗ �0.8307 peopleyear ∗ $8,442,000person � = ($7,012,624/year) + ��1− 1(1+0.032)14�
0.032 � ∗ ($7,012,624/year) =$89,530,574 
 
Overall, the total discounted health benefits from ARRA funded hybrid buses, is $89,530,574. 
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3. Hybrid Bus Purchase Sensitivity Analysis 
 
Annex 2. Summary of fuel cost savings, environmental and climate change benefits, health benefits and maintenance cost savings from the 
ARRA funded hybrid buses under all scenarios.  Does not include ARRA grant benefits. 
 
 
CO2 CO2 CO2 NOX SO2
($23.59/short ton) ($7.26/short ton) ($77.11/short ton) ($750/short ton) ($500/short ton)
passenger demand increases
1a 0.25%/year (3.5% over 15 years) 101,157,731$                  2,876,738$             $                        21,581  $                            6,640  $                           70,553  $                           791  $                          76  $            87,313,933  $           10,944,612 
1b 0.5%/year (7% over 15 years) 101,212,274$                  2,930,859$             $                        21,987  $                            6,765  $                           71,880  $                           806  $                          78  $            87,313,933  $           10,944,612 
1c 1%/year (14% over 15 years) 101,297,066$                  3,014,994$            22,618$                        6,959$                            73,943$                           829$                           80$                          $            87,313,933  $           10,944,612 
increase buses (12 additional buses/year)
1d increase number of diesel buses 98,005,638$                     2,802,764$            21,026$                        6,469$                            68,738$                           771$                           74$                          $            84,236,391  $           10,944,612 
1e increase number of hybrid buses 98,297,821$                     2,802,764$            21,026$                        6,469$                            68,738$                           771$                           74$                          $            84,528,574  $           10,944,612 
2a passenger demand remains constant 103,402,582$                  2,904,729$            21,791$                        6,705$                            71,239$                           799$                           77$                          $            89,530,574  $           10,944,612 
increase buses (12 additional buses/year)
2b increase number of diesel buses 98,222,799$                     3,018,243$            22,642$                        6,967$                            74,023$                           830$                           80$                          $            84,236,391  $           10,944,612 
2c increase number of hybrid buses 98,514,982$                     3,018,243$            22,642$                        6,967$                            74,023$                           830$                           80$                          $            84,528,574  $           10,944,612 
2d no buses retire/replaced 103,402,582$                  2,904,729$            21,791$                        6,705$                            71,239$                           799$                           77$                          $            89,530,574  $           10,944,612 
2f decrease diesel buses (12 buses retired/year) 104,728,047$                  3,018,243$            22,642$                        6,967$                            74,023$                           830$                           80$                          $            90,741,639  $           10,944,612 
diesel prices increase
2h $0.10/year ($1.50 over 15 years) 103,936,437$                  3,438,584$            21,791$                        6,705$                            71,239$                           799$                           77$                          $            89,530,574  $           10,944,612 
2i $0.15/year ($2.25 over 15 years) 104,203,365$                  3,705,512$            21,791$                        6,705$                            71,239$                           799$                           77$                          $            89,530,574  $           10,944,612 
2j $0.25/year ($3.75 over 15 years) 104,737,220$                  4,239,367$            21,791$                        6,705$                            71,239$                           799$                           77$                          $            89,530,574  $           10,944,612 
maintenance cost savings decrease/increase
2k maintenance cost savings 5%/hybrid bus 96,106,174$                     2,904,729$            21,791$                        6,705$                            71,239$                           799$                           77$                         89,530,574$             $             3,648,204 
2l maintenance cost savings 10%/hybrid bus 99,754,378$                     2,904,729$            21,791$                        6,705$                            71,239$                           799$                           77$                         89,530,574$             $             7,296,408 
2m maintenance cost savings 20%/hybrid bus 107,050,786$                  2,904,729$            21,791$                        6,705$                            71,239$                           799$                           77$                         89,530,574$             $           14,592,816 
2n maintenance cost savings 30%/hybrid bus 114,347,194$                  2,904,729$            21,791$                        6,705$                            71,239$                           799$                           77$                         89,530,574$             $           21,889,224 
passenger demand decreases
3a 0.25%/year (3.5% over 15 years) 101,052,223$                  2,772,047$            20,795$                        6,399$                            67,985$                           763$                           74$                          $            87,313,933  $           10,944,612 
3b 0.5%/year (7% over 15 years) 101,001,203$                  2,721,422$            20,416$                        6,282$                            66,743$                           749$                           72$                          $            87,313,933  $           10,944,612 
3c 1%/year (14% over 15 years) 100,902,497$                  2,623,480$            19,681$                        6,056$                            64,341$                           722$                           70$                          $            87,313,933  $           10,944,612 
3d decrease diesel buses (12 buses retired/year) 104,728,047$                  3,018,243$            22,642$                        6,967$                            74,023$                           830$                           80$                          $            90,741,639  $           10,944,612 
TOTAL BENEFITS FROM 
ARRA FUNDED 58 
HYBRID BUSES
FUEL COST, ENVIRONMENTAL, HEALTH AND MAINTENANCE BENEFITS FROM ARRA FUNDED 58 HYBRID BUSES OVER 15 YEARS, DISCOUNTED AT 3.2%
INCREASE IN MILES
NO CHANGE IN MILES
DECREASE IN MILES
ENVIRONMENTAL AND CLIMATE COST SAVINGS VALUE EARLY 
DEATHS AVERTED
FUEL COST 
SAVINGS
MAINTENANCE 
COST SAVINGS
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4. Dearborn Subway Sensitivity Analysis  
Annex 3. Cost in time days (in hours and based on an $11.95/hour) due to a lag time 
of two years, during the Dearborn renovation period and for the years following 
project completion.   Shaded dates indicate the time period when the project took 
place. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
WEEKDAY SATURDAY SUNDAY
82500 34599 24821
RE-SCALED TIME FOR 
ONE-WAY TRIP
TOTAL PASSENGER TIME 
FOR ONE-WAY TRIP
(MINUTES) (HOURS)
April 1 - December 31, 2009 6.8 15.788 4,200,258                             49,374,034$           
December 1-31, 2009 33 22.700 807,800                                9,495,685$             
2010 33 22.700 9,315,334                             106,106,346$         
2011 Project 14.1 17.191 358,362                                3,955,354$             
2011 Project 27.00 22.202 554,415                                6,119,247$             
2011 Project 60.30 35.317 555,561                                6,131,899$             
2011 Project 45.70 29.835 469,324                                5,180,076$             
2011 Project 36.00 26.231 618,948                                6,831,518$             
2011 Project 38.20 27.046 925,275                                10,212,547$           
2011 Project 24.10 21.779 372,542                                4,111,865$             
2011 Project 21.70 20.903 271,334                                2,994,800$             
2011 Project 12.80 17.556 276,163                                3,048,092$             
2011 Project 21.80 20.941 415,803                                4,589,342$             
2011 Project 39.40 27.492 573,106                                6,325,549$             
2011 Project 28.70 24.126 569,269                                6,283,193$             
2011 Project 25.10 23.386 367,875                                4,060,353$             
2011 Project 15.60 19.864 414,090                                4,570,435$             
2011 Project 6.50 16.418 325,998                                3,598,137$             
Remaining 2011 0.00 14.000 1,511,177                             16,679,327$           
2012 0.00 14.000 5,750,998                             61,507,314$           
2013 0.00 14.000 5,750,998                             59,600,110$           
2014 0.00 14.000 5,745,207                             57,693,887$           
2015 0.00 14.000 5,745,207                             55,904,929$           
TOTAL TIME COST = 494,374,038$         
NUMBER OF PASSENGERS/DAY BASED ON CTA RIDERSHIP REPORT
TIME PERIOD
DISCOUNTED 
COST OF TIME
% SLOW ZONE
LAG 2 YEARS 2011 DEARBORN SUBWAY RENOVATION, 
WITH 33% SLOW ZONES STARTING DECEMBER 2009
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Annex 4. Cost in time days (in hours and based on an $11.95/hour) due to a lag time 
of five years, during the Dearborn renovation period and for the years following 
project completion.   Shaded dates indicate the time period when the project took 
place. 
 
WEEKDAY SATURDAY SUNDAY
82500 34599 24821
RE-SCALED TIME FOR 
ONE-WAY TRIP
TOTAL PASSENGER TIME 
FOR ONE-WAY TRIP
(MINUTES) (HOURS)
April 1 - December 31, 2009 6.8 15.788 4,200,258                             49,374,034$           
December 1-31, 2009 33 22.700 807,800                                9,495,685$             
2010 33 22.700 9,315,334                             106,106,346$         
2011 33 22.700 9,297,211                             102,616,205$         
2012 33.00 22.700 9,324,724                             99,728,557$           
2013 33.00 22.700 9,324,724                             96,636,198$           
2014 Project 14.10 17.191 358,362                                3,598,705$             
2014 Project 27.00 22.202 554,415                                5,567,483$             
2014 Project 60.30 35.317 555,561                                5,578,995$             
2014 Project 45.70 29.835 469,324                                4,712,995$             
2014 Project 36.00 26.231 618,948                                6,215,529$             
2014 Project 38.20 27.046 925,275                                9,291,696$             
2014 Project 24.10 21.779 372,542                                3,741,104$             
2014 Project 21.70 20.903 271,334                                2,724,763$             
2014 Project 12.80 17.556 276,163                                2,773,250$             
2014 Project 21.80 20.941 415,803                                4,175,527$             
2014 Project 39.40 27.492 573,106                                5,755,183$             
2014 Project 28.70 24.126 569,269                                5,716,646$             
2014 Project 25.10 23.386 367,875                                3,694,237$             
2014 Project 15.60 19.864 414,090                                4,158,325$             
2014 Project 6.50 16.418 325,998                                3,273,698$             
Remaining 2014 0.00 14.000 1,511,177                             15,175,375$           
2015 0.00 14.000 5,745,207                             55,904,929$           
TOTAL TIME COST = 606,015,464$         
LAG 5 YEARS 2014 DEARBORN SUBWAY RENOVATION,
WITH 33% SLOW ZONES STARTING DECEMBER 2009
NUMBER OF PASSENGERS/DAY BASED ON CTA RIDERSHIP REPORT
TIME PERIOD
DISCOUNTED 
COST OF TIME
% SLOW ZONE
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Annex 5. Cost in time (in hours and based on an $11.95/hour) due to a lag time of 
five years, and an increase in rail ridership by 7% starting in 2013, during the 
Dearborn renovation period and for the years following project completion.   
Shaded dates indicate the time period when the project took place. 
 
 
 
 
NUMBER OF PASSENGERS/DAY BASED ON CTA RIDERSHIP REPORT
WEEKDAY SATURDAY
82500 34599
7% increase in ridership in 2013 = 88275 37021
RE-SCALED TIME FOR 
ONE-WAY TRIP
TOTAL PASSENGER TIME 
FOR ONE-WAY TRIP
(MINUTES) (HOURS)
April 1 - December 31, 2009 3,107                         15.788 4,200,258                             49,374,034$           
December 1-31, 2009 15,120                      22.700 807,800                                9,495,685$             
2010 15,120                      22.700 9,315,334                             106,106,346$         
2011 15,120                      22.700 9,297,211                             102,616,205$         
2012 15,120                      22.700 9,324,724                             99,728,557$           
2013 15,120                      22.700 9,977,466                             103,400,843$         
2014 Project 6,483                         17.191 383,448                                3,850,619$             
2014 Project 12,382                      22.202 593,224                                5,957,213$             
2014 Project 27,649                      35.317 594,451                                5,969,530$             
2014 Project 20,921                      29.835 502,177                                5,042,910$             
2014 Project 16,498                      26.231 662,275                                6,650,623$             
2014 Project 17,498                      27.046 990,045                                9,942,124$             
2014 Project 11,034                      21.779 398,621                                4,002,985$             
2014 Project 9,959                         20.903 290,328                                2,915,500$             
2014 Project 5,851                         17.556 295,494                                2,967,381$             
2014 Project 10,006                      20.941 444,909                                4,467,818$             
2014 Project 18,046                      27.492 613,224                                6,158,053$             
2014 Project 13,165                      24.126 609,118                                6,116,818$             
2014 Project 11,519                      23.386 393,627                                3,952,837$             
2014 Project 7,197                         19.864 443,076                                4,449,413$             
2014 Project 2,968                         16.418 348,818                                3,502,859$             
Remaining 2014 0 14.000 1,616,961                             16,237,669$           
2015 0 14.000 6,147,378                             59,818,337$           
TOTAL TIME COST = 622,724,360$         
LAG 5 YEARS 2014 DEARBORN SUBWAY RENOVATION,
 WITH 33% SLOW ZONES STARTING DECEMBER 2009, 
7% INCREASE PASSENGER DEMAND STARTING 2013
TIME PERIOD
DISCOUNTED 
COST OF TIME
% SLOW ZONE
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Annex 6. Cost in time (in hours and based on an $11.95/hour) due to a lag time of 
five years, and an increase in slow zones to 45% starting in 2013, during the 
Dearborn renovation period and for the years following project completion.   
Shaded dates indicate the time period when the project took place. 
 
 
 
 
WEEKDAY SATURDAY SUNDAY
82500 34599 24821
RE-SCALED TIME FOR 
ONE-WAY TRIP
TOTAL PASSENGER TIME 
FOR ONE-WAY TRIP
(MINUTES) (HOURS)
April 1 - December 31, 2009 3,107                         15.788 4,200,258                             49,374,034$           
December 1-31, 2009 15,120                      22.700 807,800                                9,495,685$             
2010 15,120                      22.700 9,315,334                             106,106,346$         
2011 15,120                      22.700 9,297,211                             102,616,205$         
2012 15,120                      22.700 9,324,724                             99,728,557$           
2013 20,618                      25.863 10,624,261                          110,103,867$         
2014 Project 6,483                         17.191 358,362                                3,598,705$             
2014 Project 12,382                      22.202 554,415                                5,567,483$             
2014 Project 27,649                      35.317 555,561                                5,578,995$             
2014 Project 20,921                      29.835 469,324                                4,712,995$             
2014 Project 16,498                      26.231 618,948                                6,215,529$             
2014 Project 17,498                      27.046 925,275                                9,291,696$             
2014 Project 11,034                      21.779 372,542                                3,741,104$             
2014 Project 9,959                         20.903 271,334                                2,724,763$             
2014 Project 5,851                         17.556 276,163                                2,773,250$             
2014 Project 10,006                      20.941 415,803                                4,175,527$             
2014 Project 18,046                      27.492 573,106                                5,755,183$             
2014 Project 13,165                      24.126 569,269                                5,716,646$             
2014 Project 11,519                      23.386 367,875                                3,694,237$             
2014 Project 7,197                         19.864 414,090                                4,158,325$             
2014 Project 2,968                         16.418 325,998                                3,273,698$             
Remaining 2014 0 14.000 1,511,177                             15,175,375$           
2015 0 14.000 5,745,207                             55,904,929$           
TOTAL TIME COST = 619,483,132$         
LAG 5 YEARS 2014 DEARBORN SUBWAY RENOVATION,
 WITH 33% SLOW ZONES STARTING DECEMBER 2009,
NUMBER OF PASSENGERS/DAY BASED ON CTA RIDERSHIP REPORT
45% SLOW ZONES STARTING 2013
TIME PERIOD
DISCOUNTED 
COST OF TIME
% SLOW ZONE
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Chapter 6. Energy and Environment   
Appendix A 
Chicago ARRA Project Summary - Environment and Energy Project 
 
 ** All $ amounts stated in million  
- 
Low Income 
Weatherization 
Program 
Chicago Area 
Alternative Fuels 
Deployment 
Chicago Energy 
and Efficiency 
Project 
Chicago Region 
Retrofit Ramp-
Up (CR3) 
Energy Efficient 
Appliance Rebate 
Program (EEARP) 
Local Energy 
Assurance 
Plan (LEAP) 
Chicago 
Clean Diesel 
Green House 
Gas 
Reduction 
Restoring 
Chicago's Jobs 
& Habitats 
Total 
Grant 
Home 
Weatherization 
Assistance Program 
(DOE) 
Clean Cities 
Recovery Act 
Award 
Energy Efficiency 
and Conservation 
Block Grant 
(EECBG) 
Energy Efficiency 
and Conservation 
Block Grant 
(EECBG) 
Energy Efficient 
Appliance Rebate 
Program 
Local Energy 
Assurance Plan 
Grant 
National Clean 
Diesel 
Program 
DOT Grant DOA Grant 
- 
Funding Agency Department of 
Energy (DOE) 
Department of 
Energy (DOE) 
Department of 
Energy (DOE) 
Department of 
Energy (DOE) 
Department of 
Energy (DOE) 
Department of 
Energy (DOE) 
Environment 
Protection 
Agency (EPA) 
Department of 
Transportation 
(DOT) 
Department of 
Agriculture 
(DOA) - 
Administrating 
Agency 
Community 
Economic 
Development 
Association (CEDA) 
Department of 
Environment, City 
of Chicago City of Chicago 
Chicago 
Metropolitan 
Agency for 
Planning (CMAP) 
Midwest Energy 
Efficiency Alliance 
(MEEA) City of Chicago City of Chicago 
Chicago Transit 
Authority 
Green Corps 
Chicago-
Calumet - 
ARRA Funding   $90.00   $15.00   $27.60   $25.00   $12.40  $0.3 $1 $1.5 $1.07 $173.87 
Project Cost   $38.50   $4.00   N/A   N/A   N/A   N/A   N/A   N/A   N/A  $42.5 
Total Net 
Present 
Benefit (NPV)  $106.6   $13.1   N/A   N/A   N/A   N/A   N/A   N/A   N/A  $119.7 
Net Benefit   $68.1   $9.1  N/A   N/A   N/A   N/A   N/A   N/A   N/A  $77.2 
Cost Benefit 
Ratio  2.75   3.28   N/A   N/A   N/A   N/A   N/A   N/A   N/A  2.81 
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Appendix B 
Environmental Cost – Carbon Price 
 
Two methods for calculating the environmental benefits of home weatherization were 
contemplated for this study.  The first was to follow the strict market priced approach of 
carbon.  This requires determining the amount of carbon reduced per weatherization 
activities measured in per tonnage, and pricing this carbon based on the current carbon 
markets.  The Illinois Department of Commerce and Economic Opportunity estimated 
that a newly weatherized home would reduce carbon emissions by an average of 2.65 
metric tons.  Unfortunately, a robust market for carbon emissions does not exist in the US 
as of today, limiting the ability to set a specific price for carbon in tis local context.  
However, several European nations have taken steps to move toward a system that taxes 
carbon output.  In addition, several economic studies have provided estimates for what 
they believe the price of carbon would be if a carbon market were to be established in the 
US.  These estimates range from $15-30 per ton, with most reports ranging from $20-$25 
per metric ton.  Point Carbon, an environmental and energy market research subsidiary of 
Thomson Reuters, estimates that if the Kerry-Lieberman Carbon bill every passes 
Congress, the price of carbon would average $26 per metric tons between 2013-2020.  
Using this estimate, we can derive a financial savings of $69 per year, or $1013 over the 
20 year lifespan. 
 
However, carbon reduction is not the only pollutant reduced after the weatherization of a 
home.  Carbon Monoxide, Methane, Sulfer Oxides, and Particulate Matter are additional 
pollutants that are all lowered by reduced energy use in a home (seen in table below).  
The DOE report also uses a market valuation approach for their carbon valuation, but 
also takes these additional pollutants into account in their environmental benefit valuation 
calculations with estimate of $1086 over 20 years – only slightly higher than the carbon 
only estimate used above.  This is most likely due to the use of a lower market price for 
carbon in the DOE estimate. 
 
In an effort to remain consistent across program analysis, it was decided to use the 
standard market valuation method of carbon reduction to capture environmental benefits 
in our calculations.  Given the more robust coverage of also including reductions in 
oxides, methane, and particular matter captured in the DOE study, the exclusion of these 
other emission reductions does result in a slightly lower benefit in our measurement.  
Nevertheless, given both methods provide similar NPV estimates; we feel the benefits of 
consistency across programs provides justification for the use of the solely carbon 
reduction and market valuation method described above.  
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Appendix C 
Estimated Station Network Benefits – 10 YR Outlook, 3.2% Discount Rate, 2009 Dollars 
Social Benefit of Increased Alternative Fuel Vehicle Adoption Resulting from Increased 
Refueling Station Network - Sensitivity Analysis 
 Status Quo 
Benefits 
Increased Alternative Fuel Car Adoption 
 10% 25% 35% 
Annual Growth Rate  
(rate of increased AF Vehicle adoption) - 0.96% 2.26% 3.05% 
Direct Fuel Saving Benefits $12,353,100 $13,588,410 $15,441,375 $16,676,685  
CO2 Emission Reduction Benefits $766,884  $843,572  $958,605 $1,035,293  
Total Benefits $13,119,984  $14,431,982 $16,399,980 $17,711,978 
          
Estimated Additional Benefit from 
Increased Refueling Network - $1,311,998 $3,279,996 $4,591,994  
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